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Korppoo, Anna, Max Gutbrod and Sergei Sitnikov
'Russian Law on Climate Change'
In Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Kevin R. Gray, and Richard Tarasofsky (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2016, pp. 700-723.
> More information about the book at the publisher's website

The legal basis of Russian mitigation policies is fragmented and largely driven by interests other than environmental protection facilitated by historically favourable GHG emission trends. Indirect policies focusing on the energy sector with less obvious links to GHG mitigation targets could, in theory, deliver more emissions reductions over time as various synergies exist between more general policy goals and mitigation. However, the weaknesses of the administrative system leading to problems with implementation and the declarative nature of many policy goals undermine the tasks at hand. It seems that Russia’s mitigation measures and their success is largely detached from actual climate policies and international regime. These problems with implementing existing mitigation policies further limit Moscow’s possibilities of committing to emissions-reduction targets due to the related risks of compliance.

Andresen, Steinar, Jon Birger Skjærseth, Torbjørg Jevnaker and Jørgen Wettestad
'The Paris Agreement: Consequences for the EU and carbon markets?'
Politics and Governance, Vol 4, No 3, 2016, pp. 188-196.
> Access original article here

Most observers agree that the Paris Agreement (PA) was a step in the right direction. However, we argue that we do not know how effective it will become in a problem-solving perspcetive. We start the article by giving a brief account of the Paris Agreemnent. There are certainly positive elements but there are also weaknesses and uncretainties. To 'test' its potential effectiveness we therefore discuss the PA in relation to EU climate policies and carbon markets, primarily the EU ETS. We discuss its potential significance along three causal patyways; the legal - political - and bureaucratic pathways. Regarding the EU we argue thatr a combination of these pathways will increase the pressure on 'laggards' within the deliver on the 40% target by 2030. It may also contribute to keep climate on the EU agenda, but long-term effects are uncertain. Regarding carbon markets, particularly the EU ETS, the PA was welcomed by the proponents of a stronger EU ETS. However, neither of the three pathway have turned out to be important so far. As things stands now the case of the EU ETS shows that it will be challenging to use the PA in internal processes and that hopes in this regard should be moderate. In conclusion we stress that however the EU and carbon markets are, the main challenge of the PA is to enable developing countries to reduce their emissions.

Bailey, Ian and Tor Håkon Jackson Inderberg
'New Zealand and climate change. What are the stakes and what can New Zealand do?'
Policy Quarterly, Vol 12, No 2, 2016, pp. 3-12.
> Download the article here

The aim of this article is to contribute to this process of policy reflection by exploring strategic options for New Zealand to accelerate its emissions reduction. The distinctive element of this analysis is its critical analysis of the main narratives that have shaped recent New Zealand climate policy, identified from published documents and 23 interviews with politicians, government officials, industry leaders and independent commentators in 2015. The general tone of these narratives, we argue, portrays New Zealand’s climate policy options as inherently constrained by its inability to influence global emissions and the economic risks of adopting more ambitious climate measures. These narratives are then subjected to critical scrutiny through a review of the major stakes facing New Zealand on climate issues, before the final sections of the article explore how some constraints might be reinterpreted to advance key aspects of New Zealand’s mitigation policy while still guarding against identified economic and social risks.

Jevnaker, Torbjørg and Jørgen Wettestad
'Linked Carbon Markets: Silver Bullet or Castle in the Air?'
Climate Law, Vol 5, Nos 1-2, 2016, pp. 109-117.
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Did the Paris Agreement provide a boost to carbon markets? Although spreading globally, relatively few links have been established between carbon markets so far. The history of linking indicates that successful efforts are characterized by converging ETS design, and – related to this – political will. Moreover, existing links have been facilitated by prior economic and political ties. There are significant challenges related to distribution of power and political feasibility involved in such linking processes. The Paris Agreement does not make the more intrinsic political linking challenges go away. Moreover, significant elaboration and clarification of the Paris Agreement remains subject to further negotiations. Nevertheless, Paris confirmed the increasing support to carbon markets: the periodic reviews of national climate policy, access to shared fulfilment, and a common guidance for accounting together provide a new momentum to the development of carbon markets and the process of linking them. What this boost means for the prospects of a globally interlinked carbon market remains to be seen.

