
A Global Climate Regime—Mission Impossible?

Helge Ole Bergesen

The year 1994 brought an addition to the already large collection of international environmental agreements when the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) came into force on 21 March. Similarly, 1995 adds a new institution to the ranks of intergovernmental bodies—the Conference of the Parties to this Convention—which meets for the first time in Berlin in March–April 1995. This ends a long period of international negotiation aimed at establishing a framework for dealing with climate change at the global level. Time is ripe, then, for an assessment of experience so far and future options.

Such an evaluation should build upon a proper understanding not only of the subject-matter at hand—the complexities of climate change issues—but also of the relations between policy and behaviour at the national and international levels. I begin with a brief account of the volatile nature of this issue-area and the consequent barriers to political interference. Secondly, I will present a simplified model of environmental policy-making and behaviour, with a focus on the interface between national and international processes. On this basis, I seek to answer the questions: what is a realistic level of ambition for a global climate regime, and how can it be achieved within a reasonable time-frame? What are the most promising avenues for the turn of the century, and what are the probable dead ends for international collaboration in this field?

The Nature of the Problem

Several empirical studies have demonstrated that the development of international environmental diplomacy is largely conditioned, not by the goodwill of governments or concerned citizens, but by the structure of the matter at hand.¹ Effective political intervention, whether at the global or the national level, requires (1) a well-founded scientific identification of the problem in ecological terms and a reliable assessment of the basic cause-and-effect relations; (2) a credible understanding of the relationship between the issue at hand, as defined by natural science, and human behaviour; and (3) a reasonable set of assumptions about how societal measures can influence the latter in the desired direction. In addition, matters are made easier if those

who are affected by the problem have a corresponding interest in its solution.

For decades now, climate scientists have been struggling with their part of the problem; since 1988 within the framework of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) established by UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization.² Despite considerable progress in identifying the mechanisms and sources behind the accumulation of greenhouse gases,³ large gaps remain in the understanding of impacts on natural systems in different parts of the world. So, precondition 1 above is met only partly, and the rest of the story is even less encouraging: While we do know in general terms what kind of human behaviour is linked to climate change—especially emissions of carbon dioxide—we have little but guesswork as to how it can be affected by political action. What we know for sure is that climate change—if it is real—will be the result of millions of large and small actions taken across the world over a long period, and the impacts, whatever they might be, will become apparent only years later—decades, if not centuries. The critical question is whether the underlying decisions by millions of people possibly leading to climate change can be brought under social control: do the basic political and economic problems simply escape intervention by governments or other public agents? I do not purport to have a definite answer to this. Indeed, the question is primarily meant to indicate the approach to the politics of climate change which I have chosen to pursue in this article.

Dealing with Climate Change at the National Level

Innumerable analyses, reports, and seminars have in recent years been devoted to *how* governments can best exert influence on large and small decision-makers so as to avoid a continuation of the trends that might lead to uncontrollable man-made climate change. Despite the remaining gaps in scientific knowledge, we know fairly well which direction we should aim for if the IPCC consensus is not completely off the mark. We—that is, well-informed governments and citizens—know quite well what kind of action to *avoid* at both the macro and micro level. The problem is *how* to avoid it.

In principle, public agencies can choose from a menu consisting of four clusters of policy measures:

- information, encouragement, and persuasion;
- regulation;
- economic incentives;
- research and development.

In debates over climate policy, the discussion seems to have come full circle. It started in many countries with the well-established instruments of environmental policy as developed in the 1970s and 1980s, with a focus on command and control, to varying degrees supported by information campaigns and public research funding. At the insistence of the entire profession of economists, the focus was soon redirected from such dated, ineffective measures and towards economic instruments instead. But as governments have recently experienced the practical barriers to such policies, whatever their academic merits, we now see a return to voluntary agreements, often combined with the veiled threat of old-fashioned regulation. It takes little imagination to foresee that within a few years the emphasis on voluntarism and persuasion, backed by command measures, will have exhausted its potential, and economic incentives will again take front stage. As in other walks of life, fashions come and go, but always with some new twist. Each new trend is different, but clearly recognizable to the observer with a memory longer than the fashion-makers.

