

Aid in a Rush

A case-study of the Norway-Guyana REDD+ partnership

Heidi Bade



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May 2013



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Aid in a Rush. A case study of the Norway-Guyana REDD+ partnership

Publication Type and Number

FNI-rapport 4/2013

Pages

59

Authors

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ISBN

978-82-7613-670-8 (online version)

ISSN

1893-5486

Abstract

This report explores the reasons why Norway chose Guyana as a partner for their REDD initiative - a 'risky' country where it had very little knowledge or traditional presence. By employing Foreign Policy Analysis I demonstrate how international, domestic, and governmental factors all contributed to making the partnership happen. I found that the decision was a political one, to a large extent made by Minister Solheim himself and a few leaders of the initiative. Although the partnership is being funded by the aid budget, this case shows that climate-policy priorities trumped foreign aid considerations in the decision-making process. The decision was characterized by lack of time, as the partnership was to serve as a model and had to be ready before the COP-15 meeting in Copenhagen in December 2009. In this context, development aspects and potential risks were given less emphasis. The analysis demonstrates how differences in priorities, influence and responsibilities between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Environment became evident in this case. The report contributes to an ongoing debate in the field of foreign aid, as to whether spending aid allocations on payments for ecosystem services is a new practice that should be maintained.

Key Words

REDD+, foreign policy analysis, development aid

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Abbreviations

CI	Conservation International
CIFOR	Centre for International Forestry Research
COP	Conference of the Parties
DFID	Department for International Development
FAC	Foreign Affairs Committee
FPA	Foreign Policy Analysis
GFC	Guyana Forestry Commission
GHG	Greenhouse gas
GOG	Government of Guyana
GRIF	Guyana's REDD+ Investment Fund
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IR	International Relations
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
JCN	Joint Concept Note
KOS	The climate and forest-secretariat based in ME
LCDS	Low Carbon Development Strategy
ME	Ministry of the Environment, Norway
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRV	Measurement, Reporting and Verification
MSSC	Multi Stakeholder Steering Committee to the LCDS
NICFI	Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative
NOK	Norwegian Krone
Norad	Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
NUPI	Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
PES	Payment for Ecosystem Services
REDD	Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries
REDD+	See REDD. The + indicates the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks
RFN	Rainforest Foundation Norway

UN	United Nations
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
USD	US dollar
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature Norway

Acknowledgements

This report is based on my Master's thesis submitted to Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) November 2012. In this report I have shortened Chapter 3 on Theoretical approach and Chapter 4 on Methodology in addition to minor changes and updates throughout. Thank you once more to my supervisor Desmond McNeill at SUM, and Lars Gulbrandsen, Kristin Rosendal, Inken Reimer, Mariel Støen, Cecilie Hirsch, Maren Olene Kloster, Berit Kristoffersen, Pål Skedsmo and all the other positive and helpful staff at Fridtjof Nansen Institute. I also wish to express my gratitude to my interviewees who provided their insights and knowledge.

Map of Guyana showing forest coverage




Figure 1 Map of Guyana

Source: Guyana Forestry Commission, June 2012

1 Introduction

"It's a mystery why we chose Guyana out of all countries"

Informant, Norwegian Government official

Norway's International Climate and Forest Initiative (NICFI) has won a highly prominent place in the Norwegian aid agenda, as well as in public debates about foreign aid priorities and climate change. It provides a real-world test case of the term "sustainable development". Norway's Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg first launched the initiative during the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) thirteenth Conference of the Parties (COP-13 in Bali in December 2007), when he announced that Norway would allocate up to three billion Norwegian Kroner (NOK) annually to work towards reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries. A key feature of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD) is to provide incentives and compensation to forest managers to reduce deforestation through payments for environmental services (PES) (Angelsen 2009:125).

The dilemmas of achieving both environmental and social benefits are at the core of the concrete climate and forest initiatives, and REDD can thus be seen as one way of trying to achieve sustainable development. REDD is currently one of the most important initiatives in the global climate negotiations and has been one of few areas where it has been possible to align developing and developed countries. The fact that Norway has taken a lead role in the initiative investing up to 15 billion NOK by 2015 makes it a highly interesting object of study.

The REDD funding from Norway is channeled bilaterally or via multilateral funds. Norway's bilateral REDD partner countries are large, forested countries like Brazil and Indonesia.¹ These are 'logical' countries to choose as REDD partners in the sense that they are large forest-rich countries.

But among the recipient countries is also another and quite different country. It is an unusual recipient country in many ways. Norway has had no bilateral ties with Guyana before the REDD partnership. There is no Norwegian embassy in Guyana, and at the time of signing the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in November 2010, the responsible Ambassador for the area was so-called "home-based," meaning that he was working from Norway.² Norway has no apparent political or commercial interests in the country. Few Norwegians have even heard of the country, and even fewer would be able to place it on a map. Guyana is a small country, with only 770,000 inhabitants. It is located north of

¹ In addition to the bilateral partners, Norway also supports the multi-donor Congo Basin Forest Fund, the UN REDD Programme, as well as civil society in more than twenty different countries.

² In January 2011 the responsibility for Guyana was transferred to the embassy in Brasilia.

Brazil with its coastal stretch towards the Caribbean and is extremely forest-rich (see map on page xii). As with many poorer countries in South America, it is not poor enough to be labeled a developing country, but is considered a middle-income country. A risk report by Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) concluded that there are high risks associated with the partnership even after recommended measures are taken and that it represents a considerable negative reputational threat for Norway (MFA 2010). In spite of this, Guyana was chosen and is currently the country that has received the most bilateral REDD funding after Brazil, according to NICFI's most recent update from October 2012.

1.1 Research question

As part of NICFI, Norway chose the small, South American country Guyana as a bilateral partner. The partnership is both surprising and groundbreaking, given that Norway has minimal knowledge about Guyana and no former official presence. This report therefore asks: *why did Norway chose Guyana as partner country despite minimal experience and high levels of risks?*

To operationalize the question I will ask these sub-questions:

- What international, domestic and governmental factors influenced Norway to go into REDD-partnership with Guyana?
- Who were the key actors in the decision-making process and what roles did they play?
- Were there different opinions regarding the partnership?
- What was the level of influence exerted from the different actors or actor groups?

To answer these questions I apply a Foreign Policy Analysis framework. This framework allows for identifying key actors meanwhile demonstrating how international, domestic and governmental factors play into the reasoning behind such a decision.

1.2 Outline of the report

Having briefly presented this report's topic and research question, the next chapter will present the background of the case study. The most important sources of inspiration to the REDD regime will be presented. Here the country of Guyana and the main actors for the analysis will also be introduced. In chapter three the theoretical approach Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a theoretic branch within International Relations (IR) is accounted for. I will present key concepts and definitions and the three-part division adapted from Hill (2003) that will structure the analysis: international, domestic and governmental factors. Chapter four contains a short overview of the methodology used. Chapter five represents the interlude before the analysis. Here I explain what happened in the decision-making process and how the partnership is set up. Chapter six contains the analysis, divided into three sub-sections, the international, domestic, and governmental factors as developed in the theoretic chapter.

In this part I discuss why Norway and Guyana became REDD partners. Through this section I demonstrate the usefulness of the actor-specific foreign policy analysis for my case study. Here we will also see how the partnership represents at the same time foreign aid, PES and foreign policy.

Lastly chapter seven is a short concluding chapter summarizing the main findings. Here I emphasize the findings which best answers my research question.

2 Background

This chapter lays the foundation for the analysis of the case study. After reading this chapter, the reader will know key elements of REDD, REDD+, and Norway's participation in the global REDD regime. This chapter will also familiarize with Guyana and the risks identified in partnering with the country.

2.1 REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation

The idea of REDD can be traced back to COP-11 in Montreal in 2005, when Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica put forward the proposal called "Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries: approaches to simulative action" (Governments of Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica 2005). In the proposal the two high-forested countries develop the argument for the REDD concept and for including deforestation in the UNFCCC framework.

But it was not until Western actors joined in as REDD advocates that REDD fully materialized. In 2006 the British government commissioned the so-called Stern Review, which states that curbing deforestation can hinder the worst effects of climate change. The report was published in October 2006 and was widely noticed for its documentation of the seriousness of climate change. It provides a strong economic argument for paying for reduced deforestation, or for 'standing forests', as they have been known. The 4th IPCC Assessment Report was published in 2007 and further added to the momentum of REDD. It (re)affirmed the seriousness of climate change and established that deforestation contributed to almost a fifth of the world's anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (Nabuurs et al., 2007). These two reports in combination contributed heavily in convincing Norway to wager for REDD.

As a development initiative, REDD has gained attention for being performance-based. International donors, funds or markets will, eventually, pay national or local agents based on results, *after* the results can be documented. The scale envisaged for REDD also distinguishes REDD from previous initiatives. REDD is, potentially, a deforestation and forest degradation initiative unprecedented in volume and scale (Angelsen 2009:294).

2.2 REDD +: From trees to people

In the last few years the name has changed from REDD to REDD +³. The + was added to count for all the issues in *addition* to avoided deforestation that should be included in REDD projects. According to the UN-REDD Programme "REDD+ goes beyond deforestation and forest degradation, and includes the role of conservation, sustainable manage-

³ Throughout the report I use both REDD and REDD+. When speaking of the general mechanism I will use REDD for simplicity.

ment of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks” (UN-REDD Programme 2009). The multiple benefits implied by this enhanced type of REDD include “ecosystem-based benefits” such as conservation of forest biodiversity, water regulation, soil conservation, timber, forest foods, and other non-timber forest products. REDD+ can also lead to direct social benefits, such as jobs, livelihoods, land tenure clarification, carbon payments, enhanced participation in decision-making and improved governance (UN-REDD Programme 2009).

The REDD scheme has in other words a complex and wide-ranging set of goals. It pertains to not only trees and carbon, but also to the people, animals and organisms living in the forest.

2.3 Norway as REDD frontrunner

Norway has taken a central role in REDD internationally. Stoltenberg’s statement in Bali 2007 and the large commitment gained attention, both within and outside of Norwegian borders. Norway is still by far the largest REDD donor. So far, one could argue that Norway is a front-runner, but hardly a leader, as there are few followers in the field. This is the core argument of Frida Skjæraasen in her master thesis *A frontrunner is not a leader* (Skjæraasen 2012). Although Germany and the US have scaled up their funding, there is still not a large-scale mobilization of followers in place.