Andresen, Steinar
'Regime effectiveness'
In Karin Bäckstrand and Eva Løvbrand (eds), Research Handbook on Climate Governance. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, pp. 425-435.
> More information about the book at the publisher's website

Initially the UN climate regime was fairly dynamic in terms of institution building and the Kyoto Protocol was the result of a joint and creative effort primarily by the EU and the US. However its narrow scope in terms of targeting emissions commitments has grown increasingly obsolete as the brunt of emissions emanate from the countries in the South. From a problem solving perspective the effectiveness of the climate regime has therefore been exceedingly low. The main explanation is the very malign nature of the problem. However, as noted, institutional design also makes a negative difference.This development has necessitaed a change from a narrow top-down approach to an all inclusive bottom-up approach. This more unruly and clumsy approach may at first glance seem to be a step back from the more elegant top-down approach. Given the necessity to engage the emerging economies, however, it may be the only way forward. Still, this approach is no guarantee that the steep rise in emissions will slow down much. Strong review mechanisms are needed and not the least more political will to act by the major emitters.

Bang, Guri, Arild Underdal and Steinar Andresen (eds)
The Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change: Key Actors in International Climate Cooperation
Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, 216 p.
> More information about the book here

Why are some countries more willing and able than others to engage in climate change mitigation? This book's authors address this questionn by exploring climate and energy trajectories of seven key actors that play crucial and different rroles in global climate cooperation: Brazil, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Russia and the US. We map similarities and differences in domestic policies as well as the roles they play in the global climate negotiations. Moreover, to understand these similarities and differences we undertake a comparative analysis of the main drivers and barriers that shape cliamte and energy policy trajectories in each case. :

Korppoo, Anna, Karl Upston-Hooper and Emilie Yliheljo
'Climate change mitigation in Russia: foreign policy, envinronmental action or simple economics?'
In Geert Van Calster, Wim Vandenberghe and Leonie Reins (eds), Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, pp. 617-633.
> More information about the book here

Russia is a key actor in terms of GHG emissions, energy exports as well as global climate politics. WTO membership and opportunities provided by the Kyoto mechanisms supported Russia’s ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, but were not sufficient to incentivize participation in the second commitment period. Given this, and the marginality of precautionary principle in Russian climate policy, domestic mitigation actions are driven by economic and energy security interests unrelated to climate mitigation. The main policy-measures, energy efficiency, associated petroleum gas flaring and renewable energy, have suffered from the low administrative capacity available for policy-implementation. Joint Implementation was also slow to start and plagued by political and economic struggles between domestic actors. Nevertheless, the implementation of the current domestic target to limit GHG emissions to 75 per cent of 1990 level by 2020, which is under discussion, envisages market-based policy initiatives.

Bang, Guri, Arild Underdal and Steinar Andresen
In G. Bang, A. Underdal and S. Andresen (eds), The Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, pp. 1-24.
> More information about the book here

We start out by presenting the purpose and scope of the book. Three reasons for focussing on these actors are given. First, domestic politics and measures constitute the building block of any international agreement. Second, the slow pace of negotiations has spurred interest in mitigation measures that can be implemented at lower levels. Third, too little is known about the effects of different measures applied by different countries to curb emissions. In the conceptual framework we start out by stating that models conceptualizing countries as unitary actors have severe limitations. First, mitigation and damage cost will be unevenly distributed. Second, other factors than material self-interests guide policies and action. Third, decision.making processes aew decided by the relative power of actors involved. Finally, political systems differ. In the conceptual framework we zoom in on the significance of politics, interests, institutions and ideas as well as fundamental parameters and principal driving forces in order to explain differences and similarities in policies.

