
UNDP and Global Environmental Problems:

The Need for Capacity Development at Country Level

Poul Engberg-Pedersen and Claus Hvashøj Jørgensen

What Role for UNDP?

Since the 1960s the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been central to the development activities of the United Nations system. However, the organization is still in search of a role through which it can make a real difference with the structure and resources at its disposal. In May 1996 UNDP's Executive Board adopted the following mission statement for the organization: 'UNDP's mission is to help countries in their efforts to achieve sustainable human development by assisting them to build their capacity to design and carry out development programmes in poverty eradication, employment creation and sustainable livelihoods, the empowerment of women and the protection and regeneration of the environment, giving first priority to poverty eradication.'

This is quite a task, considering that UNDP is operating in some 130 countries, with an annual budget of some \$US1.7 billion, of which less than \$1 billion are core resources at the free disposal of UNDP. In addition to the above mission, UNDP continues to have co-ordinating responsibilities within the UN at both headquarters and country levels. It could be considered a 'mission impossible', were it not for the soft concepts of 'helping and assisting countries to build their capacity'. UNDP's primary field of operation lies in the provision of technical co-operation to developing countries and countries in transition (i.e. the former centrally planned economies).

The aim of this chapter is to examine an important aspect of UNDP's role in the move towards sustainable development in developing countries. Sustainable development means improving the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting ecosystems.¹ It combines economic, social, and environmental elements² and is therefore not far from covering the entire UNDP mission. Our focus is on the following question: *What role can and should UNDP play in the international response to global environmental problems?*

Seeking an answer requires the following steps: (1) assessment of the international, UN-based response to global environmental problems, through conventions, information, and aid; (2) assessment of UNDP's role in international

development co-operation; (3) analysis of capacity requirements at country level for the implementation of international conventions on global environmental problems; (4) understanding the renewed interest in capacity for state intervention in environmental and other fields; (5) conclusions on the role for UNDP, particularly at country level.

The significance of UNDP's role in the international response to global environmental problems lies in the fact that developing-country governments are quite willing to sign and ratify international environmental agreements, but are lacking in capacity for implementation at national level. Given UNDP's decentralized structure, its institutional presence in 130 countries, its close links with recipient governments, its multisectoral mandate, and its instruments of technical co-operation, we argue for a much stronger UNDP focus on capacity development assistance to the governments of developing countries. Here, UNDP can really make a difference.

The chapter builds on two recent studies, addressing UNDP's capacity as a development organization³ and its involvement in aid for the reduction of ozone-depleting substances under the Montreal Protocol.⁴

The International Response to Global Environmental Problems

The global environmental problems traditionally referred to by the international community are global warming, biodiversity protection, ozone layer depletion, and pollution of international waters. These four problems correspond to the intervention fields of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), which is an international institution established in 1991, at the initiative of the World Bank, to promote support for global environmental protection.⁵ The control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal must be considered a fifth global environmental problem, as it passes the criterion that the major impact is found in the recipient countries and not in the country producing the hazardous waste. The problem of small particles of highly toxic persistent organic pollutants being

airborne for thousands of kilometres is an example of an emerging global environmental problem.

The international community has responded to the global environmental problems through international agreements on (national) actions to reduce the problems; through provision of information to governments, industries, and consumers; and through direct support in the form of technical assistance and project investments in individual countries. International negotiations on the significance of the problems and the means and ways to reduce them have today led to conventions⁶ on all five global environmental problems. Mobilizing the international community to support developing countries in fighting global environmental problems is obviously helped by the fact that the benefits are shared by the international community.

Concluding international agreements on environmental problems is an important first phase on the road to environmental improvements. However, two subsequent phases must be concluded successfully in order to make an impact on environmental improvement. After concluding an international agreement, the second phase is the requirement for countries to ratify the agreement through national parliaments or governments depending on the country governance specifics. National ratification brings the agreement to the third and decisive phase of in-country implementation. In each of these three phases there is scope for international community actions to secure wide participation of countries in the effort towards environmental improvement. The distinction between the three phases is important because the need for government capacity and for international assistance differs between the phases.