Torbjørn Tumyr Nilsen (2010) in his master’s thesis discusses the motivation behind Norway’s large REDD initiative. According to him, NICFI becomes a way of greening the image of Norway, without making substantial changes domestically. Thus the nation can both be a major oil producer and save the climate at the same time (Nilsen 2010). The REDD set-up becomes a quick-fix following economic lines of reasoning that resonate well with Prime Minister Stoltenberg as an economist.

Norway’s REDD funding comes from the aid budget, and it is reported as official development assistance (ODA). Whether REDD should be considered aid is the subject of political debate, which I will come back to throughout the report. Norway allocates REDD funding both through multilateral institutions and bilaterally. So far there are four countries that have bilateral agreements: Tanzania, Indonesia, Brazil, and Guyana. In addition, NICFI contains a civil society component, which is managed by NORAD. The civil society scheme supports national and international NGOs and other institutions that are considered relevant to enhance the REDD+ agenda (NICFI 2012:16).

2.4 The institutional set-up

Following Stoltenberg’s announcement at Bali, NICFI was a reality. Discussions arose around where the initiative should be located. Both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of the Environment (ME) claimed that they should be responsible for the initiative. The Minister responsible was Erik Solheim, who at the time had just become Norway’s first Minister for International Development *and* the Environment. During the Stoltenberg government I, Solheim was the Minister for

International Development, and when the sitting parties were re-elected in 2007 under Stoltenberg II, Solheim became Minister for International Development and the Environment. This double-post was a historical exception; after Solheim left office in 2012, the two minister posts were again split. This means that during the discussions around the set-up of NICFI, Solheim was the Minister for the part of MFA dealing with development, as well as Minister for ME.

As the initiative is to be financed from the aid budget, the MFA wanted the secretariat to be part of their Ministry as development aid is under MFA's responsibility. On the other hand, NICFI is a climate initiative and thus also fits naturally under ME. After a process of discussions, the NICFI secretariat was finally set up in ME. The institutional set-up is not, however, straightforward. MFA still has the final responsibility on how the money is spent, as the REDD funding is taken from the aid budget. ME is responsible for the political aspects and decisions are mainly made there. But MFA and Norad are responsible for following the development aspects. Norad has the role of advisor and evaluator, while the final responsibility that the money does not go to corruption and that financial rules for ODA are kept, lies within MFA.⁴

2.5 Guyana: a fly-over country

Guyana, it is fair to say, is the least known and the least heard of among Norway's REDD recipient countries. My informants in Norway call it a "fly-over country", a country most people would never visit, only fly over at most. Before the REDD partnership, Guyana was mainly known for the horrible Jonestown massacre in 1977, when more than 900 people lost their lives in a collective suicide led by People's Temple sect founder Jim Jones. But Guyana is also a country with large reserves of pristine rainforest and endemic species.

Guyana is a small country with about 80 percent of its area covered with rain forest.⁵ The main source of deforestation is mining, which also leads to negative effects on the soil and surrounding rivers. But deforestation has not yet reached the speed and scale seen in most other forested areas of the world, which means that pristine rain forests are still intact. Therefore, high-coverage, low-deforestation countries like Guyana are affectionately being called the "best pupils in class" by some of my informants in KOS.

This small country north of Brazil is a complex one, with ethnic conflicts, high levels of corruption, and low levels of transparency. The population consists only of about 770,000 inhabitants. It is ethnically diverse and comprised of around 43 percent of East Indian descent, 30 percent of African descent, and around 9 percent classified as Indigenous groups called Amerindians. The remaining 18 percent are of mixed descent. The party politics follows to a high degree the two largest ethnic groups,

⁴ The institutional set-up is the subject of re-structuring and might be changed in the future.

⁵ The vast amount of rainforest can be seen on the map on page xii

without any political party representing the Amerindian population (Norad evaluation department 2010). Historically, there has been an excellent education system in Guyana and high literacy rates compared to the region as a whole. However, political instability, paired with economic stagnation, has led to mass emigration among the skilled workforce. This has “led to extensive emigration of skilled people, creating a highly educated diaspora in the Caribbean, North America and UK particularly. Some people are now returning but the emigration of educated people has been a major loss to the country” (Norad evaluation department 2010). The percentage of this so-called brain-drain varies according to different estimates. One study by the International Monetary Fund conducted in 2005 found that 89 percent of university-educated Guyanese “eventually leave the country due to better employment options abroad; this represents the highest percentage of “brain drain” in the world” (US Department of State 2012).

Guyana stands out among the partner countries, being the only one representing a country with historically low deforestation, with an annual average deforestation rate of only 0.022 percent over the last twenty years (Guyana Forestry Commission 2011). The baseline used to measure payments from Norway is set to count for the period 2000–2009, when deforestation amounted to 0.03 percent. In comparison, the global average deforestation rate is 0.52 percent. A reference level for Guyana is calculated as the mean value for these two measures, which amounts to 0.275 percent (Governments of Guyana and Norway 2011). An amount of up to 250 million dollars is set aside to be spent within 2015 if Guyana keeps its obligations in the partnership.

Guyana has prepared a Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS) and the support from Norway is meant to help the country pursue the low carbon development trajectory outlined in the strategy. The cooperation between Guyana and Norway is meant to, if successful, serve as a model for how developing countries, including countries that historically have had low deforestation, may receive financial compensation for preserving their forests (ME, 2011). However, the LCDS includes building a large hydropower plant that will inevitably lead to increased deforestation and is the subject of criticism from several holds.⁶

Power in Guyana is centralized, with important decisions made in the Office of the President. Former president Bharrat Jagdeo⁷ has been active at the international arena in working for compensation for standing forests. He has been highly visible on the international arena in trying to incorporate forests in a post-Kyoto agreement. In 2010 he won the UN Champion of the Earth prize, won by Minister Solheim the year before.

⁶ For more on the hydropower plant, see chapter 5.1.2 on the LCDS.

⁷ President Jagdeo’s presidential period ended November 2011, when he had been in office for two election periods, which is the maximum according to the Guyanese constitution. Donald Ramotar from the same party, People’s Progressive Party, won the 2011 election. He is not as intimately engaged with climate change as his predecessor. However, it is held among my informants that Jagdeo still to a large extent governs from behind the scenes.

2.6 Corruption and risks

On Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2012, Guyana ranks 133rd with 28 points. The Corruption Perceptions Index ranks countries and territories based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be. A country's score "indicates the perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 - 100, where 0 means that a country is perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means it is perceived as very clean" (Transparency International 2012). The high level of corruption is a feature that Guyana shares with most tropical countries. In general it appears that when mapping the most corrupt countries and the most forested countries, the two overlap substantially. Highly forested countries tend to score low on governance indicators (Bofin et al. 2011:5).

On ME's most recent update, Guyana is listed as the country that has received the most REDD funding after Brazil. The most recent update (October 2012) states that 396 million NOK, equaling about 70 million US dollars, have been transferred to Guyana (ME 2012). However, the majority of this funding has not been disbursed by the World Bank, to the Guyanese government's irritation, as explained in section 5.2.

Norad made a risk assessment of the country in 2010 where a number of risk areas are identified (MFA 2010). In this risk assessment ethnic tensions, a lack of institutional capacity and challenges posed by the fact that Norway lacks presence in Guyana are mentioned as posing risks to the partnership. A significant reputational risk for Norway as a donor country is also noted, and the conclusion is that risks will be high even though the recommended measures are put in place (MFA 2010).

The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre in Norway was also consulted and gave an expert answer with overview of the corruption in the country, dated February 26, 2010. The U4 report, written by Marie Chêne, states that corruption is widespread, but that the available information is poor and that the report is therefore based on anecdotal evidence: "A comprehensive risk assessment of corruption risks would require more in-depth research and in-country data collection" (Chêne 2010).

Both the U4 expert answer and Norad risk report were issued *after* the MoU was signed. The MoU is a document stating the intention of collaboration without being a legally binding document, and was first signed November 2009. Even though it is not legally binding, it is politically binding in the sense that the countries are expected to follow up on the agreement. Thus, the MoU represents an important bench mark for the partnership. The risk assessment was made almost one year after, in September 2010. I will come back to the reasons behind this in chapter six.

2.7 Studying REDD in Norway

Performing research on aid is not a favorite activity of researchers, according to Terje Tvedt (Tvedt 2003). Aid is a “moral activity”, and not something that most researchers would want to criticize; therefore, it tends to deter closer scrutiny. With his notion of “the south-political system,” Tvedt criticizes academia for not conducting enough research on foreign aid. According to Tvedt, aid has become a national trait defining Norway as a nation, but it has largely been neglected by the social sciences (Tvedt 2003:18). With this in mind, a closer look at aid decisions seems pertinent.

Most ongoing research on REDD is somewhat policy-oriented. Arild Angelsen from UMB is editing one of the main REDD contributions, a series of CIFOR publications sponsored by NICFI. The Christian Michelsen Institute (CMI) performs research on corruption in connection with REDD in their research series REDD Integrity. They in turn are sponsored by Norad.⁸ They focus on governance challenges in the weakest REDD recipient states. So far, they have conducted research on Uganda, the Philippines, and the Congo (CMI 2012). There have also been produced several real-time evaluation reports of NICFI’s contribution to national REDD processes in the partner countries. These examples do not constitute, however, basic, independent research. According to Kristin Rosendal, Norway spends a lot of money on REDD through consultants and NGOs. But when it comes to funding for independent research on REDD, funding is comparatively less abundant and available (Rosendal, personal communication 02.05.12).

Perhaps as a result of that fact, research on the decision-making processes behind REDD has been largely absent. Studies that do look closer at what lie behind NICFI are typically master theses. One example is before-mentioned Torbjørn Tymur Nilsen (University of Oslo (UiO), Centre for Development and the Environment) using post-development theory to analyze the paradoxes behind the Norwegian climate and forest initiative (Nilsen 2010, mentioned in chapter 2.3) and Irene Øvstebø Tvedten (UiO, Centre for Technology, Innovation and Culture) on the apolitical nature of official discussions around REDD (Tvedten 2011).

⁸ Terje Tvedt has written on state-funded development research and what he calls Norwegian national corporatism (Tvedt 2009).