This continuous search for viable policies, as witnessed throughout the OECD area in the 1990s, underscores the intrinsic difficulties of the climate issue: it is hard to find proper motivation for the necessary measures, as the benefits to be reaped are long-term and diffuse. It is even harder to identify a constituency promoting a 'climate policy'—normally a prerequisite for government action in democratic societies. It is not, however, difficult to identify the opponents to climate measures, who range from fossil-fuel producers and energy-intensive industries to ordinary motorists. In addition, anything resembling a coherent 'climate policy' would have to cut across well-established boundaries of authority among public agencies, which is bound to meet fierce resistance from the vested interests involved.⁴

If political intervention is difficult, apparently intractable, at the domestic level, what can we expect beyond that? The facile conclusion would be that meaningful action at the international level is inconceivable, given this state of affairs. That would be self-defeating, since national measures, even for the largest countries, can be meaningful only if other governments also take appropriate action. Hence the dual difficulty: fragile, dithering measures at the domestic level must somehow be co-ordinated internationally if they are to make any sense in relation to the assumed collective problem.

Table 1. International collaboration in environmental issue areas

	Acid rain	Ozone depletion	Climate change
Early warning	late 1960s/ early 1980s	1974–	early 1970s–
Scientific assessment	EMEP 1978–	CCOL 1977–	IPCC 1988–
Intergovernmental negotiations	ECE 1978–	UNEP 1981–	INC 1990–
Framework convention	LRTAP	Vienna	FCCC
Signed	1979	1985	1992
Into force	1983	1988	1994
Protocol	SO ₂ NO _x	Montreal	
Signed	1985 1988	1987	
Into force	1987 1991	1989	
Amendment/revision			
Signed	1994	1990	
Into force		1992	
Amendment/revision			
Signed		1992	
Into force			

Source: Compiled from (1994) *Green Globe Yearbook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), and other sources.

An Emerging Climate Regime?

International environmental relations within a given issue-area seem to pass through certain stages. In the first phase, early-warning signals appear in the form of alarming reports from individual scientists, which will often be neglected or refuted by others, equally reputable. For the general public and politicians alike the situation is confusing. If the scientific debate continues to produce evidence or serious indications of environmental risk, arousing media attention, at least some governments will feel obliged to act, which in turn brings the process to the second stage: the organized scientific assessment initiated by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) or a group of states. If this leads to the conclusion that international action is required to deal with the problem, the governments concerned can hardly avoid the next step—the tortuous process of negotiating a suitable international agreement. In recent years this has normally begun with a framework convention, establishing the organizational and procedural basis for consequent protocols with targets and commitments.

Table 1 shows how international collaboration in the issue-areas of acid rain (largely in Europe), ozone depletion, and climate change has developed through these stages. In the first two cases, scientific discussion started in the late 1960s or early 1970s, but serious political bargaining did not get off the ground until a decade later. It was not until the mid-1980s that intergovernmental negotiations began to produce tangible results in the form of protocols with verifiable commitments. Since 1985, when the sulphur dioxide protocol and the Vienna Framework Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer were signed, progress has been remarkably swift compared with the previous ten years. This wave of international environmentalism reached its peak by the early 1990s, at the same time as IPCC published its first landmark assessment of climate change.⁵ In my judgement, this timing goes a long way to explain how the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change could be negotiated within a year-and-a-half and enter into force less than two years thereafter. For a global agreement with such wide-ranging implications, such an astounding pace can hardly be accounted for by governmental interest in this issue as such.⁶ The rapid progress is more likely a by-product of the green beauty contest among political leaders that developed around the Rio Conference in 1992. No government has wanted to be branded an environmental laggard in the run-up to this mega-media event.