Korppoo, Anna
'Russia’s climate policy'
In G. Bang, A. Underdal and S. Andresen (eds), The Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, pp. 141-159.
> More information about the book here

The prospects for significant policy change towards decarbonization are low in Russia due to the lack of environmental concern, in particular over the impacts of climate change, the interpretation of the post-Soviet emission decline as a climate effort, and the dominance of the economically vital fossil fuel sector. The main emission reductions is likely to originate from cutting energy waste and modernization rather than focused mitigation policies. However, the abundance of domestic fossil fuels, the unfavourable investment climate and the weakness of the policy implementation system obstruct these policies. Nevertheless, Russia’s domestic goal to limit emissions to 75 percent of 1990 level by 2020, which never deviated much from business-as-usual emissions trend, is likely to be achieved even easier than expected due to the current negative economic prospects. Even though the political conflict with Ukraine has destabilized President Putin’s power, and an overthrow of the Putin regime seems less unrealistic than a year ago, climate policy is unlikely to change due to the lack of public demand for stronger measures. In international level Russia is likely to wait and see how other major emitters will play their cards in Paris in 2015 before deciding on its participation.

Iguchi, Masahiko, Alexandru Luta and and Steinar Andresen
'Japan's climate policiy: post-Fukushima and beyond'
In G. Bang, A. Underdal and S. Andresen (eds), The Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, pp. 119-140.
> More information about the book here

While Japan hosted the adoption of the Kyoto Protocal i 1997 it has presently rejected to participate in the second commitment period of the protocol. Japan's climate policy was for long quite ambitious, not the least considering the high abatement costs, but this is no longer the case. What has caused this back-lash? Is it Japan's high dependence on imported fossiil fuel due to the Fukushima nuclear disatser or are there also other stumbling blocks? There is no doubt that the nuclear disaster play a large role in explaining this change. However, taking a closer look at Japan's climate policies one is struck by the close cooperation between business and government and most climate measures have therefore been voluntarily. The key players have been the maijn industry association, the Keidranren, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the major government part, the LDP, playing the role of veto-players in Japn's climate policies. Also, environmental NGOs are generally weak in Japan so although there are demands for a more pro-active pollcy in the public, the above suppliers of such policies tend to heed to industry rather than civil society. Although there is now an increased emphasis on renewables, this is from a very low level and nucler energy will probably sonn play a larger role in Japan's energy mix.

Bang, Guri, Arild Underdal and Steinar Andresen
'Comparative analysis and conclusions'
In G. Bang, A. Underdal and S. Andresen (eds), The Domestic Politics of Global Climate Change. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2015, pp. 182-205.
> More information about the book here

We conclude by asking and answering three main questions. The first one is what we can learn from using our conceptual framework. Our conceptual framework proved useful in identifying and categorization of factors that have in fact influenced climate policy trajectories. For example the identification of veto players proved useful in finding actors able to block policies. However, our assessments of the strength of impact on policy trajectories typical have the formula of ordinal-level statements. Regradin the question on the expectation on trajectories, the expected trajectory fails by a wide margin to achieve the UNFCCC objectives. This is because most key actors are not able to decouple economic growth and population growt from rising emissions, but there are some positive exceptions. Regrarding the last question on the course of the future negotiations the picture is rather bleak. However there is some potential in the idea that some of these major emitters act together and form a winning coaltion. However, for this to happen strong leadership is neede and there are few indications that such coaltions will emerge in the short to medium term.

Korppoo, Anna and Alexey Kokorin
'Russia's 2020 GHG emissions target: Emission trends and implementation'
Climate Policy, published online 25.08.2015. DOI: 10.1080/14693062.2015.1075373.
> Access original article here

This article provides an overview of the recent modelling results on Russia's GHG emission trends, and reviews the success of mitigation policies in order to establish whether Russia's domestic target seems feasible. Various Russian GHG emission scenarios indicate that Russia's domestic target - emissions 25% below the 1990 level by 2020 - is not far from the business-as-usual emissions trajectory. In particular, two factors could deliver the required emissions reductions: the currently declining gross domestic product (GDP) growth and ongoing domestic mitigation policies. The former is more likely to secure the target level of emissions, because GDP growth has been contracting significantly in comparison to earlier forecasts of 3–5% annual growth, and this trend is expected to continue. The latter option – success with domestic mitigation measures – seems less likely, given the various meta-barriers to policy implementation, and the marginality of mitigation policies, problems with law-making processes, bureaucratic tradition, and informality of legislative and implementation systems.