3 Theoretical framework

My main framework for analysis is based on Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), a theoretical approach within IR. I found this framework to be appealing to analyze my empirical material. FPA came as a reaction to the assumption of the rational, unitary actor with pre-given goals, usually power maximization (Hill 2003:8). It allows the researcher to explore who are the key decision makers and what ideas frame their understanding of the situation. It does not take the interests for granted, but opens up for a more thorough and decision-near analysis. FPA therefore fits well with the findings in my case: namely, the varying ideas about REDD and Guyana apparent in different parts of the government and bureaucracy.

FPA, furthermore, is an exploratory framework that takes the empirical case seriously and gives room to look at the case with an open mind. Thus, it resonates with one of the very ideas behind multi-disciplinarity: namely, that one should not be so constrained by theory as to be blind to the specifics of the case at hand.

First I will pay attention to the fact that I use FPA on an unusual field: a foreign aid allocation. Then I will outline the characteristics of FPA as a theoretic branch and how it is different from mainstream IR theory. I will then give a brief overview of one of the founding fathers of FPA, before I proceed to the three dimensions that will structure my analysis. These are international, domestic, and governmental politics.

3.1 Foreign aid policy analysis: uniting values and interests

FPA has commonly been utilized for studying security issues and typically the decision of going (or not going) to war (Hill 2003; Mintz and DeRouen 2010; Smith et al. 2008). Whereas most FPA analyses focus on high politics decisions, this report's focus is an aid allocation, usually conceptualized as low politics.

Decisions within foreign aid are rare topics within FPA analysis for a number of reasons. One reason is that foreign aid is a small sub-field at the periphery of IR. Furthermore, as Tvedt convincingly argues, foreign aid is not a favorite topic amongst academics and researchers (Tvedt 2003). Tvedt points to "an unfruitful, but influential" conceptual separation between foreign policy guided by self-interest and development policy as guided by values and altruism (Tvedt 2007:619).

However, foreign aid is part of Norway's foreign policy, and it is a stated national goal to bring the developmental policy and foreign policy closer together as a whole. This is highlighted in the White Paper *15 Interests, Responsibilities and opportunities, The main features of Norwegian foreign policy*. The report highlights how altruistic interests and Norwegian national interests are not mutually exclusive, but that they rather can overlap. This foreign policy that embodies both altruism and national interest is named "policy of engagement," which "is first and foremost motivated by altruism (...). On the other hand, the broad

globalization processes and geopolitical changes we are seeing today are giving the policy of engagement new significance as it promotes the realization of objectives that are also in Norway's interests" (MFA 2009b:112).

The Norwegian international climate policy, and NICFI as part of it, is one example of such policy of engagement. This case study is one good example of aid allocations that aim to achieve a political goal. There are no clear lines between foreign policy and foreign aid. In the White Paper *Climate, Conflict and Capital —Norwegian development policy adapting to change*, climate change is mentioned as an issue that represents both a common good, and thus is in Norway's interest to preserve, as well as in the poor countries' interest (MFA 2009a:10).

Aid decisions are part and integral to foreign policy and, I will argue, should be studied as such. The same actor-near framework provides a fruitful approach to foreign aid allocation decisions, just as it did to Graham Allison's missile crisis in Cuba (Allison 1969), a FPA pioneer study, which will be outlined in chapter 3.3. It is my argument that using the FPA framework on an aid allocation contributes to important insights and understandings of the dynamics at stake.

3.2 Room for agency

Perhaps the most important asset for this study, has been FPA's actor-specific focus. In the first edition of the journal *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Valerie Hudson (2005) gives an overview of what characterizes FPA, both historically and contemporarily. FPA is seen against mainstream IR theory with its favoring of grand theories. FPA on the other hand, takes context, human agency and power into the theoretic and analytic approach. Hudson traces FPA back to the late 1950s, when several paradigmatic works were published. Works like *Decision Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Snyder et al. 1954) "inspired researchers to look *below* the nation-state level of analysis to the players involved" (Hudson 2005:6, emphasis in original). In FPA, "states are not agents because states are abstractions and thus have no agency" (Hudson 2005:2). Thus, FPA will analyze the actions of specific individuals, and not the state, which is discarded as a "metaphysical abstraction" (Snyder et al. in Hudson 2005:6).

Perhaps the most famous example of a foreign policy analysis taking agency into account is Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Allison 1969). Here Allison provides an early example of the benefits of an integrated analysis beyond the standard rational model, which supposes a rational, unitary state. He outlines three models of analysis, which are supplementary and give an integrated analysis when combined. The most important insight is perhaps the appreciation of an integrationist theoretical perspective, and the observation that the conceptual lens used will determine the answer to a research question (Carlsnaes 2008:90). Allison's model II and III have inspired the third part of analysis.

The first of Allison's models is the "Rational Policy Model," which tries to identify the "objective" interests of the state. But this, as Allison shows, will only be a partial explanation. Allison suggests a Model II: "Organizational Behavior," where he focuses on the politics inside the government. Here the observed outcome or the foreign policy decision is seen as an output of the Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) of the organization from which the decision emerged. Model III "Bureaucratic Politics" considers the actors themselves as important agents, and is very relevant to my case. Here, governmental choices can be seen "as outcomes of bargaining games" among many different players in the national government. In an analysis, the perceptions, motivations, positions, power, and maneuvers of principal players are important: "What moves the chess pieces is not simply the reasons which support a course of action, nor the routines of organizations which enact an alternative, but the power and skill of proponents and opponents of the action in question" (Allison 1969:707). The model asks some core questions: "Who plays? Whose views and values count in shaping the choice and action?" Within this model the researcher also tries to establish "what factors shape each player's (a) perceptions (b) preferred course of action; and thus (c) the player's stand on the issue" (Allison 2008:227).

Allison's article has become highly influential, but has also met criticism. Bendor and Hammond (1992 in Mintz and De Rouen 2010:74) conclude that the rational actor model is poorly specified and set up as a straw man. Basing the two next models on a model that is set up to fail magnifies the problem (Mintz and DeRouen 2010:75). Allison's models have, however, developed over the years, both by various theoreticians of IR and not least by Allison himself (see, for example, Allison 2008). The last two models of organizational behavior and bureaucratic politics soon merged into a single model called "Governmental Politics"⁹ (Hill 2003:85). Being aware that Allison's Model I is overly superficial, I still make use of insights provided by Allison's article. I will develop my use of Allison in chapter 3.4.3 "Governmental politics." But let me first turn to a more recent FPA theorist that has informed the larger structure of my analysis.

3.3 Hill: Three sources of foreign policy

Christopher Hill, like Allison, operates with a three-fold division when analyzing what influences foreign policy. Hill's book *Understanding Foreign Policy* (2003) is divided into three parts entitled "Agency", "The International" and "Responsibility". Under these headlines, Hill discusses governmental politics, the international system and domestic factors that will influence foreign policy. Hill incorporates Allison's Model II and Model III in his account for Agency and in addition he distinguishes between the international and domestic level. Therefore I find Hill's

⁹ The use of the term "Governmental politics" might cause some confusion, as it has been used both as a term for Model III and to describe Model II and Model III combined. Allison himself changes the name of Model III from "Bureaucratic Politics" in his earliest articles to "Governmental politics" in later versions (See Allison 1969 and Allison 2008). My use of the term "Governmental politics" brings with it elements from both Model II and Model III.

three-folded set-up more appropriate for my case study. The fact that the international level is given more specific attention in Hill (2003) than in Allison (1969) might simply be due to the importance attached to globalization in recent years. At the time of writing “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis” (Allison 1969), the international level was perhaps seen as relatively less significant in an analysis of a country’s foreign policy. Today, in the context of globalization and increased interconnectedness,¹⁰ I find it pertinent to examine how factors at the international level influence foreign policy decision-making. I find that Hill provides a fruitful analytical structure for the study of my case. I will thus adopt Hill’s three-fold division, but rename them *international, domestic, and governmental politics* and will discuss them in that order, both here and in the analysis in chapter six.

The three components, international, domestic, and governmental politics, are intertwined and affected by each other, but I find them to provide a logical analytical division, well-suited to perform a holistic FPA analysis. The structure is commonly used for analyzing foreign policy decision-making (Carlsnaes 2008:88). This three-level approach also incorporates the actor-structure divide. Such three-fold types of analysis will in general focus more on structures at the international level and gradually move to a focus on actors when analyzing the bureaucratic (Carlsnaes 2008:89). This continuum from structures to actors is visualized in figure 2:




Figure 2 Levels of analysis

In my analysis we will, however, also see that it is not only structures that dominate at the international level. Actors can be important also at the international arena, connected through government networks (Slaughter 2001 and 2004) or epistemic communities (Haas 1992). As I opt for a three-fold analysis, my aim is an integrated analysis that manages to point to the links between the three levels. It is this integration that is the main challenge, the theoretical integration of the three levels still being “a potential that remains unfulfilled for the time being” (Hudson cited in Carlsnaes 2008:89). In the following I will examine these three components at some length, as they will structure my analysis in chapter five.

¹⁰ A discussion of the effects of globalization and if the world in fact is becoming more or less connected is not a subject for this report.

3.4 International politics; norms and networks

“What then, from the viewpoint of the actors (and our understanding of them, which is not the same thing) is the ‘international’ like? What are the predominant features of their external environment?” (Hill 2003:164). Hill’s own answer to the question I find a bit too vague to provide fruitful concepts for an analysis. Hill emphasizes the changing nature of “the international” and notes how actors are embedded in structures that they both help constitute and are shaped by (Hill 2003:166). Hill’s conceptualization of the international consists of, on the one hand, a system with “various different levels, mysteriously but definitely interconnected” (Hill 2003:164). This is not a very operational definition. A system with mysteriously connected levels is perhaps a good description of the international reality but is far from helpful in an analysis that needs some clear-cut concepts. Hill’s conceptualization of globalization is that of an “even less systematic notion” (Hill 2003). Therefore, as I make use of his three-part division, I will look to other theoreticians for a conceptualization of the International.

My conceptualization of the international political level is influenced by constructivist stances of FPA. Here, the state’s identity shapes its interests and both the identity and interest are influenced by international society (Barnett 2008:194). For example, commitment to human rights and the spread of democracy will shape a state, and not just concern for security and wealth (Barnett 2008:194). Importantly, following the constructivist foreign policy analysts, states care about what other states in the international society think about them. They want their foreign policy to seem legitimate according to prevailing norms. In this view, states are respected for their ability to defend universal principles, and not their ability to aggressively defend their interests in a Hobbesian world society (Barnett 2008:194). In this line of reasoning, responsible climate aid might also provide a nation with respect and legitimacy.