In the first phase of concluding the agreement, there is a need to draw the attention of countries to the environmental problem and to secure the availability of comprehensive information on the environmental problem, its potential impacts, means of mitigation, etc. There is a clear role to be played here by UN institutions such as UNEP and UNDP and the World Bank. These organizations have the best direct access to the convention or protocol secretariats and have served as liaison agents between the developing countries and the secretariats.

In the second phase of getting countries to ratify the agreement, direct assistance is needed in a number of developing countries and countries in economic transition. This assistance may comprise analysis of the possible consequences and effects of the country's ratification of the agreement (costs, benefits, burden sharing, etc.) and means of implementation at country level. Information dissemination through the international organizations as well as their direct assistance for impact and economic analysis at country level are important instruments in motivating countries to ratify the agreement.

For developing countries implementing the international agreement in the third and final phase there is often a need for assistance relating to the establishment of a cost-effective government strategy for implementation of the agreement, identification and preparation of relevant policy instruments, policy monitoring and enforcement, and investment project preparation and implementation. As the implementation phase is by far the longest and most demanding, the need for assistance from the international community is considerable, requiring the involvement of both international organizations and bilateral donors. Capacity at central-government level in developing countries to negotiate, ratify, and implement international environmental agreements is a common critical constraint which is examined below.

UNDP's Role in International Development Co-operation

UNDP's role and position have evolved in three stages, following its gradual emergence on the international scene during the 1960s.

The 1970s: A belief in central planning, co-ordination, and central funding of the UN's technical co-operation activities. In 1970 the Executive Board (then Governing Council) of UNDP agreed that voluntary contributions to the operational activities within socio-economic development of the UN proper (excluding the World Bank and the IMF) should be channelled through UNDP. Five-year country programmes agreed with each recipient government should be the central planning document for all UN assistance. UNDP's country programmes were conceived as a reference document for the aid of bilateral donors as well, in support of the recipient governments' national five-year development plans. These high ambitions failed almost completely: recipient governments preferred to use UNDP's small grant resources for technical gap-filling in a multitude of central-government departments and institutions; bilateral and other multilateral donors disregarded UNDP's country programmes because of their own vested interests (commercial and political) and because of their much larger resources; and the UN's specialized agencies (the Food and Agriculture Organization, International Labour Organization, World Health Organization, etc.) sought an independent presence in developing countries, with projects financed from extra-budgetary funds from bilateral donors.

The 1980s: 'Projectitis' in technical co-operation, migration of tasks to the World Bank, and marginalization of UNDP. The vested interests of recipient government institutions, UN agencies, bilateral donors, and UNDP departments led to projectitis, i.e. the breakdown of UNDP's individual country programmes into scores of projects, each

costing a few hundred thousand \$US, with a very brief time-frame, though still with huge project objectives. The World Bank involved itself in more and more sectors and in technical co-operation, which was meant to be a UNDP prerogative. In the heyday of structural adjustment and market reforms, UNDP's planning approach became irrelevant and the organization was marginalized in government-donor policy dialogues.⁷

The 1990s: A move towards sustainable human development, poverty, governance, and capacity development. UNDP has become more substantive during the 1990s. The work on human development has given the organization a stronger profile in the political field of global advocacy. However, the attempt to translate this into operational guidelines for a concentrated effort within capacity development for sustainable human development has so far failed for several reasons: insufficient political will in UNDP's Executive Board and management to make the necessary priorities and strategic choices; declining allocations for UN development activities; an existing UNDP staff of project administrators with limited capacity for substantive work; and continued pressures on UNDP to support everything under the sun.

UNDP stands today with a range of good policies within a very broad mission; with an obligation to respond to government requests for assistance in all sectors in all countries; with a dearth of guide-lines to operationalize UNDP's role in support of the good policies; and with human and financial resources that are inadequate for the organization to develop its expertise and to acquire a decisive role in the donor community.

Current reform efforts by a variety of stakeholders in the UN can be summarized in three groups, with views and desires comparable to the three decades described above. First, some, including UNDP's current Administrator, struggle to establish the organization as the central, co-ordinating development agency of the UN system, with leadership and co-ordination roles at headquarters in New York, and at country level in each recipient country. This desire is shared by some governments of developing countries, who prefer to retain the full control which they used to have over UNDP's country programmes. Second, others, including much of the US Congress, would be happy to see marginalization continue beyond the point of no return. Third, some donor and recipient governments, supported by UNDP staff especially at field level, aim to give the organization a focused role in a particular field of excellence within capacity development for improved national governance, which represents a continuation of the concentration trends of the early 1990s.