Korppoo, Anna
'Who is driving Russian climate policy? Applying and adjusting veto players theory to a non-democracy'
International Environmental Agreements, published online 19.05.2015. DOI: 10.1007/s10784-015-9286-5. 15 p.
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What is driving Russian climate policy? This article focuses on the veto player approach developed by George Tsebelis and its applicability for examining the power relations in climate change policy-making in Russia. It makes two original contributions: veto players analysis on Russian climate policy and proposals how to adjust to theory to be applied to non-democracies for comparison with democracies. After identifying the veto players and their preferences, and determining their equivalence in the decision-making process, two case studies are examined: the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the establishment of one of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms, Joint Implementation, in Russia. Regarding the power play between actors, the latter emerges as far more accessible than the former, where scholars can generally observe only the domestic debate—which, due to the absorption of democratic decision-making institutions by the president, is detached from the actual decision-making process. Three proposals are made for adjusting the veto players approach to facilitate qualitative analysis of Russian decision-making: (1) select cases which involve also lower-level actors in charge of policy implementation; (2) due to implementation problems, changes in the status quo must be sought deeper than in statute-level changes; and (3) note that motivations of actors beyond the actual policy substance can facilitate explanations of puzzling outcomes in the process.

Inderberg, Tor Håkon
'Changes in Organizational Culture, Changes in Adaptive Capacity?'
In Karen O'Brien and Elin Selboe (eds), The Adaptive Challenge of Climate Change. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, pp. 213-229.
> More information about the book here

This chapter argues that organizational culture is a vital yet often overlooked dimension of climate change adaptive capacity and shows that including it in an integrated analytical framework can modify or even change conclusions about adaptive capacity based on analyses of formal organizational factors. Drawing upon organizational theory, this chapter presents a comparative analysis of how organizational changes in two quasi-public network services, the Norwegian and Swedish electricity grid sectors, influenced adaptive capacity to extreme weather events that can be associated with climate change. Two perspectives are used to underline this important message: an instrumental perspective and an institutional-cultural perspective. The findings show that both the formal structure and organizational culture highly influence adaptive capacity to climate change. These influences can be positive or negative depending on context. The change in formal structure and organizational culture in the Norwegian electricity sector effectively reduced adaptive capacity to any challenge not encouraged by regulatory regime and/or legitimized by economic efficiency arguments. Equivalent influences from formal and cultural factors are found for Sweden although the changes in the sector have been less transformative, and the considerations between efficiency and security of supply have been more balanced. Based on this research we conclude that the capacity to adapt to climate change and extreme weather events is greater within the Swedish than the Norwegian electricity grid sector.

Andresen, Steinar
'International Climate Negotiations: Top-down, Bottom-up or a combination of both?'
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs, Vol 50, No 1, 2015, pp. 15-30.
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This article discusees the main features of both the top-down and the bottom-up approcahes. The top down approach is problem-oriented, scienece driven and the parties jointly decide on emission-goals. As such this is seemingly a rather elegant approach and was long hailed as the best way to deal with the problem. In contrast the bottom-up approach is more pragmatic and not science driven as the parties define their goals and policies themselves. The down-side is that as climate measures are costly policies may be modest in the absence of international incentives to reduce emissions. However, in reality most approaches have elements of both top-down and bottom-up approaches. This, for example, applies to the many new more exclusive 'clubs' that have been established. As climate change is a very politically malign proiblem, institutional design of agrements cannot be expected to matter that much. However, in order to include as many countries as possible to real commitments a bottom-up approach may be necessary in the UNFCCC but then it is important that top-down review is effective as well.