According to Barnett, while realists focus mainly on communities *within* the state constructivists suggest “a transnational community that encourages states and their societies to be concerned about the welfare of others.” Such communities may be global or regional (Barnett 2008:194) and may be likened to networks. Anne Marie Slaughter conceptualizes the locus of interaction at the international arena with her concept of *Government networks*. Launched in her 2004 book *A New World Order*, the concept unveils a new understanding of how states interact. Instead of looking at a system of states that makes decisions in a rather independent manner, the new world order is marked by webs or networks of government officials, organizations, and multilateral organizations that meet regularly at international conferences. It is within this network that one must look to understand modern and future decision-making, according to Slaughter. She sees the people within these networks as the key actors in foreign policy (Slaughter 2004), a notion that also resonates well with this case study.

The notion of government networks is similar to the concept of “Epistemic communities” as defined by Peter Haas. His definition is networks “of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in

a particular domain or issue-area.” These may not come from different disciplines but share the same normative and principled beliefs and the same perception of causal mechanism, as well as prescription of proper action (Haas 1992:3). As we will see in my analysis (section 6.1.2) it is possible to detect an epistemic community based on an economic logic in this case.

According to Haas, a growing number of decisions are characterized by uncertainty. That is, actors must make choices without “adequate information about the situation at hand” or in the face of “inadequacy of the available general knowledge needed for assessing the expected outcomes of the different courses of action” (Alexander George cited in Haas 1992:14). Under these circumstances, decision makers will typically make use of epistemic communities as advisors. The epistemic communities can be consulted as a justification for choosing policies already decided upon for political reasons, or they can exert real influence both on defining the possible alternatives and on the chosen course of action (Haas 1992:15-16).

3.5 Domestic politics: the four P’s

I find Hill’s analysis of domestic politics to be more concise than his International level and I will make more use of him in this section. The relationship between domestic policy and foreign policy has two dimensions, according to Hill. First, foreign policy is vulnerable to domestic events. Second, foreign policy affects domestic politics (Hill 2003:219). As my research question deals with the influences on a foreign policy decision, and not vice versa, I here focus on the first dimension. It is difficult to generalize exactly how domestic factors influence foreign policy, and those who put too much weight on domestic explanations run the risk of one-dimensional analysis. Hill argues that the domestic and the international both interact, like in Putnam’s notion of the two-level game. Domestic environment shapes foreign policy, in interaction with international factors, or in Hill’s words: “foreign policy is about mediating the two-way flow between internal and external dynamics” (Hill 2003:21). It can be fruitful to imagine foreign policy makers as “Janus-faced” where two different sets of concerns with different logics constantly interact (Hill 2003:221).

Domestic sources both influence and put constraints on foreign policy. Importantly, the domestic environment is far from monochrome; rather it consists of different actors and kinds of activity (Hill 2003:223). Hill conceptualizes the main actors as the four Ps: parliaments, public opinion, pressure groups, and the press. A 2004 publication entitled *Media, Bureaucracies and Foreign Aid: A comparative analysis of the United States, The United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan* (Van Belle et al. 2004) thoroughly analyze the effect of one of Hill’s Ps: the press -and other types of media. They look specifically at how press coverage influence both public opinion and foreign aid allocations and establish through six extensive case studies that media indeed is an important factor when analyzing a country’s foreign aid policies.

In addition, social classes and regime type are also domestic factors that influence foreign policy and provide categories for empirical assessments (Hill 2003:223). An examination of different classes' possible influence on this specific policy decision is beyond the scope of this report. Rather, I will limit myself to Hill's four P's for an understanding of domestic society's influence on foreign policy.

3.6 Governmental politics: the actors at centre stage

Foreign policy analysts question the notion that "states want" or "states act." They see it indispensable to break the actor down to its various levels and components (Hudson 2005). This section builds on Allison's Model II and Model III and makes the actor-near framework of FPA apparent. It looks closer at the organizations and key actors involved in the decision-making. Who were the key actors and what were the positions in the various ministries involved? Was the decision a result of consensus-building or leadership? (Hill 2003:52). In short, *who governs?*

3.6.1 Who governs in foreign policy?

In foreign policy, as opposed to other policy fields, important decisions may be derived without catching the attention of the public eye, as foreign policy issues are not always at the center of popular concerns. Whereas health, education and transport will never go by unseen or uncommented, that might be the case for some parts of foreign policy (Hill 2003:70). Who is it that has the opportunity to handle foreign policy decisions?

According to Hill, the head of state must be included in an analysis of foreign policy, as in most political systems policy will be conducted by the head of government together with the departmental Minister, which in this case means the Minister for International Development and the Environment. In addition there is the group of trusted colleagues who are gathered in the inner circle (Hill 2003:58). These decision makers have the opportunity to dispose a great deal of influence. As external policy requires relatively little legislation, the decision makers have a fairly unstructured decisional environment to exploit. This puts a large responsibility on the relatively small group that handles foreign policy, according to Hill. The formal, political decision-makers have the opportunity to exert leadership and have significant scope to influence events and to personify the state in their actions (Hill 2003:56). This, as I will demonstrate, manifests itself in the Guyana partnership. The governmental politics model also asks how the key actors perceive the situation and thus how they view the preferred course of action (Allison 2008:227). Trying to uncover key actors' "definition of the situation" (Snyder et al. 1954) is thus important in order to understand and analyze foreign policy.

3.7 Challenges related to the FPA framework

I decided on FPA as my framework because I find that overall it allows for a fruitful analysis of the case at hand. It allows the researcher to analyze the actors and bureaucratic entities involved, which is enlightening in this case. But there are some challenges to FPA, which have also been challenges for this report. First, the field of foreign policy is influenced by a wide array of factors ranging from individual traits, via domestic processes to international structures. As James Rosenau put it “little of human behavior falls *outside* the scope of the analysis of foreign policy phenomena” (Rosenau 2008:vii, my italics). Foreign policy phenomena are inordinately complex, and these complexities cannot be assumed away as they are so central to the dynamics of foreign policy. Therefore, one has to select some of the complex phenomena that seem especially relevant and examine these in relation to each other as interactive (Rosenau 2008:vii).

The task of reconstructing a decision-making process is also a challenge in itself. It requires data gathering from different sources, often sources that are not easily accessible. As FPA is an actor-specific framework, the analysis ideally includes in-depth interviews with all the main actors involved to really uncover their ‘definition of the situation’. A thorough FPA research could thus easily become impossible to conduct within the scope of a limited case study. One objection to FPA is that it “requires a ‘back-breaking burden’ of near impossible proportions to be assumed by the analyst” (McClosky cited in Hudson 2005:3). However, my aim is not to provide an in-depth psychological account of the actors involved, as the cognitive strands of foreign policy decision-making approaches tend to aspire to do. Uncovering possible “ulterior motives” is if anything a task for psychologists, and is not among my ambitions for this report. I will rather perform an integrated analysis of the international, domestic, and governmental factors that contributed to the decision.

4 Methodological approach

This report aims at exploring the case in detail, and using the FPA framework to understand the case. It is thus an explorative, rather than theory-testing case study. In this section I outline the methods used to collect the data for this qualitative case study. I have relied most heavily on interviews and document analysis and I present both my informants and type of documents in the following pages.

4.1 Interviews and interview situations

4.1.1 The informants

I have conducted in total 36 focused interviews with various stakeholders in Norway and in Guyana.¹¹ My informants were chosen on the basis of their knowledge and involvement in the partnership and in REDD in general.

In table one is a categorization of my informants.

Table 1 Overview of informants

Country/affiliation	Norway	Guyana
Government officials In Norway: 15 In Guyana: 4 Total: 19	NICFI-Ministry of Environment NICFI/Ministry of Foreign Affairs Minister of International Development and the Environment Norad	Guyana Forestry Commission Office of the President Consultant to the Government
NGOs In Norway: 2 In Guyana: 7 Total: 9	Rainforest Foundation Norway WWF Norway	Conservation International Multi-Stakeholder Steering Committee (MSSC) AmerIndian Peoples Association (APA) Guyana Gold & Diamond Miners association
Multilateral organizations In Norway: 0 In Guyana: 3 Total: 3		The World Bank UNDP IDB
Journalist/other In Norway: 1 In Guyana: 4 Total: 5	Development Today	Stabroek News DFID Canadian High Commission PhD (LSE) on GRIF
Total: 36	Total: 18	Total: 18

¹¹ See appendix I for complete list of informants

4.1.2 *Conducting the interviews*

I used the method of open-ended semistructured interviews, each lasting for about one hour. Semistructured interviews with open-ended questions represent a style commonly used in elite interviewing (Leech 2002:665). When the informants allowed it, I used a tape recorder; otherwise I tried to take as accurate notes as possible underway. Only three informants asked not to be recorded, and these were also the ones that did not wish to be quoted. In Norway the interviews were conducted between April and November 2012, and in Guyana they were conducted during a two-week fieldwork in June 2012.

4.1.3 *On anonymity and quotations*

Many of my informants asked not to be quoted, or to be quoted as anonymous informants. My Norwegian informants were generally more worried about being quoted than my informants in Guyana and some asked not to be quoted as a pre-requisite for discussing the Guyana partnership, they only wanted to “give background information”. There is naturally a trade-off between offering anonymity and the principle of reliability; the transparency is diminished when the researcher cannot state who said what. I sent the quotations to be used in the report for approval from the respective informants. Some of the quotations were amended by the informants and one asked all the quotations to be paraphrased and not quoted directly. This created some extra work and a few quotations that I could not use, but here the concern for the informants weighed more heavily.

4.2 **Documents: access and analysis**

The other main method used in this report is document analysis. I have studied the two White Papers that are most relevant to the study of climate-related aid, namely the *Climate, Conflict and Capital and Interests, Responsibilities and Opportunities*. I have also asked for access to several documents in the Norwegian official electronic archive (OEP). This is a service that allows the public to “follow the political decision-making process on the internet across departmental and agency boundaries. Government agencies publish their public records via OEP, and your order for access will be sent to the responsible agency.”¹²

Here I have received central documents that have confirmed the findings from my interviews. One document that proved very useful is the decision document concerning the agreement with the World Bank to channel money to Guyana, made by the MFA team dealing with NICFI (MFA 2010). Here the differences of opinion between the two ministries are exemplified with separate points stating where KOS in ME does not agree with the considerations made by MFA. Many of the documents I have asked for have been classified as “exempted from the public,” and therefore I have been denied access. Especially documents about on-

¹² Quoted from oep.no (Accessed 07.11.12). All documents that are not openly available to the public have been retrieved from this electronic public records service.

going processes and negotiations or internal working documents were not disclosed. For example, documents regarding potential changes to the GRIF have been difficult to access. The analysis might have been fuller had I gained access to all relevant documents. Irretrievability and inaccessibility are two of the weaknesses for this type of data (Yin 2009:102). According to Yin, the most important function of documents is “to corroborate and augment evidence from other sources” (ibid.:103). In my study, interviews with a wide range of relevant actors have been the main sources of evidence, whereas the documents have served the role of testing my findings, giving clues as to relevant questions to ask, and verifying factual details such as correct dates and names.