In relation to global environmental problems, the first-

mentioned view prefers to see UNDP in two major roles: as the international co-ordinating secretariat (pushing UNEP into the sidelines); and as an operational fund involved in investment preparation and finance. The second view emphasizes the role of the private sector, seeking to confine all multilateral organizations to facilitators and political guarantors. The third view, to which we subscribe, argues for a UNDP focus on capacity development at country level, which is both the critical weakness in current environmental management and the optimum level for an effective use of UNDP's strengths and resources.

In the late 1990s UNDP faces four dilemmas and strategic choices of significance to its very existence:

1. Government control and UN co-ordination versus concentration and excellence: UNDP must choose between a reactive, facilitating, and funding role, where individual recipient governments and global UN conferences determine, on an *ad hoc* basis, the use of UNDP's limited human and financial resources; and a pro-active role in a key field, where UNDP can make a difference and attract resources as a result of an internationally recognized excellence.

2. *Ad hoc* country support versus focus on capacity development assistance. The provision of capacity development assistance requires human expertise and institutional priority setting. This is not possible if UNDP prefers to involve itself more in directly operational activities, particularly in investment project preparation, financing, and monitoring.

3. Multisectoral coverage (poverty, employment, livelihood, empowerment, environment, etc.) versus focus on national governance and capacity. A jack of all trades is the master of none. This applies to UNDP as well. Having poverty eradication as the overriding goal is useful only if tough priorities are set for the level and instruments of intervention of UNDP. Emphasizing capacity development assistance would be a significant step towards priority setting.

4. Sustainable development versus sustainable human development versus human development. Around 1990 UNDP achieved a breakthrough when it launched the annual Human Development Reports. Following the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) and the arrival of a new Administrator, 'sustainability' was added, with a particular focus on the environment. Unfortunately, this made UNDP's focus less clear. Currently, sustainable development in all its dimensions is addressed by all development agencies, including UNDP. Hence, there is a risk that UNDP will lose its significant lead in global and national policy work on human development as originally conceived.

If UNDP is to solve these dilemmas successfully, it must first understand the need for capacity development assistance, which the governments and public sectors of developing countries will face in the years to come.⁸

Capacity Requirements in Developing Countries

In developing countries, government capacity to implement international environmental agreements is an important factor in the degree of success of these agreements. Judged from the rate of participation of developing countries in the *negotiation* of global environmental agreements, there is little evidence of a critical constraint in this field at present. *Ratification* of the agreements by developing countries is also progressing well, though some countries find this step more troublesome than the international negotiation process. *Implementation*, however, is the phase where most countries face a critical capacity constraint in government.

Part of the explanation for the easier process of negotiating and ratifying the agreements is of course that this requires little capacity in itself. International organizations such as the World Bank, UNEP, and UNDP have been quite successful facilitators of the initial phases of government accession to the agreements. This has taken place through extensive information work, liaison with governments on the topics, support for governments' participation in the international negotiations, as well as technical assistance for institutional strengthening. Box 1 provides, with the Montreal Protocol as an example, a description and assessment of typical government capacity constraints and the response of the international community.

Box 1. Government capacity constraints: The case of the Montreal Protocol

Using the developing countries' accession to and implementation of the Montreal Protocol as an example, one can identify a number of capacity constraints in government which are addressed by the international community through assistance. The efforts of UNEP, the World Bank, UNDP, and a few bilateral donors (providing information on the ozone layer problem, support for developing countries' participation in meetings of the Parties of the Protocol, and technical assistance to the preparation of country programmes for the implementation of the Protocol) have enabled the Protocol to record an ever-increasing number of developing country Parties. The existence of a financial support instrument under the Protocol, the attractiveness for developing-country governments of international meetings, and the relatively lax obligations of developing countries under the Protocol for quite a number of years are likely to be important factors behind this success.