Inderberg, Tor Håkon, Siri Eriksen, Karen O'Brien og Linda Sygna (eds)
Climate Change Adaptation and Development: Changing Paradigms and Practices
London, Routledge, 2015, 295 p.
> More information about the book

Climate change poses multiple challenges to development. It affects lives and livelihoods, infrastructure and institutions, as well as beliefs, cultures and identities. There is a growing recognition that the social dimensions of vulnerability and adaptation now need to move to the forefront of development policies and practices. This book presents case studies showing that climate change is as much a problem of development as for development, with many of the risks closely linked to past, present and future development pathways. Development policies and practices can play a key role in addressing climate change, but it is critical to question to what extent such actions and interventions reproduce, rather than address, the social and political structures and development pathways driving vulnerability. The chapters emphasise that adaptation is about much more than a set of projects or interventions to reduce specific impacts of climate change; it is about living with change while also transforming the processes that contribute to vulnerability in the first place. This book will help students in the field of climate change and development to make sense of adaptation as a social process, and it will provide practitioners, policymakers and researchers working at the interface between climate change and development with useful insights for approaching adaptation as part of a larger transformation to sustainability.

Eriksen, Siri, Tor Håkon Inderberg, Karen O'Brien and Linda Sygna
'Introduction: Development as Usual is not Enough'
In T.H. Inderberg, S. Eriksen, K. O'Brien and L. Sygna (eds), Climate Change Adaptation and Development: Changing Paradigms and Practices. London, Routledge, 2015, pp. 1-18.
> More information about the book

The rate and magnitude of climate change and its social impacts are linked to the dominant developmental pathways currently driving accelerated warming and heightened vulnerability. These pathways, based on fossil-fuel driven economic growth, are the product of systems, policies, practices and actions at many levels. Development and aid interventions form part of such practices and actions. Here a key question is: to what extent are they contributing to, or countering, current development pathways that are based on fossil-fuel-driven economic growth? A critical question is whether adaptation measures are merely incremental adjustments to ‘development as usual’, or whether they can indeed influence current development pathways in ways that bring about fundamental transformations and paradigm shifts. In this introductory chapter, we describe why climate change adaptation and development need to be taken more seriously, what is meant by ‘development as usual’, and how adaptation is framed, financed and practised within this paradigm. We then describe the contributions to this book, and show that there is significant empirical research to support arguments for new approaches to adaptation and development which can serve as an entry point for creating sustainable and resilient development pathways.

O'Brien, Karen, Siri Eriksen, Tor Håkon Inderberg and Linda Sygna
'Climate Change and Development: Adaptation through Transformation'
In T.H. Inderberg, S. Eriksen, K. O'Brien and L. Sygna (eds), Climate Change Adaptation and Development: Changing Paradigms and Practices. London, Routledge, 2015, pp. 273-289.
> More information about the book

In this concluding chapter, we consider what it means to transform paradigms and practices so as to enhance social equity, resilience and environmental integrity in the face of climate change. Synthesizing some key findings about adaptation from the chapters, we present a framework or ‘roadmap’ that can be used to navigate ‘adaptation as transformation’. We begin by discussing why transformative responses to adaptation and development are necessary. Focusing on three interacting spheres of transformation, we describe entry points for adaptations that reduce vulnerability and contribute to outcomes for global sustainability, of which social equity, resilience and environmental integrity can be considered key components. Finally, we offer some recommendations relevant to those working in bilateral and multilateral aid organizations, in governments and in research, all of whom can potentially play key roles in promoting the transformation of paradigms and practices in support of global sustainability.

Andresen, Steinar
'The Climate Regime: A Few Achievements but Many Challenges'
Climate Law, Vol 4, Nos 1-2, 2014, pp. 21-30.
> Access original article here

During its more than twenty years of existence the UN climate regime has created some innovative mechanisms but with little practical significance for emissions reductions. Over time, the efforts by the climate negotiators have increased significantly but the effectiveness of the regime has not been enhanced. The Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment period is weaker than its predecessor and there are presently no binding obligations for countries emitting some 85% of global emissions. The main reason for the slow progress is the extreme malign nature of the issue area as it goes to the heart of virtually all global economic activity. All actors need to do more to increase the effectiveness of the regime but this particularly applies to the emerging economies. They cannot continue to ‘hide’ within the Group of 77 if progress is to be made.