The question now facing the governments that have signed the Convention is whether this interest is declining so fast as to erode the basis for meaningful international collaboration. The year 1995 is a critical juncture for the infant world-climate regime: It has a legal basis with impressive adherence among states (ninety ratifications by the

end of August 1994). It has a long-term objective, to prevent dangerous man-made interference with the global climate, as well as a short-term commitment by the OECD countries to stabilize emissions by the year 2000. However, it is widely recognized that these commitments are insufficient and that the regime must make considerable progress in both substantive and procedural terms, if it is not to be relegated to the ranks of the paper tigers of environmental diplomacy. This brings us to the questions, how can international collaboration in a complex field like this influence behaviour at the national and sub-national level?⁷

A Model of Environmental Policy-Making

In order to answer this, we need to know how decisions on environmental matters are normally formulated and executed in open societies.⁸

I would identify three main driving forces. First, *popular concern*: if voters don't care about the environment, governments certainly won't. Secondly, experience since the mid-1980s has shown that particular *events* have been decisive in shaping both public opinion and political response. Suffice it to mention accidents like Chernobyl and Exxon Valdez—without them, current environmentalism would probably have been much less of a political force. And thirdly, *science* has been crucial in focusing attention on specific environmental issues. Indeed, in all the three issue-areas mentioned above—acid rain, ozone depletion, and climate change—the political process at both the national and the international level has been driven primarily by science, often by scientific assumptions and forecasts of a problem to come.

Concern, events, and science are the motors that drive the environmental policy process—the continuous bargaining over objectives, measures, and concrete decisions among public agencies, political parties, interest groups, and NGOs. This takes place within and outside governments and parliaments, always aimed at influencing public policy either in the environmental field itself or in other areas with ecological consequences, such as energy. This 'machinery' produces domestic policies intended to solve or at least affect specific real-life problems, like emissions of greenhouse gases, as well as national positions in the intergovernmental arena. If the bargaining among governments is successful, common understanding or an international regime will gradually develop. This may be formalized in a convention and an IGO, or may be less structured; the purpose is in any case to influence behaviour of relevance to the given problem *at the national level*. This critical relationship can work through various connections—whether the long way through science or concern or directly via the domestic policy process. Either way, objectives or targets agreed to at the international




Fig. 1. IGO functions in the field of the environment

(Source: adapted from Helge Ole Bergesen, Norms Count, But Power Decides, Lysaker: The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 1985.)

level must somehow be translated into national policies and action, which will normally give ample room for discretion, manoeuvre, and bargaining. This outcome will in turn feed back into the IGO process, as compliance or non-compliance with the regime. If verification is possible, it will in due time affect the national policy process. This continuous interaction between the national and international level is the core of greenhouse politics, as in many other fields of international collaboration. At best it is constructive and dynamic, at worst a mere paper exercise, highly dependent on the tasks performed within the IGO arena.

IGO Functions

An intergovernmental organization can have a variety of functions vis-à-vis the participating states.⁹ In its simplest form an IGO is merely a forum for discussion among state representatives. But even this apparently technical task can have the effect of setting an environmental issue on the agenda for governments, forcing them to consider the subject-matter.¹⁰ If the issue is sensitive or controversial, this *arena function* may well develop into a forum for regular manifestation of conflict. UN discussions of population issues comes to mind. The large and small gatherings since the first World Population Conference in 1974 do not seem to have fostered mutual understanding, but have rather reinforced reciprocal resentment over the matters involved.

In the environmental field, however, we have several cases where discussions have led to common concern among most, if not all, participating states.¹¹ This is normally the starting point for climbing the

ladder of ever-more ambitious IGO functions, as illustrated in Figure 1. The first step on the way upwards includes mutual learning and developing a joint scientific and technical understanding of the issues. The importance of these functions can be clearly seen from the development of European bargaining over acid rain in the 1970s and 1980s. As long as scientists openly disagreed on the major issues, there was little governments could do. By contrast, in the ozone negotiations a tight network of experts gradually developed a joint understanding of the nature and magnitude of the problem, which formed the basis for subsequent political deals.