4.3 Generalization and Validity

The main objection to case studies is that it does not tell one much beyond the specific case being studied. Very rarely does a case study involve representative sampling from a known population, to provide the kind of statistical sampling typical for surveys (Robson 2011:160). This is true for my case study as well, although my informants argued that the Guyana case did shed light on some mechanisms that are apparent also in discussions around NICFI in general. Through the case it becomes apparent that there are two differing views prevailing in ME and MFA. The Guyana case is a striking exemplification of these differing views. The opinions are very starkly opposed to each other in the Guyana case, because there have been disagreements concerning the choice of country from the very beginning. But the underlying differences of opinion that I analyze are also observable in other REDD partnerships, many informants pointed out. Thus although I have not done sufficient research to justify generalizing from this case, the prevailing view in my interviews is that the Guyana case in a somewhat intense or focused way shows a significant difference of opinion that exists in the MFA and in the ME concerning NICFI. In that way, this report can provide the reader an understanding of some mechanisms that underlie NICFI. It might also give an understanding of how aid decisions can be made under certain circumstances. However, this is not to say that all aid decisions are marked by these dynamics, or that the next REDD country will be elected in the same manner.

5 The Norway-Guyana Partnership

In the analysis to come I discuss *why* Norway chose to enter into partnership with Guyana. But to understand *why*, I find it necessary first to account for *what* actually happened and *how* it happened. In this light, this chapter is to be seen as a preparation for the analysis to come. I will start by providing a chronological account of what happened before and around the making of the partnership. Then I explain how the partnership is set up with the making of a trust fund in the World Bank.

5.1 What happened?

As decisions may be moderated over time, one might be required to study a series of decisions, rather than just one single decision (Hudson, 2007:4). Thus the following is a chronological account of the main events that led to the Norway-Guyana partnership. In the tradition of process-tracing such chronological accounts can shed light on possible causality as well as establish non-causality (George and Bennett 2005). In addition I will provide a more detailed account of the Low Carbon Development Strategy (LCDS), as it represents a key document for Guyana and will be referred to throughout the analysis.

5.1.1 *Guyana and Norway: tracing the process*

Below are the main benchmarks extracted from my interviews and analysis of documents, represented in a list of key events. This list will give the reader a general overview of *what* actually happened, which is necessary in order to appreciate an analysis of *why* it happened. The following account is my interpretation based primarily on interviews of Pharo and Solheim, the GRIF website, the LCDS website, the GRIF decision document (MFA 2010) and Norad's risk assessment (Norad 2010).

1. Guyana's President Bharrat Jagdeo and Norwegian Environment Minister Erik Solheim meet several times during 2008 and 2009 at international conferences.¹³
2. On contact initiated by Guyana, under the UN General Assembly in the autumn of 2008, leader of KOS Hans Brattskar and deputy leader Per Fredrik Pharo meet with President Jagdeo, Climate advisor Shyam Nokta, and advisor Kevin Hogan.
3. Just after the turn of the year, in early 2009 all the above-mentioned actors except President Jagdeo and Minister Solheim meet again in Washington, and discuss the main principles for a potential partnership. They find that they agree on the main points.

¹³ I have been unable to get a more concrete account of when and how Minister Solheim and President Jagdeo actually met. Minister Solheim says he cannot recall exactly when they first talked, only that they had met several times at various international conferences.

4. In February 2009 President Jagdeo visits Norway and has an official meeting with Norway's Prime Minister Stoltenberg. A joint statement released on February 3, 2009 states that Norway and Guyana will collaborate both bilaterally and towards the inclusion of REDD in a post-Kyoto agreement at the international climate negotiations. It is stated that "Norway is prepared to provide performance-based, substantial and sustained compensation for the progress Guyana makes in limiting emissions from deforestation at low levels and further decreasing forest degradation"¹⁴
5. In April 2009 Prime Minister Samuel Hind of Guyana and Prime Minister Stoltenberg both attend a meeting to discuss the importance of rainforests hosted by HRH Prince of Wales of world leaders at St James's Palace.¹⁵
6. The first version of Guyana's LCDS is launched in June 2009. The LCDS is a document that outlines a low-carbon development plan for the country and is titled "Transforming Guyana's Economy While Combating Climate Change".
7. KOS staff member Marte Nordseth and KOS deputy leader Per-Fredrik Pharo work on project documents. Reports are prepared by the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) assessing forestry and governance in the forest sector. In this period MFA express worries about lack of Norwegian presence and experience in Guyana but do not actively try to stop the agreement.
8. October 6, 2009: The support to Guyana is being discussed by the Norwegian ministries. The government decides to initiate a result-based Climate and Forest partnership with Guyana.
9. November 9, 2009: The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and a first joint concept note (JCN) are signed in Guyana by President Jagdeo and Minister Solheim. Norway pledges to provide Guyana up to 250 million US dollars (USD) in the period 2010 to 2015, equaling about 1.5 billion NOK. The document is politically binding, although not legally binding.
10. March 8 to 11, 2010: A delegation from ME and MFA visits Guyana on a so-called "fact-finding mission." They meet with actors from the government, civil society, and donor community.
11. September, 2010: Norad finalizes a risk report on Guyana. A draft version of the report was available March 2010.

¹⁴ See <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/smk/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/samarbeid-norge-guyana-for-a-redusere-kl/joint-statement-on-climate-and-forest-is.html?id=544715>.

¹⁵ See http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/newsandgallery/news/hrh_hosts_a_meeting_of_world_leaders_at_st_james_s_palace_to_2060520190.html Accessed 10.10.12

12. October 2010: The Guyana REDD+ Investment Fund (GRIF) is established with the World Bank as Trustee.
13. November 7, 2011: The first project is approved by the GRIF: Institutional Strengthening in Support of Guyana's LCDS.

It is difficult to state at what exact point the decision of entering into partnership was actually made. Rather than a specific point in time, it was the whole decision-making process that was significant. The MOU was perhaps the most important benchmark, as from then on it was clear that the partnership would happen. The objective of the MoU is

to foster partnership between Guyana and Norway on issues of climate change, biodiversity and sustainable, low carbon development. Of particular importance is the establishment of a comprehensive political and policy dialogue on these issues, and close cooperation regarding Guyana's REDD-plus efforts, including the establishment of a framework for result-based Norwegian financial support to Guyana's REDD-plus efforts (Governments of Guyana and Norway 2009).

But the MoU is not a legally binding document, only expressing political will. According to the current leader of KOS Per Fredrik Pharo (interview), Norway is in a quite unique position in the way that political statements and promises are actually taken seriously by other countries; it is expected that Norway delivers as stated and that Norway will live up to promises made. Here I will treat the decision of entering into partnership with Guyana as a process, with the MoU signed in November 2009 as an important step but not the definite point in time that defined the decision. Hence, events that happened after November 2009 will also form part of the analysis.

5.1.2 *The Low Carbon Development Strategy*

As seen above, the LCDS was launched in June 2009. It is an important document, often referred to in my interviews. As its title indicates, it is a development plan that stakes out a course for the country based on a low-carbon trajectory. The LCDS is subject to regular updates and the last version was released in May 2010. Here, the main areas for investments in a low carbon future are highlighted. The most important component is the building of a hydropower plant, called Amaila Falls. Through this hydropower plant Guyana can exchange expensive and unreliable diesel imported from neighboring countries with clean energy. The plant is planned in the Amazon region, and it is estimated to cause deforestation of 4500 hectares. But the overall output is said to have a positive effect, and Amaila Falls is the flagship of the LCDS: "Yes, it does lead to certain deforestation, but it does also lead to access to clean energy which has a more positive net effect" (interview, Pharo). The building of Amaila Falls has been warned against by RFN, who points to the construction of a new road, which is very often the first step towards increased deforestation. That has invariably been the case for example in Brazil (interview, Olsen).

Other important areas are the development fund and land titling for Amerindian populations. Land titling and demarcation is a contested area in Guyana, with nine percent of its population being Amerindian. The LCDS also outlines investments in green small-scale business development and an increased focus on climate change and biodiversity in research and education. The last point of the strategy is institutional strengthening of the key national institutions that are to follow up the LCDS. These include a Ministry of Environment, an office of climate change, Guyana's follow-up of GRIF, a REDD secretariat, and a project management office (Government of Guyana: 2010).

The critics say the LCDS is little other than a regular development plan, that the Amaila Falls will in itself lead to vast deforestation, and that other alternatives have not sufficiently been examined (interview, Trædal and Olsen). Still, the LCDS makes Guyana one of few developing countries with a clear idea of a green national development (interviews, KOS).

The next section examines in more detail how the partnership is set up and the specific set-up of the GRIF.

5.2 *How it happened: the set-up of the GRIF*

From the inception it was clear for ME that it would have been difficult to partner directly with Guyana (Interview, Solheim, Bendiksbj). They needed a multi-lateral institution, so that Norway did not need to handle the risk of corruption and securing safeguards alone. The GRIF was set up with the World Bank as trustee in October 2010. According to the official GRIF webpage, "the GRIF represents an effort to create an innovative climate finance mechanism which balances national sovereignty over investment priorities while ensuring that REDD+ funds adhere to the highest internationally recognized standards for financial, environmental and social safeguards" (GRIF 2011). This is a temporary mechanism, pending the creation of an international REDD+ mechanism, and in that way it is innovative and a test case. As is clear from figure three, it is a quite complex structure.

What is the organizational structure of the GRIF?

The GRIF has the following structure:

Steering Committee: (Norway and Guyana) – The governing body of the GRIF, chaired by Guyana, that reviews and approves projects. Guyana and Norway are the only voting members. The World Bank as Trustee, Partner Entities and civil society members participate as observers. The first Steering Committee meeting was held by videoconference on November 24, 2010.