For the implementation phase, developing countries are supported by the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol. The World Bank, UNDP, UNEP, and UNIDO provide support for information activities, institutional strengthening, preparation of country programmes, and preparation and implementation of investment projects. The World Bank has engaged in most types of intervention means of the Financial Mechanism with an emphasis on larger countries. UNDP has a relatively more specialized intervention portfolio dominated by investment project preparation and implementation in certain sectors. Information activities, institutional strengthening, and preparation of country programmes have dominated UNEP's Montreal Protocol efforts.

During a decade of Montreal Protocol implementation the major weaknesses of the capacity development efforts have been:

- the lack of continuity of interventions; capacity development requires sustained efforts over a relatively long period;
- the parachuted project identification mechanism used by donor and UN organizations, where countries are often only marginally involved;
- the bias towards hardware in the institutional strengthening projects ignoring most training and other human resource dimensions;
- levels of funding that are too low for capacity development for preparation by organizations for country programmes; and too little attention paid to capacity development for establishing an in-country environmental control regime with regulatory instruments, implementation, monitoring, and enforcement arrangements

The global environmental problems require national capacity for environmental management at *three levels*. The first level comprises the setting of political priorities on the development of the national economy and society. This requires capacity for analysis and public debate on the direction of development sought by various interest groups, political parties, and individuals. The definition of the agenda of environmental problems and the setting of priorities on sustainable development include decisions on how to manage the country's contribution to global environmental problems. This is a prerequisite for the countries to get to the stage of negotiating international environmental agreements. The second level of capacity requirements concerns the ability of the government to control the environmental behaviour of the agents of the economy through public interventions.

The government must have the legitimacy to implement a regulatory regime controlling the environmental externalities of economic agents. At the third level, governments must have the administrative and technical capacity to ensure support for the first level of policy direction, and the second level of policy instrument definition and intervention, and finally the administrative and technical capacity to identify and implement relevant investment programmes for environmental management.

The environmental management tasks differ between the levels. At the first level of policy priorities, government institutions must be able to prepare, support, and participate in assessments and dialogues on the extent of local, regional, and global environmental problems and the need to allocate resources for the country's contribution to their mitigation. At the second level of policy instrument definition and implementation the environmental management tasks are to establish the legal and administrative framework, laws, and directives that constitute an environmental regulatory regime. The government must have capacity (powers, resources, and legitimacy) to ensure compliance through enforcement of policy instruments, whether these are of the command and control type or are economic instruments correcting the incentive structures of the economy. At the third level of administrative and technical capacity, the environmental management tasks include compilation of basic data on the magnitude of the environmental problem and on the responsible agents, analysing technical and economic consequences of alternative levels of control, identifying alternative policy instruments, and analysing their technical, economic, and institutional pros and cons. Furthermore, administrative and technical capacity is needed to support the implementation of environmental improvement projects by public or private institutions and enterprises.

The recent emergence of environmental concerns in developing-country governments⁹ and the continued low priority attached to environmental administration in these governments obviously result in a very limited capacity for government intervention in and for the environment. In many countries, this capacity was further restrained over the past decade by the general liberalization and reorientation of the economy away from central planning. In a market economy, the means of environmental intervention are complex, ranging from information dissemination and dialogue between government and industry to direct production commands in the form of technology standards and economic instruments creating an environmentally conducive incentives structure for industry and consumers.

Government Capacity for State Intervention

The question of capacity in developing countries for environmental management must be related to the much broader question about the role and capacity of the state in developing countries. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has recently presented *capacity development* as a new paradigm in development theory: 'The new framework puts capacity development at all levels—national, regional, local and individual—at the centre of development policy.'¹⁰

Following the triumphs of market forces in the 1980s, supported by the liberalization and structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank, interest in the state has revived in the 1990s.¹¹ There are four basic reasons for this: firstly, the need to control environmental and social externalities, i.e. the negative effects of market-based growth including greater inequality and a higher number of losers in the free play of market forces; secondly, the need to attack persistent poverty in developing countries and the continued marginalization of large regions, including most of sub-Saharan Africa; thirdly, the realization that the 'supply response', which market proponents expected from structural adjustment programmes, did not materialize in many low-income countries; fourthly, the related realization that structural adjustment led to undermining of state capacity through fiscal austerity measures, unadapted modernization programmes, and too rapid privatization programmes in situations where there is no private sector to take over.