A common scientific basis is a necessary but not sufficient condition for further progress. Once the underlying issues are reasonably well understood, politics takes over, as governments face the question of distribution of costs and benefits. They also have to figure out the best combination of measures to combat the problem identified by scientists. If they agree, the IGO is used for creating norms of behaviour, in the form of general objectives like 'stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'.¹² Such normative accord will often be supported by promotion activities, like training of national experts, and assistance to reluctant parties to strengthen their capacity to deal with the issue.

The process goes a vital step further when (or if) the principles are translated into standards or targets against which national performance can be measured and verified. This is the key distinction from objectives, which are usually

too vague for anybody to tell the difference between compliance and non-compliance. The change from the Vienna Framework Convention on Protection of the Ozone Layer to the Montreal Protocol with amendments illustrates the point: the latter contains commitments to which the participating states can be held accountable, the former does not.

But formulating verifiable targets or standards for national action does not in itself touch on the delicate issue of monitoring, which is the next step on the ladder. It is possible, indeed not uncommon, in international affairs simply to leave implementation to individual governments, relying on their goodwill. In the environmental field, with its persistent free-rider problems, states will hesitate to take costly action on their own unless they can be reassured that others will follow up on their part of the deal.¹³ Thus, targets will often have scant importance unless a reliable monitoring function is performed within the same IGO. The least controversial option here is also the most common—intergovernmental review of national reports: governments describe what measures they have taken to fulfil their obligations, and submit their self-assessment to the others. This can have a certain deterrent effect in the sense that the responsible national agencies will have in mind the duty to report when formulating national policies. But self-reporting will not necessarily lead to a clear-cut distinction between compliance and non-compliance. Governments as represented by diplomats tend to be too polite to draw such unambiguous and uncomfortable conclusions.

The next monitoring option is, however, explicitly designed to verify the contents of national reports: through the relevant IGO, governments authorize an expert body to scrutinize the material submitted by the participating states and publish its findings, according to a specific set of procedures.

Investigation is even more drastic. An independent body can in this case, on its own initiative, or following a complaint, ask a participating government for information on a particular case falling within the scope of the agreement.

Adjudication implies a litigation-like procedure, where a body under the IGO makes a ruling on a particular case involving alleged violations of rules or standards. This function resembles that of national courts and is therefore a rare commodity in international relations, but the International Labour Organization (ILO) has made very interesting experience in this direction.

Once such a ruling has been made, the question of enforcement comes to the fore: how to deal with violators once their non-compliance has been demonstrated? Even if trade sanctions have been incorporated in a few recent environmental agreements, notably the Montreal Protocol, the primary method of enforcement in the international system remains a combination of persuasion

and publicity. How effective this will be depends on the domestic context within the country in question, which brings us back to the link between the national and the international level.

Feedback to National Policy-Making

As an international regime develops up the ladder of IGO functions, the potential for feedback to the domestic level changes dramatically. As noted above, the fundamental driving forces behind environmental policy are located primarily within national boundaries. This is the case today and will, in my judgement, remain so for the foreseeable future. In the absence of a domestic constituency, negative feedback in the form of critical remarks on dubious compliance or negative publicity will have no significant effect, unless the outside world is willing to resort to strong coercive measures, like trade sanctions. And experience has shown that even this may not work if the other party is intransigent enough.

Hence the importance of the links to domestic politics: the first of them concerns the 'science' element in the national context. As many scientific efforts concerning the environment are international, the relation to the outside world will often be visible from the first discussions of an issue. However, an international assessment process, like IPCC, will strengthen the scientific capability in the participating countries and thereby probably enhance the standing and independence of scientists in the domestic arena.

Secondly, formulating objectives, standards, or targets at the international level will, in a similar way, improve the credibility and position of those domestic actors who have argued for such purposes, like environmental NGOs. It will also strengthen the hand of the political parties most sympathetic to green issues. This tendency will be further reinforced if the monitoring function of the IGO acquires more teeth than standard self-reporting. The more likely that a government will be exposed to a critical scrutiny, the more likely that it will pay close attention to its performance.¹⁴ If NGOs are entitled to file complaints against governments, the risk of exposure increases manifold.