Secretariat: Prepares operational manuals and procedures, facilitates Steering Committee meetings and decisions, processes project proposals, and manages public communication. As an interim solution, the Governments of Norway and Guyana will constitute the Secretariat and provide necessary administrative support to the Steering Committee for the operation of the GRIF.

Trustee: The World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) was invited by the Governments of Guyana and Norway to act as Trustee and will be responsible for providing financial intermediary services to the GRIF. The Trustee signs contribution agreements with donors, receives and holds GRIF funds, transfers funds to Partner Entities upon project approval by the Steering Committee and requests from the Partner Entities, and provides financial reporting.

Partner Entities: (IDB, UNDP and the World Bank) – Partner Entities submit projects to the Steering Committee for approval, receive funds and supervise projects according to their own fiduciary, social and environmental safeguards and operational policies and procedures, and report on implementation progress and results.

Implementing Entities: (Guyana Ministries or any other eligible entities according to Partner Entity policies and procedures) – Receive funds from the Partner Entities to implement projects. Partner Entities will enter into agreements with Implementing Entities, which will receive funds from the Partner Entities and be responsible for the implementation of the relevant project or activity. These may include the Government of Guyana or any other entity that is eligible for funding in accordance with the relevant policies, guidelines and procedures of the Partner Entity and approved by the Steering Committee.

Figure 3 Institutional set-up of GRIF

Source: www.worldbank.org/grif

In summary, the money flow will go 1) from Norway to the World Bank, based on continued low deforestation rates in Guyana, 2) from the World Bank to the Partner entities *after* they submit projects and they are approved by the steering committee, then 3) from the Partner entities to Guyana Ministries to actual project implementation. Each project is carried out by the Partner Entities, which are the Inter-American Development bank (IDB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) or the World Bank together with a Ministry or other entity in Guyana. All projects are part of Guyana's LCDS, but must follow the safeguards of the specific Partner Entity in each case.

The set-up is subject to continuous discussions between Guyana, the World Bank, and Norway. The point of controversy is the degree of safeguards attached to the money. Guyana has on several occasions expressed discontent with the fact that the vast majority of the money is still in the World Bank. According to the latest report on the financial status of the GRIF dated May 2012, a total of 69.8 million USD has been transferred from Norway to the World Bank, whereas only 7.2 million is transferred to partner entities. That means that 63 million USD, or 90 percent, is still waiting in the World Bank.

5.2.1 *A hands-off-approach*

Having the World Bank as Trustee of the GRIF makes it possible for Norway to play a limited role. One informant from the donor community said with reference to the 69.8 million USD transferred from Norway to GRIF: "This is huge amounts of money. And that's only parts of it! Up to 250 million is to be spent. I'm sure Norwegian taxpayers would want some people to be there managing it, you know, hands on" (interview, anonymous).

Both representatives from the World Bank and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) said in interviews that they offered office space to Norwegian bureaucrats, in order for them to be more involved in the projects on the ground. But Norway did not take the offer. When asked, the NICFI office in the ME says they cannot recall any such offer: "I think presence is important and positive, but it does not solve all our problems. There will still be challenges" (interview, Brattskar). Another informant in NICFI says that it is possible to evaluate progress without a presence in Guyana, through regular visits and reports from the World Bank and UN system in addition to reports from the Embassy in Brasilia: "We get reports on the implementation of the agreed enabling activities and interim performance indicators, plus independent verification of those reports. We also follow the media coverage both there and elsewhere" (interview, Tveteraas). However, the verification has been criticized, among others from the Rainforest Foundation in Norway (RFN) for focusing too much on interviews with government officials and not the affected populations. This is expressed in a letter to the former leader of KOS, Hans Brattskar, from five organizations including RFN. Other informants in Guyana use words like "amazing" that Norway has no one on the ground in Guyana considering the vast amount of money involved.

The involvement of a multilateral partner worked as a risk mitigation measure. Trusting the safeguards of the World Bank, Norway was not left alone with the responsibility partnering with a country where there were issues of corruption and lack of transparency. Steven Grin, a Wall Street economist who has been Guyana's consultant in the GRIF, explains: "The fact that there were no prior relations between Norway and Guyana means there was no trust. I don't want to use the word mistrust, but no trust. Therefore it has taken time to build that trust" (interview, Grin). It was because of this lack of prior experience and lack of trust that a trust fund had to be made. But according to one informant this was problematic, as Norway let the World Bank be "the bad guy in the middle" having to take all the criticism (interview, anonymous). According to this informant, the relationship between Guyana and the World Bank has become considerably worse since the partnership began.

I will now proceed to my main question, namely why Norway chose Guyana as a REDD partner. I will look at international, domestic and governmental factors to explain and analyze the question.

6 **Why did Norway enter into REDD-partnership with Guyana?**

In this main part of this report I discuss why Norway entered into partnership with Guyana using the FPA framework. I will structure my findings according to my theoretical framework adapted from Hill (2003): international, domestic and governmental politics. I thus aim to show that all three aspects played an important part in the decision-making, and that FPA proves a fruitful lens through which the partnership can be analyzed. As Hill convincingly argues, all three aspects are important, and no all-encompassing perspective can explain a foreign policy outcome satisfactorily. But first, what were the official reasons Norway chose Guyana for REDD partnership?

On the official NICFI material Guyana's historically low deforestation is highlighted: "To provide a working example of how to incentivize countries with high forest coverage and low deforestation, Norway and Guyana entered into a climate and forest partnership in November 2009" (NICFI 2012). Also on Norad's webpage on Norway's aid relationship with Guyana, it is stated that the country was chosen because it has shown great political will both nationally and internationally to take care of its forests and thus contribute greatly to the fight against climate change (Norad 2011). The fact that Guyana is a high coverage-low deforestation country was the starting point. But there were other alternatives with that feature, like Congo and Gabon. Papua New Guinea was also discussed but found politically unmanageable (interview, Pharo).

Thus three features have been highlighted as features that made Guyana an attractive REDD partner: 1) a high coverage-low deforestation country (Norway was actively seeking a country that could represent this group); 2) strong political will with a very active president, and 3) it was small enough so that the Norwegian funds could actually make a difference. In fact, there were very few other options available that had all these features (interview, Pharo). One detail that also is worth mentioning is that Guyana is the only one out of the countries mentioned as possible alternatives that is English-speaking. That has not been hailed as an important aspect in my interviews, but it may also have helped facilitate contact. Most importantly though, according to Pharo, Guyana was looked upon as a visionary country that matched well with what Norway wanted to achieve with NICFI. This was because Guyana was willing to: "a) maintain deforestation at its extremely low historical level, b) spend the money 'earned' from REDD+ on climate adaptation and a transition to a low carbon economy, including renewable energy, and c) through a pay for performance approach" (interview, Pharo). It was a perfect package for KOS: "At a general level, this is a win-win value proposition from our point of view" (interview, Pharo).

The above-mentioned features are all important aspects that provide a partial answer to the research question *Why did Norway enter into REDD+ partnership with Guyana?* But in order to provide a complete and comprehensive answer, I will dig deeper into a wider range of influences, from international norms and networks to the institutional set-

up of NICFI. To understand the different factors that made Norway choose Guyana, I will analyze international, domestic and governmental factors. International factors include global climate change and the emergence of REDD which provided a context that made a large-scale climate initiative in relation to forests possible. President Jagdeo is important as an actor on the international arena, connected to Norway through government networks.

Nationally there are fewer factors directly providing explanations for the Norway-Guyana partnership, but it is important to the analysis to explain how NICFI could become reality. When analyzing domestic explanations, I discuss the four Ps as developed by Hill (2003). Here both public opinion and pressure groups played a crucial role in making NICFI happen, but did not advocate Guyana specifically.

My last part visualizes the importance of an actor-specific analysis, which takes perceptions of key actors seriously. Here, we find that different opinions in the Norwegian political landscape and in the bureaucracy prevailed, but that the choice of Guyana as REDD partner became a political decision. The decision would go through no matter the objections from the aid bureaucracy who worried about lack of experience and risks of corruption. The partnership was to serve as a model and it was important to cast it as a success story. This was a climate political decision first, and an aid allocation second.

6.1 The international level

6.1.1 Deforestation and global climate change

NICFI is a large-scale climate initiative and must be understood in the context of global climate change. According to Lunde and Thune et al. (2008):¹⁶

It is difficult to envisage an area where global interconnections are more evident and borders between nation states less relevant than that of climate. The global climate challenge is the very quintessence of the new demands being made of foreign policy in a world of merging social systems, erasing in practice the borders between countries (Lunde and Thune et al. 2008:80).

After 2006 most policy makers agreed that the seriousness of climate change was undeniable. The Stern Review and the IPCC report added momentum to the plea of forested countries that advocated a REDD regime, which up until then had been seen as “interesting, but a little bit on the side” (interview, Tvetraas).¹⁷ On the one hand the reports made it

¹⁶ Their book *National Interest. Foreign policy for a globalized world, the case of Norway* is issued as part of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Refleks-project, but is meant to be an independent contribution and not the official view of the Norwegian government or Foreign Ministry.

¹⁷ Whenever a quotation has been translated from Norwegian without the informants having reviewed the English version, I will provide the original quotations. Most of the quotations have been sent to informants for approval and alterations have then been made directly in the English versions. In these cases, I do not find it necessary to add the

clear that climate change was a serious threat, and on the other they suggested reduced deforestation measures as a cost-effective measure to fight it. It was estimated that deforestation accounted for almost a fifth of global greenhouse gas emissions, and thus it was a sector that had to be included in a global climate regime.

The situation of the international climate negotiations and the seriousness which was clear after the IPCC-report made us actively seeking large-scale solutions. The sum of the climate debate contributed to the possibility of such an ambitious project as this one (interview, Tveteraas).

Here, Tveteraas refers to NICFI as a whole. But to establish a large scale REDD initiative technological developments were crucial. The last years have seen a rapid growth of monitoring systems, which made it possible to verify actual deforestation. NICFI could not have become operational had that not been the case (interview, Brattskar).

This context was without doubt important to make Norway take a large-scale climate and forest initiative. Let me now turn to another important aspect, -the economic nature of the agreement.