Inderberg, Tor Håkon, Knut Bjørn Stokke and Marte Winsvold
'The Effect of New Public Management Reforms on Climate Change Adaptive Capacity: A Comparison of Urban Planning and the Electricity Sector'
In Walter Leal (ed), Handbook of Climate Change Adaptation. New York, Springer, 2014. Chapter 35, 15 p. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-40455-9_83-1
> Access the chapter here

From the mid-1980s and onwards, a number of public institutions in Western democracies were subject to New Public Management (NPM) reforms, applying management tools from the private sector, oriented towards outcomes and efficiency. The chapter identifies organizational factors that influence adaptive capacity to climate change and finds that the NPM reforms have changed the sectors, significantly reducing adaptive capacity to climate change. In urban planning project planning has been moved to private actors, undermining formal responsibility for adaptation. In addition, an increased focus on efficiency and short-term market orientation has reduced (adaptive?) adaptive capacity. For the electricity sector, the revolutionary change with the reform in 1991 led to an abrupt undermining of adaptive capacity. The radical change in incentive structures, from encouraging security of supply to an extreme focus on economic efficiency, downplayed robustness and adaptation. The change in formal structure is followed by a corresponding professional demographic change which further undermines adaptive capacity. Whereas both sectors were previously dominated by engineers focusing on robustness of constructions and maintenance, many economists focusing on cost reduction and economic efficiency were employed as a result of NPM reforms. The chapter shows that adaptive capacity to climate change is influenced by a wide set of organizational factors beyond the traditional discussions, which have important practical implications for public administration.

Kokorin, Alexey and Anna Korppoo
Russia’s Greenhouse Gas Target 2020: Projections, Trends and Risks
Berlin, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2014, 17 p.
> Download the report in English
> Download the report in Russian

In September 2013, Russia adopted a domestic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions target that limits emissions to 75 per cent of the 1990 level by 2020. The structure and trends of the past and future national GHG emissions are analysed based on the recent lower growth assumption of the national economy. This makes the target achievable given that: technological emission reduction opportunities are used effectively; non-economic risks that can drive GHG emissions to exceed business-as-usual scenarios are eliminated; and the use of carbon instruments is accelerated.

Understanding the costs of climate change to the national economy could make expenditure on mitigation acceptable and thus facilitate establishing an ambitious post-2020 goal. The lack of information on these costs is the basic reason for Russia’s quiescence on climate mitigation. Any future international climate agreement will fail to change this without awareness of the risks of climate change for the Russian Federation; As a result, Russia is unlikely to proceed beyond the »economically viable« development path almost equivalent to its business-as-usual trajectory, which rejects the additional costs associated with emission reductions. This is more or less equivalent to the adopted domestic target, depending to some extent on which of the existing policies proves to be viable in practice.

Andresen, Steinar
'Exclusive Approaches to Climate Governance: More Effective than the UNFCCC?'
In Cherry, T.L., J. Hovi and D.M. McEvoy (eds), Toward a New Climate Agreement: Conflict, Resolution and Governance. London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 167-181.
> More information about the book here

The UN climate regime has proven ineffective in a problem-solving perspective. Therefore it is understandable that other and more exclusive approaches have been called for. However such forums have existed for quite some time already. This brief empirical examination of some of the most important alternative or supplemnentary international institutions demonstrate that they do not represent panacea for dealing more effectively with climate change. The malignancy of the issue is so severe that it cannot be removed by clever design alone. Still, in a learning perspective these institutions may have some influence by showing that more pragmaticicallt-oriented bottom-up sector approaches can be a supplementary avenue to the UNFCCC. Whether they will turn out to be more effective, remains to be seen. Also, this study indicates that these other forums still regard the UNFCCC as the most important and legitimate international institution to deal with climate change.