Implications for the Climate Convention

It then follows that if the nascent global climate regime is to have an impact not only on the itinerary of diplomats and government experts, but also on substance—the ever-increasing emissions of greenhouse gases—the critical question is: how can the regime be designed and developed to give maximum constructive feedback to the domestic policy process, in Western, ex-communist, and developing

countries? On the basis of the analysis of the transnational links, I will offer five suggestions.

1. Targets Are Essential, Not Protocols

If the climate convention is to develop beyond an organizational framework, it must be extended from general objectives to normative standards against which future behaviour can be evaluated. The current commitments contained in its Article 4.2(a) suffer from serious flaws.¹⁵ They are open to diverging interpretations; most importantly, they do not go beyond the year 2000, where most of the real challenges lie. The present decade is an inappropriate time-frame for any meaningful climate policy.

As this is widely recognized, considerable attention since the Convention was signed in Rio in 1992 has focused on the form and content of future commitments.¹⁶ Many OECD governments have adopted national objectives or targets, more or less specific, more or less conditional, but most of them hesitate to announce verifiable targets and supporting policies because they are sceptical of domestic political and economic costs, and because they are uncertain whether others will follow suit.¹⁷ Here we see a classic free-rider problem, to which the standard reaction in environmental diplomacy is to call for a legally binding protocol. Whether such negotiations are confined to separate gases or sinks or are more comprehensive in character, they will be extremely time-consuming, with the final outcome highly uncertain.

In my view, the question is not how to design negotiations on a follow-up protocol to the framework convention, but whether this is the best approach to formulating more tangible commitments. The alternative way is for governments to record in political statements their national targets and on this basis encourage an open-minded discussion of adequacy. If backed by national NGOs, this might over time develop into a core of commitments by, hopefully, most OECD governments, consisting of targets and standards with substantive contents. These could include reduction targets for particular emissions, or a national aggregate, quantified objectives for expanding renewable energy supplies, or energy-efficiency goals, defined in a meaningful, measurable way. Initially, commitments would probably vary considerably from one government to the next, as they do today, but if the domestic process works properly the laggards might feel the pressure over time to keep up with the front-runners. This presumes that environmental concern does not decline significantly, but if it does, there is little to be done on the international arena anyway.

The advantage with this approach, often referred to as 'pledge and review' among negotiators, is that it manages to circumvent all the legal technicalities of ratification and entry into force. More importantly, it deprives the vocal anti-environmental minority,

primarily the OPEC governments, of their veto power and most of their formal influence. If formal negotiations on a protocol are opened, however designed, these procrastinators will have all the opportunities they need to tie down the political energy of other governments in endless bargaining sessions with a highly uncertain outcome. Why give them that chance?

2. Voluntary Monitoring For a Start

Targets and standards must be followed by monitoring, if the feedback to the domestic arena is to work properly. If a government can just state an objective, subsequently announce its own impeccable performance, and get away with it, nothing is gained. However, developing formal procedures with legally binding force will be highly controversial and extremely cumbersome. Any review procedure that goes beyond national self-reporting is bound to meet vehement opposition from governments preoccupied with preserving their national sovereignty. Again, an informal, voluntary approach is the best way to get around such hard political sentiments. There is nothing to prevent OECD governments from suggesting and funding, on an interim basis to gain experience, a monitoring procedure that includes independent scrutiny. If they are really concerned about free-rider problems, this would be in their own best interest. The more transparent the monitoring, the easier to uncover cheating on national commitments. An open, rational process with adequate independent expertise, NGO participation, and even public hearings would act as a powerful deterrent against possible free-riders. Once a government has recorded its commitment, it does not want to be embarrassed in the subsequent monitoring phase, for fear of its own reputation and a political backlash at home. Western governments have experience with performance review within the OECD, but this suggestion goes further in two ways: monitoring activities are explicitly linked to a national target or commitment, and they will be far more transparent. Governments would have to answer to difficult questions in public, not behind closed doors, and independent assessments would be published without prior consent from the government in question.