6.1.2 REDD as PES: an economic fix

Important in the REDD paradigm is the notion of PES (Payment for Ecosystem Services). A PES scheme is defined by CIFOR as “a voluntary transaction in which a well-defined environmental service (ES), or a form of land use likely to secure that service, is bought by at least one ES buyer from a minimum of one ES provider, if and only if the provider continues to supply that service (conditionality)” (CIFOR 2011). The idea is that the ES provider, be it an individual farmer or a state, provides a service by (in the case of REDD) abstaining from deforesting. In the PES scheme there are no demands as to how the service provider spends the money. The conditionality lies in continued supply of the service, meaning continued low or even lowered deforestation rates.

Thus, PES is driven by an inherently economic logic. Interesting in this regard is that the two main negotiators from the Guyanese delegation are two economists hired as consultants, Steven Grin and Kevin Hogan. Both have been repeatedly referred to in my interviews as very central actors in making the partnership happen. In Norway, the REDD idea may have appealed particularly to Prime Minister Stoltenberg, also being an economist. Ever since Stoltenberg was a state secretary in ME in the early nineties, he has been advocating that the climate crisis must be solved in an economically reasonable way. The main actors involved on both the Norway and Guyana sides can be seen as part of this larger epistemic community. One feature of epistemic communities is that they define some aspects of reality. They agree on one version of reality and out-define others. In this case I will argue that particularly developmental aspects of REDD were given less emphasis, which is an argument I

original Norwegian quotations. Minister Solheim did not request his quotations for approval, and I have therefore added the Norwegian translation to his quotations.

further develop in the section on governmental politics. The negotiations dealt with economic terms and the negotiators were World Bank officials and economic consultants. This fact underscores the point made in the section above: namely, that this was first and foremost seen as a partnership dealing with Payment for Ecosystem Services, and thus should be dealt with in economic and financial terms.

PES differs from traditional foreign aid, which is not to be used freely but rather on pre-defined developmental objectives. Norway's REDD partnership with Guyana is influenced by the PES idea, but the money used comes from the foreign aid budget. This is a contested issue, which I will come back to in chapter 6.3 and seven. Here it suffices to say that NICFI was established as a PES initiative, but that the only possible way to make it happen was through the aid budget (interview, Solheim).

There is also a moral stance apparent among my KOS informants: namely, that Western countries have historically polluted the atmosphere and must be the ones paying for the damage. One of the NICFI officials said:

These are models for collaboration, partnerships between a rich country like Norway and poor countries where there is less of a donor and aid recipient relationship. They provide a global service; they take care of the world's rainforests and thus help mitigating climate change. That is a service we ought to reward (interview, Tveteraas).

But the incentive-based economic logic in PES may meet difficulties on the ground, especially in states like Guyana. An article by Karsenty and Ongolo (2011) is one of very few studies that address Guyana in particular. The authors question the very basis of REDD in their paper, instructively entitled "Can 'fragile states' decide to reduce their deforestation? The inappropriate use of the theory of incentives with respect to the REDD mechanism." In this article Karsenty and Ongolo sow doubt about the ability of "fragile states" to implement the appropriate policies and measures, based on a cost-benefit analysis of anticipated financial rewards (Karsenty and Ongolo:2011:38).

When discussing Guyana in particular they critically question the hypothetical baseline scenario developed for the country. This was developed by McKinsey and entitled "Economically rational land-use scenario." In this scenario, 90 percent of Guyana's forests are to be converted into industrial crops over the next 25 years, which means that Guyana's deforestation rate would become 4.3 percent per year (Karsenty and Ongolo 2011:42), as opposed to 0.03 percent, which is the current rate.

The opportunity cost of avoided deforestation (on the basis of this scenario) was estimated by McKinsey to be \$580 million per year. This "offer", which many considered to be an ecological form of blackmail, had no takers, but Guyana has Norway's commitment to pay up to \$250 million for implementation of policies and measures to conserve forests, provided that the national deforestation rate does not exceed 0.275% per year — leaving the

country some leeway given the current (lower) rate (Karsenty and Ongolo 2011:42)

This baseline scenario was referred to by many of my informants. KOS did not buy the McKinsey scenario; they looked at it as “illustrative but totally unrealistic” (interview, Pharo). Rather than adopting the scenario developed by McKinsey, deforestation reference levels were developed based both on the historical deforestation levels in Guyana and the global reference level. These levels give Guyana leeway to actually increase its deforestation rate, given the historically extremely low rates. But if the deforestation increases beyond 0.05 percent a mechanism is in place that gradually decreases the estimated payments.¹⁸

6.1.3 Government networks

“(...) More evanescent are the individual actors who can emerge from almost anywhere, with an impact of unpredictable nature and duration. Who would have said that Princess Diana would have become a crusader against land mines, causing controversy inside her own state on a matter of defense policy?” (Hill 2003:224).

And who would have thought that her former husband, Prince Charles, would have anything to do with the Norway-Guyana REDD partnership?

In fact, Prince Charles was no less than “instrumental in bringing forest countries together” (interview, Nokta) and provided an arena for key actors from Norway and Guyana¹⁹ to meet. According to Anne Marie Slaughter, the main source of policy decisions is to be found in the range of conferences and meeting places that together comprise what she calls “the new world order.” One of these arenas that facilitated contact between Minister Solheim and President Jagdeo is the Prince’s Rainforest Project.²⁰

Through this project, Prince Charles hosted a meeting in April 2009 inviting world leaders to St James’s Palace to raise awareness of the tropical deforestation and the need for emergency action to halt it. Prime Minister Stoltenberg and Guyana’s Prime Minister Samuel Hind were among the officials who attended the meeting. The Prince had a special connection to Guyana, being the Royal Patron of the Guyanese nature conservation project called Iwokrama. According to Steven Grin, Guyana’s GRIF advisor, “Prince Charles was a kick-starter, a facilitator of the Guyana-Norway relationship” (interview, Grin). Prime Minister Stoltenberg has also mentioned Prince Charles’ important role in the

¹⁸ See the Joint Concept Note for more detailed information on the incentive structure: http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/MD/2011/vedlegg/klime/klime_skogprosjektet/Guyana/JointConceptNote_31mars2011.pdf (Accessed 06.11.12)

¹⁹ Informants have differed in their account of who actually met through the project. Prime Minister Stoltenberg, Minister Solheim, President Jagdeo, and Prime Minister Hind have all been mentioned.

²⁰ According to the website “the Project’s work was largely concluded in Oslo in May 2010 when over fifty Governments launched the R.E.D.D.+ Partnership..” I have not succeeded in establishing contact with The Prince’s Rainforest Project, but information about the project can be found here: <http://www.rainforestsos.org/>

work to reduce deforestation. At the Oslo Climate Conference on May 27, 2010, Stoltenberg invited Prince Charles to hold the opening speech and he was given the credit for having brought several countries' leaders together to form forest partnerships. At this occasion, HRH The Prince of Wales said in his keynote speech:

I have endeavored to create a global public, private and NGO partnership to discover an innovative means of halting tropical deforestation. Success would literally transform the situation for our children and grandchildren and for every species on the planet. Failure, I'm afraid, is inconceivable

- HRH The Prince of Wales (2010).

6.1.4 Jagdeo: Champion of the earth I

My informants have all pointed to the pivotal role of Guyana's former President, Bharrat Jagdeo. He was highly vocal on the international scene, representing a strong voice from the tropical South. He was very influential in focusing on the countries that have not yet started deforesting, and the importance of creating incentives also for them, and not only for countries that already have high deforestation rates. In 2010 he won the UN Champion of the Earth prize and is today "Roving Ambassador for the Three Basins" (Amazon, Congo Basin, and South East Asia). In March 2012, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) announced that he would become the IUCN High Level Envoy for Sustainable Development in Forest Countries and Patron of Nature.

Power in Guyana lies in the office of the president (interviews, Liang, Patel, anonymous). The ministries have little power, and most decisions are made by the President himself or his close allies. The initiative of the LCDS is seen as President Jagdeo's own and not an initiative by Guyana as a country. One informant characterizes the former Guyanese President as an extremely powerful, dynamic, and charismatic leader. He is very well-connected, having been both Minister of Finance and then President for two terms, which is the maximum according to Guyanese constitution. According to the informant, he could also be dogmatic, determined and aggressive and outright angry if he did not get his way (interview, anonymous).

That anger has been felt most heavily by the World Bank, which has felt Jagdeo's discontent throughout the partnership.²¹ But Stoltenberg, too, became the subject of Jagdeo's anger. At the COP-16 in Cancun in 2010 Jagdeo complained that the money from Norway was not coming even though Guyana had met the conditions. *The Guardian* quotes Jagdeo saying: "It's a nightmare. It is a test of the sincerity of the developed world, and the delivery on development assistance has been abysmal" and "We have not seen a single cent expended as yet on the projects that are so vital to transformation" (President Jagdeo cited in *The Guardian*,

²¹ I refer to the relationship between Jagdeo and the World Bank in chapter 5.2.1, "A hands-off approach."

2010). Such comments did not help in showcasing the partnership as a model for the world. *The Guardian* reported: “There was a burst of applause. Stoltenberg, who had been staring hard at Jagdeo during his speech, did not join in” (*The Guardian* 2010).

But Jagdeo’s role as a visionary leader with political will to make a model for rainforest countries is what makes him a central actor in my analysis. His voice was very strong in the international arena. Like Solheim, he has been granted the prize “Champion of the Earth,” awarded by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP). Solheim calls him “a very positive and active president” who was eager to place Guyana on the international arena and personally concerned about climate change: “He invoked confidence, there was no doubt that he meant what he said” (interview, Solheim). One informant described him saying “Jagdeo is a good salesman” (interview, Ram). Most of the informants pointed to President Jagdeo as the main reason for why Guyana was chosen. One informant said:

“It’s a mystery why we chose Guyana. I guess Jagdeo is to blame, or has the honor, for that. Minister Solheim and Prime Minister Stoltenberg were eager to make NICFI work fast. They wanted to show that we actually did something and to build this new paradigm” (interview, anonymous).

The idea was that with the eager president in Guyana results could come quickly, and, as I will develop further in section 6.3, that was precisely what Norway needed.