Thus, the 'Washington consensus' recognizes the need for a capable state to maintain macro-economic balances; develop human resources; build and monitor public infrastructure; provide a social safety net; establish an accountable political regime; guarantee the rule of law; and control environmental externalities.¹² In its assessment of the economies and public policy in East Asia,¹³ the World Bank praised the importance of good public policy, good institutions, and good leadership in the promotion and achievement of economic growth. However, this goes hand in hand with continued World Bank priorities for liberalization and privatization of public functions, including transfer of the provision of public services to civil society, the private sector, and beneficiaries themselves.

This is significant for UNDP's future role in capacity development assistance, because there are structural and ideological limits to the approach of the World Bank and other key donors to state development. The analysis and policy prescriptions offered by the Bank are deficient in two key respects. Firstly, they fail to understand and support the impact of state actions on the direction of societal change, related to the structure of the economy, the form and pace of technological development, and the social norms and identities of the people. Secondly, they offer the perspective

of managers, neglecting the role of politics, blaming politicians for all evils, and trying to insulate 'good government' from political priority-setting processes.¹⁴

In concrete situations, it is often possible to agree with this World Bank approach, which does take significant aspects of national institutional capacity seriously. However, three elements must be added for capacity development to be as effective as argued by UNDP, OECD, and others. Firstly, the capacity of the national political system to debate and set political priorities on sustainable development has hitherto been excluded through a simplistic reference to 'government commitment', although this difficult and sensitive field involves the state, central and local government, and the institutions of civil society. Secondly, individual public institutions have a key role in the promotion of sustainable development, especially as governments move from central planning and control to agenda setting and incentives. The capacity of public institutions should be developed as political agents, not in isolation from national politics. Thirdly, the synergy between public and private institutions should be exploited to empower the intended beneficiaries, not just to secure implementation of programmes agreed between donors and governments. Fundamentally, capacity development must recognize that national and local ownership by capable institutions may lead to local priorities that differ from those of the international partners.

The importance for UNDP is that its structure (offices in 130 countries), its means of co-operation (technical assistance for capacity development), and its mandate and ideologies (capacity development for sustainable human development) can provide the organization with a critical role related to the political elements of capacity development that are avoided—and sometimes attacked—by the World Bank and many bilateral donors for ideological and pragmatic reasons.

The Role for UNDP

The analysis of the capacity requirements for the management of global environmental problems in developing countries leads to three critical findings on the future role for UNDP in international development co-operation. Firstly, UNDP's mandate, structure, resources, and means of intervention provide the organization with a strong potential within capacity development assistance to central government, where the national management of global environmental problems is seen as an element in the move towards sustainable development of the national economy and society. Secondly, in the balance between international and country-level work on global environmental problems, UNDP can and should concentrate on the national level, where the governments lack capacity to implement the

international agreements which they have negotiated and ratified.

Finally, in relation to the three levels of capacity needed for national management of global environmental problems (political priority setting; policy intervention; and administrative and technical implementation), UNDP is well placed to assist with capacity development at all three levels; UNEP is largely confined to the first level for structural reasons, and the World Bank has its strengths at the second and third levels for ideological and structural reasons. Thus, UNEP lacks an institutional and financial presence in developing countries, which limits its activities at the first level to information dissemination aimed at increasing government awareness. The World Bank has contributed to the increased awareness of environmental problems, but it stops short of understanding and supporting political priority-setting processes. The Bank's increased attention to environmental problems is the result of external pressure, not of national political processes.

As regards UNDP, these findings fit well with the recommendations of the recent report *Assessment of UNDP: Developing Capacity for Sustainable Human Development*, on the future roles and priorities of the organization. UNDP has an important policy role, based on its global and country-level human development analyses. In this field of low-cost, high-leverage impact, the 1990s have seen a breakthrough for UNDP which can and should be sustained. In relation to the management of environmental problems, UNDP should not, however, acquire a role primarily through the addition of the word 'sustainable' to the concept of human development. UNDP can hardly emerge as a leader in the understanding of global environmental problems and in global policy making on sustainable development. Because of its policy work on human development, UNDP is—contrary to the World Bank—oriented towards the *political* level of national policy making. There is a link between UNDP's work on human development and its capacity to support government priority setting also in relation to global environmental problems.