Wettestad, Jørgen and Torbjørg Jevnaker
'The EU's Quest for Linked Carbon Markets: Turbulence and Headwind'
In Cherry, T.L., J. Hovi and D.M. McEvoy (eds), Toward a New Climate Agreement: Conflict, Resolution and Governance. London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 266-279.
> More information about the book here

The Emissions Trading System (ETS) of the (EU) is the largest carbon trading market in the world, but climate change is a global challenge. In 2009, the EU announced its ambition of having linked carbon markets OECD-wide by 2015. This article assesses the EU’s progress in reaching this goal, inquires whether the explanatory factors lie within the EU itself or in the external environment, and discusses the main prospects for the future. Despite some progress, no interconnected emission trading system will cover the entire OECD area by 2015—so the EU is lagging behind in terms of achieving its own ambitions. Within the EU, member-state pressure for external linking has been modest, with Germany and the UK as notable exceptions. The European Commission has worked to establish links between the EU ETS and other systems, with only modest backing from other EU bodies. Globally, the development of emissions trading has progressed slowly. Furthermore, external interest in linking up with an increasingly crisis-ridden EU ETS has been variable, with, for instance, reluctant US actors and an eager Australian government. Experience thus far indicates that the bottom–up route to a global climate regime offered by linking is a long-term project—certainly not a “quick fix.

Skjærseth, Jon Birger
'EU Emissions Trading: Acievements, Challenges, Solutions'
In Cherry, T.L., J. Hovi and D.M. McEvoy (eds), Toward a New Climate Agreement: Conflict, Resolution and Governance. London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 254-264.
> More information about the book here

The EU ETS is a grand climate policy experiment—the first-ever international cap-and-trade system to target industry. The ultimate aim is to create a global carbon market by encouraging other major emitters, not least the USA and China, to follow suit. However, the economic recession that developed from 2008 and the resultant conflict with other energy policy instruments has put the EU ETS to the test. A significant supply–demand imbalance of allowances has accumulated, followed by a low carbon price. This chapter explores possible solutions for the EU, as well as presenting a brief analysis of the evolution and the achievements of the system.

Andresen, Steinar, Norichika Kanie and Peter M. Haas
'Actor Configurations in the Climate Regime: The States Call the Shots'
In Kanie, N., S. Andresen and P.M. Haas (eds), Improving Global Environmental Governance: Best Practices for Architecture and Agency. London/New York, Routledge, 2014, pp. 175-196.
> More information here

The role of various actors and actor combinations are discussed in the various stages set out in the introductory chapter of the book.In the agenda setting stage non-state actors as well as key indfividuals played a key role- However as these are mostly activists of various kinds they contributed to downplay the difficulty of the issue. The US played the key role in setting up the IPCC. When negotiations started most non-state actors were marginalized and the process was firmly in the control of the states. The North-South divide has been the most important reason for lacking progress, The compliance regime has also proved to be rather weak in practice. Both states and non-state actors in various combinations have played a role in implementing commitments. Altgough most key states have introduced a number of measures and non-state actors have also been active this has not been enough to stop the rising emissions. The main drivers in the development towards rising emisisons are economic growth, demography and general forces. Climate based measures initiated has not been enough to halt this development, Thibgs might have been different with non-state actors playing a more significant role but this has proved impossible in practice.

Skjærseth, Jon Birger, Guri Bang and Miranda Schreurs
'Explaining Growing Climate Policy Differences Between the European Union and the United States'
Global Environmental Politics, Vol 13, No 4, 2013, pp. 61-79.
> Purchase the original article here

Although there has been a strong rhetorical difference between the European Union (EU) and the United States on climate policy matters, it is really only since the mid- to late- 2000s that this difference has resulted in major differences in the range and depth of binding policies addressing climate change. Increased climate change concern in the United States in 2006–2008 created new opportunities for convergence, but failed to lead to policy change. We propose three explanations for the major differences in policy outcomes in the EU and the United States. First, distinctly different agenda-setting privileges among policy-makers in the EU and the United States caused diverse potentials for consultation and issue linkages on energy and climate policy. Second, while issue linkage helped overcome distributional obstacles in the EU, in contrast it led to more complexity and higher obstacles in the United States. Finally, legislative rules, procedures, and norms constrained the coalition-building efforts among lawmakers differently, leading to different negotiation processes and outcomes. Such differences in agenda-setting privileges, potential for issue linkage, and legislative procedures resulted in divergent climate policies in the EU and the United States that leave them wide apart in international climate negotiations.
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