If OECD governments initiate a monitoring process of this kind, which could very well begin in 1995, the sensibilities of their developing-country counterparts can be put aside for some time. Under the terms of the Convention, they do not have to submit reports until 1997 and can therefore, from the outset, participate as observers in the review procedures. Hopefully they will learn that this is not necessarily an adversarial exercise, but that it can contribute to mutual learning. Let us likewise hope that Southern NGOs will see the value of such open procedures and, over time, work to persuade their governments that this is the only way

to avoid cheating, given the structure of the international society.

3. Joint Implementation on Experimental Basis

Another controversial issue within the Convention is whether states can fulfil their commitments through joint action. Some Western governments see this as a promising option, to cut costs and (though it is never publicly admitted) avert domestic barriers. Third World representatives are sceptical, arguing that joint implementation could relieve the pressures for structural change in the West, and fearing that Western governments or companies could hoard the cheapest reduction options in the South at little expense. While the theoretical attractions are indisputable and have been documented in numerous studies,¹⁸ the practical and institutional obstacles to such a system remain formidable.¹⁹ In my view, the institutional setting is not yet ripe for joint implementation, including *emission credits*, apart from within the European Union. Opening negotiations in 1995 on a regime of this kind could very well prove premature. It will require much more confidence among the participating states and more institutional experience in joint problem-solving before a sophisticated system of this kind can play a constructive role. This does not exclude experimental projects as part of the mutual learning process, which is the crux of the monitoring procedures sketched above, but the funders of such experiments in a pilot phase should take care not to preclude the outcome by calculating the credits before they have been authorized. It may take a decade or two before governments in North and South muster enough joint ambition and joint political will to permit joint implementation, without undermining the objectives of the Convention. The trouble with such schemes is not the transfer of resources or technology, but keeping track of the credits and making sure that quotas are respected. So far, governments have been very reluctant to grant IGOs such powers of supervision. Economists around the world may continue to lament the waste of resources that follows in the absence of joint implementation or emission trading; others may recognize that in the world we live in, it is often necessary to put up with third- or fourth-best solution for a long time.

4. Expanding Scientific Co-operation

One of the most promising aspects of international climate collaboration so far has been the expansion of joint scientific efforts stimulated by the IPCC. Despite its shortcomings in a bargaining context, as pointed out by Lanchbery and Victor in their contribution to this volume, the panel has played an essential role in building credibility and legitimacy for climate science around the world. A major difficulty in political terms has been the concentration of participants from Western countries, which reflects the general unequal distribution of scientific resources. In the

future it will be essential to expand and improve the technical capability of developing-country institutions, if forthcoming assessments are to gain widespread support among governments. Equally important, Southern institutions must be able to analyse the impact of climate change on their own societies, and thereby become a force to be reckoned with in the domestic policy process—on a par with the critical role often played by science in environmental discussions in the West.

5. Pragmatic Approach to North–South Tensions

The negotiations that led to the Climate Convention were marred by North–South conflicts which continue to haunt negotiators and governments alike. The Convention itself is a veritable minefield of time-bombs that can be activated at any time. Third World representatives have made it clear that the West must pay the price for climate-related measures to be taken in developing countries. Governments in the latter have not taken on any substantive obligations under the Convention, but have agreed to submit national communications of a fairly general character. The expenses involved in such an exercise are to be borne by industrialized-country governments by providing 'new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs'.²⁰ This could set a precedent for future burden-sharing, highlighting the most emotional and intractable issues on the entire North–South agenda: how to define 'additionality' in resource transfers?²¹ What is a reasonable level of development assistance from the North to the South? Such discussions could easily stall the forthcoming international climate bargaining for the rest of the 1990s—which some governments and some observers would be only too happy to see. Avoiding this will not be easy, as the preference of many Third World governments in international climate discussions has been to press the West for increased resource transfers. They perceive the vulnerability as lying on the other side, as Western opinion is concerned about environmental dangers, and do their best to take advantage of it. In reality, developing countries, in particular the poorest ones, may prove far more vulnerable to the impact of climate change—but apart from the small island countries, this has not yet had much effect on their positions.