This should then be followed up through UNDP's most important role within technical co-operation and capacity development assistance to individual developing countries. UNDP will have to develop excellence within a few patterns of intervention which exploit the organization's close links with developing-country governments. UNDP's capacity development assistance should in general have three primary objectives and target institutions: (1) improved management of public resources by core government agencies through the strengthening of public administrative systems and institutions; (2) improved management of public resources by line ministries and local authorities through their integration into an overall governance framework; and (3)

improved institutions for people's participation through the strengthening of democratic practice and dialogue between government and civil society.

In the field of environmental management, UNDP can provide capacity development assistance for the national political priority-setting process through support to the necessary studies of development scenarios and policy options and to their discussion among national stakeholders. Few other donors are likely to be welcomed by governments in these fields. Translating the national priorities into policy interventions, including, for example, incentives for change towards environmentally benign technology, requires expertise, which UNDP cannot have in-house, but the organization can facilitate collaboration with specialized institutions in industrial and other developing countries. Developing technical and administrative capacity for information processing and implementation support is also appropriate for UNDP, whereas UNDP staff, wherever possible, should leave feasibility studies and investment project operations to other institutions, notably of the countries themselves.

For UNDP to play these roles, the organization would have to continue the substantive specialization process of the 1990s; strengthen its field structure through decentralization; develop its human resources in the field of state intervention and capacity development; reduce its ambitions in the field of UN co-ordination, particularly at global level; and be provided with adequate, untied grant resources to give its 130 field offices sufficient leverage to provide and backstop capacity development assistance. These pre-conditions are not easily met, however, because of the vested interests described above in an *ad hoc*, diversified use of UNDP's meagre resources. Still, we believe that UNDP's survival depends on it setting tough priorities within policy work on sustainable human development and the provision of capacity development assistance to developing countries.

Notes and References

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6. See Section II of the *Green Globe Yearbook* for an overview of international environmental agreements.
7. See Danish International Development Assistance (1991), *Effectiveness of Multilateral Agencies at Country Level: Case Study of 11 Agencies in Kenya, Nepal, Sudan and Thailand*, incl. a separate report on UNDP, prepared by COWIconsult (Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
8. Capacity enhancement is needed equally in the emerging private sector and in the weak civil society institutions in most developing countries. However, UNDP's comparative advantage lies in support to the governments and state apparatuses that are often neglected by other multilateral and (some) bilateral donors. At the same time, capacity development in the public sector must be seen in the context of overall national capacities. See P. Evans (ed.) (1996), 'Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Creating Synergy across the Public-Private Divide', *World Development*, 24/6 (June), 1033–1132.
9. See Konrad von Moltke (1996), 'Why UNEP Matters', in Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann (eds.), *Green Globe Yearbook 1996* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 55–64. See also von Moltke (1996), *International Environmental Management, Trade Regimes and Sustainability* (Winnipeg, Man.: International Institute for Sustainable Development).
10. OECD, Development Assistance Committee (1996), *Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee*, DAC 1995 Report (Paris: OECD), 21.
11. The World Bank's *World Development Report 1997* is dedicated to an analysis of 'The State in a Changing World'.
12. See e.g. Deborah Brautigam (1996), 'State Capacity and Effective Governance', in Benno Ndulu and Nicolas van de Walle (eds.), *Agenda for Africa's Economic Renewal* (Washington: Overseas Development Council), 81–108.
13. World Bank (1993), *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*, a World Bank Policy Research Report (New York: Oxford University Press).
14. An important example is given in Mamadou Dia (1996), *Africa's Management in the 1990s and Beyond: Reconciling Indigenous and Transplanted Institutions* (Washington: World Bank). Three strategies are, in Dia's view, required to contain the influence of African politicians. Firstly, co-operation should be sought only with those governments that show 'commitment' for reform, i.e. agreement with the basic priorities of donors. Secondly, critical institutions of central government, such as the central bank, revenue collection services, or essential supply companies, should be insulated from political influence through donor conditionalities, narrow administrative reforms, or modern management techniques. Thirdly, 'reconciling indigenous and transplanted institutions' should be pursued to ensure local ownership without undue political interference.