The problem in relation to the international regime is, again, how to connect activities at the global level with the societies of the South. As long as the focus is limited to funding, governments are the sole external agents, as they will be the recipients of increasing transfers. If, however, more attention is paid to substantive action that can be taken in the Third World to constrain emissions of greenhouse gases and enhance forest cover, interesting feedbacks at the domestic level may begin to appear. If, for example, the international community made an obligation as part of a

global climate regime to support energy efficiency, renewable energy, and sustainable forestry in developing countries, then a number of actors in the Third World would become 'parties' in a real, if not legal, sense to the world-wide bargain. Funding from the West could be made increasingly available for such purposes, without touching on 'additionality'. Some LDC (least-developed country) governments would most likely raise the issue, but they would hardly veto increased funding within such a context in the absence of evidence of additionality. In exchange for such transfers, Western governments could encourage—not dictate—their Southern counterparts to draw up and submit plans for sustainable energy development and forestry, as a basis for international discussions of how external funding could yield maximum benefit at both the local and the global level. The futile effort to distinguish between the two, which has taken up so much attention in the World Bank and the Global Environment Facility, has led nowhere and is better left aside.

If this works—if some governments of developing countries can be sufficiently tempted to produce and submit such plans—the first steps towards a global monitoring system will have been taken from the South, almost inadvertently. If others follow suit, this could gradually develop into a comprehensive review based on a logical *quid pro quo*: Western governments report on their commitments, targets, and policies to reduce greenhouse emissions, while Southern states contribute plans, hopefully including targets and policies, for their energy and forestry sectors. And on both sides, NGOs and other domestic interests can use the information provided and the assessments made to influence their governments at home.

If such a regime can be established, in practice though not in legal terms, by the end of the 1990s, both governments and negotiators will have reason to be satisfied.

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7. For a broad review of current and future options, see Jill Jäger and Reinhard Loske (1994), *Options for the Further Development of the Commitments within the Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Wuppertal: Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy).
8. The following is based on empirical studies of climate policies in different OECD countries carried out by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute.
9. The following is adapted from Helge Ole Bergesen (1985), *Norms Count, But Power Decides. International Regimes—Wishful Thinking or Realities?* R:002-1985 (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute), which in turn builds on Harold Jacobson (1979), *Networks of Interdependence* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf).
10. For the importance of agenda-setting, see Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy (1993), *Institutions for the Earth* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), ch. 1.
11. Haas, Keohane, and Levy, *Institutions for the Earth* comprises several case-studies where development of common concern is a critical variable.
12. Art. 2 of the FCCC.
13. They need a proper contractual environment, in the terminology used by Haas, Keohane, and Levy.
14. The OECD performance reviews are intended to have this function. For elaboration of this and other corresponding arrangements, see Olav Schram Stokke (1993), 'Environmental Performance Review: What? Why? How?', *International Challenges*, 13: 4 (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute), 17–27.
15. 'Each of these Parties [OECD and countries in transition to a market economy] shall adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, by limiting its anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. These policies and measures will demonstrate that developed countries are taking the lead in modifying longer-term trends in anthropogenic emissions consistent with the objective of the Convention, recognizing that the return by the end of the present decade to earlier levels of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to such modification . . .'.
16. David G. Victor and Julian B. Salt (1994), 'Climate since Rio', *Environment* (Nov.), summarizes these discussions in the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee, INC.
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20. Art. 3 of the Convention.
21. Olav Kjøven and Anne Kristin Sydnæs (1992) have shown the difficulties and contradictions inherent in the concept in *Funding for the Global Environment: The Issue of Additionality*, EED:004 (Lysaker: Fridtjof Nansen Institute).