6.1.5 Concluding remarks

In this section I have examined the international factors that contributed to the Norway-Guyana partnership. In an examination of the international, the context of global climate change becomes important. A large-scale climate initiative would not have gained momentum had the understanding of global climate change been absent. Thus, several strong contributions that showed the seriousness of climate change comprised an important backdrop of NICFI. This perception of the seriousness of climate change, combined with the economic logic of PES, made REDD an appealing option. There is no reason to doubt that this resonated well with the economist Prime Minister Stoltenberg. To understand the Guyana decision in particular, one must in addition bring into the analysis the government networks that facilitated contact between Norway and Guyana. But the international level is not exclusively about structures. It has also proved fruitful to be “actor-specific” as FPA advocates. Chapter 6.1.4 shows how former president of Guyana, Jagdeo, played a crucial part. Jagdeo and his political power are principal reasons why Norway chose Guyana. Following my analysis framework, I will next proceed to what domestic factors can explain the partnership. As outlined in chapter 3, I conceptualize the domestic level comprising of the four Ps: the press, public opinion, parliament, and pressure groups.

6.2 Domestic explanations: The four Ps

6.2.1 Press and other media

It is not difficult to see how media can exert influence when covering wars or famines. Guyana, however, is not a country that looms high the Norwegian public. There has been very little media coverage of Guyana, both before and after it became Norway's second largest bilateral REDD recipient. When searching for the words "Guyana" and "rainforest" in the press in the Norwegian media monitor Retriever, relatively few articles come up, as seen in figure four:²²




Figure 4 Guyana and its rainforest in Norwegian printed media

Source: Media search at retriver.no

The figure shows the prevalence of the word Guyana combined with rainforest in Norwegian printed media. Taking into consideration that the search includes 110 printed newspapers and that articles that only mention Guyana without the country being its main focus are also included, the numbers seen in figure four must be considered very low. As I seek to explain the background for the partnership, it is most interesting to look at the numbers before 2010. In 2006 there is a top with 11 articles mentioned Guyana and the rainforest, with articles on logging, Amerindian tribes, and governance challenges. These articles are all published in smaller, local newspapers, however. After that, very few articles mention Guyana until the signing of the MoU in November 2009. 17 out of the 21 articles that mention Guyana during 2009 were published

²² All searches have been done in <http://retriever.no/>, accessed 10.11.12. Retriever is Scandinavia's largest media monitor. For simplicity I have only included printed media. All searches are meant to be illustrative. A thorough media analysis is outside of the scope of this report.

during November and December, which means that preceding the signing of the MoU, the press kept quiet about this small, tropical country.

Also in comparison with the other bilateral REDD countries, the picture is clear: in relation to rainforests, Guyana is mentioned in a total of 106 times in the printed press, whereas Indonesia and Brazil is mentioned 656 times and 1222 times respectively. The lack of media coverage is an indication that the press cannot be said to have influenced the decision of electing Guyana as a partner country. Also the critical articles about Guyana are quite few; among them is the Christian newspaper *Vårt land* with a publication questioning the Amaila Falls project and the independent monthly publication *Development Today*, which is mostly read by development professionals. *Development Today* has a special section on the Norway-Guyana Partnership and has written seven articles on the topic so far.²³

Searching for “deforestation” and “climate change” adds to the picture of the media’s role in relation to NICFI. The result can be seen in figure five.




Figure 5 Climate change and deforestation in Norwegian printed media

Source: Media search at retriever.no

23 Development Today series on Norway-Guyana available at: http://www.development-today.com/norway-guyana_forest_deal Accessed 27.10.12. One could argue that the readers of Development Today represent examples of what Hill calls the “attentive public” who may affect foreign policy (Hill 2003: 262). But it is difficult to trace an influence on policy stemming from these articles.

The graph shows the historical prevalence of the words “climate change” (in blue) and “deforestation” (in yellow). Both search words shows a stark increase from 2006 to 2007, indicating a markedly heightened focus on these issues. This matches the time when the Stern review and IPCC report were published as explained in section 6.1.1, and is a further indication on the overall focus that was given to these issues. The media thus may to some extent be a factor for climate action but seems like a poor explanation for the Guyana partnership in particular.

Irene Øvstebø Tvedten argues that NICFI has become depoliticized and that decisions are taken concealed from the general public (Tvedten 2011). Controversies and issues within NICFI are viewed as technical and not political. This depoliticization can explain the lack of media coverage about NICFI and about deciding on specific partner countries. So then, what about the public opinion?

6.2.2 *Public opinion*

According to Hill, there is a widespread ignorance among the general public about the details of foreign affairs (Hill 2003:263). This seems to be true also with regards to foreign aid, which became apparent in a poll issued by Norad (Norad 2012). Only one percent knew which country received the most aid funding, and only 34 percent of the population say they are interested in Norwegian foreign aid. To put it bluntly, the majority of the Norwegian public cares little about knowing how the 28 billion NOK spent annually on the foreign aid budget is used. However, 60 percent think Norway has an obligation to give aid and 65 percent think international development is beneficial for Norway as well. The picture of an uninterested general public can also be nuanced by recent TV series and public debate about the effects of Norwegian foreign aid.

This public support to Norwegian aid-spending can be seen in light of Terje Tvedt’s notion of the ‘Do-gooder Regime’(Tvedt 2007:621). As constructivist FPA directs attention to, a state’s aid allocation is deeply rooted in a state’s national culture. Canada is an example of a country whose national identity is inclined toward positive international action (Barnett 2008:194). Norway is another such country (Tvedt 2007). According to Tvedt, this national identity has developed into what he calls a national “Do-gooder Regime.” This notion refers to the unique standing and legitimacy of the field of international development and foreign aid in Norway; in fact, the whole nation supports it, according to Tvedt (2007:621). This broad consensus makes it possible to dramatically change the content of development policies without waking public debate. The aid budget is described as a measure of the nation’s ability to care, and thus becomes a “thermometer of the country’s moral status” (Tvedt 2007:629).

In this light, public opinion seem to give support for spending aid in general, but gives little explanation value for the Guyana decision in particular. Neither the media nor public opinion was a driver, but on the other hand there has been little protest, so neither of the two can be said to have posed constraints either.

6.2.3 Parliament

NICFI has broad support in the Parliament from all parties except the Progress Party. The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) has been the watchdog in Parliament, following different aspects of the initiative. According to Hill, FACs rarely exert strong influence on a country's foreign policy. That becomes apparent from the "relatively infrequent plenary debates on foreign affairs" in the national assembly, where "only a small proportion of members is informed and interested about foreign affairs" (Hill 2003:257).

Still, it is the FAC that has the opportunity to function as watchdog and quality controller (Hill 2003:257). In Norway, the FAC is comprised of members from the seven main political parties. In the FAC's recommendation on the White Paper *Climate, Conflict and Capital*, several important aspects concerning NICFI are highlighted. The committee affirmed that they supported the initiative holding that it is "a strategic follow-up on the Climate Settlement to tackle climate change, and that the fight against deforestation is intrinsically attached to poverty alleviation and sustainable economic development" (FAC 2008:24). They do, however, express criticism about the financing. The committee suggest a new post on the National Budget called "Financing of Global Common Goods." Where development and poverty alleviation is not the main purpose, the financing should be kept outside of the aid budget (FAC 2008:25). If not, the committee warns that we will see a diffusing of what can be labelled aid, and that climate measures can become at the expense of the fight against poverty (FAC 2008:26).

In FAC's recommendation to the 2012 national budget, Guyana is specifically addressed. In this recommendation the general support of NICFI is again highlighted, although the members from the Conservative Party and the Norwegian Christian Democratic Party note the high risks in parts of NICFI and asks how the Government ensures that the large payments in fact give the intended effects (FAC 2011:65). The members from the Progress Party "note a considerable pressure for REDD+ payments in general and for Guyana in particular." These members accuse the government for expressing that it is "more important that the aid flow continues than that it gives results" (FAC 2011:64, my translation).

There is no evidence of the Parliament or the FAC having actively supported the Guyana decision. Importantly, the Parliament was behind NICFI as a whole, but when it comes to Guyana there seems to have been expressed skepticism if anything. It seems thus that the Parliament, like the press and public opinion, cannot explain the Guyana decision. If anything, Parliament discouraged it.

6.2.4 Pressure groups

The point of departure was the Climate settlement from 2007. At that point I had just become Development Minister and the government had put forward a climate bill that was being criticized for not being strong enough. It was very criticized by the opposition. So we were looking for something new to do, and then came the suggestion from Lars and Lars that Norway should set aside a substantial amount of money to save the rainforest. It was possible exclusively because Norway was in that situation (interview, Solheim).²⁴

The suggestion from Lars and Lars refers to the leader of Norway's rainforest Foundation, Lars Løvold, and the Chairman of Friends of the Earth Norway, Lars Haltbrekken, and their letter proposing the idea of a large-scale climate and forest initiative. This letter became known as "The Letter from Lars & Lars."

"Well, you need someone with an idea, Lars and Lars, and someone to carry it through, me" (interview, Solheim).²⁵ Even though they have been credited for being the idea-makers behind NICFI, civil society groups did not play an important role when it came to the selection of Guyana. RFN had projects in many other Amazon states, but not Guyana. In an article in *Development Today* published September 9, 2012, leader of RFN Lars Løvold says Norway should have chosen the Congo Basin instead of Guyana, as the forests of the former are of such an important size (*Development Today* 2012). RFN was by far the most important pressure group the starting phase of NICFI, and it is clear that they did not advocate specifically for Guyana (interview, Olsen).

6.2.5 Concluding remarks

In this section I have shown domestic factors that did and did not contribute to the decision of Guyana as REDD partner country. When reviewing the media coverage on Guyana it becomes clear that the press provides a poor explanation for the choice of Guyana. There seem to be no ground for advocacy for Guyana in Norwegian media; rather, the coverage about the country reflects the minimal interest it has in Norwegian public. Public opinion, too, provides little explanation for the Guyana decision. It did not influence the choice, and it did not put constraints on the decision-makers. The general public is little involved and interested in Norwegian aid, but as Tvedt argues, the country's self-understanding is that of an "humanitarian super power," which is also reflected in the poll stating that 60 percent are of the opinion that Norway has an obligation to give aid.

²⁴ My translation. Original quotation: "Utgangspunktet var Stortingets klimaforlik fra 2007. Da var jeg akkurat blitt utviklingsminister og regjeringen hadde lagt fram en Klimamelding som jo var veldig kritisert for ikke å være god nok. Den ble veldig kritisert av opposisjonen. Så vi var ute etter noe nytt å gjøre, og så kom det forslag fra Lars Løvold og Lars Haltbrekken (...) om at Norge skulle sette av en god slump penger til å redde regnskog. Det var mulig utelukkende fordi Norge var i den situasjonen."

²⁵ My translation. Original quotation: "Altså du må ha noen som kommer med ideen, Lars og Lars, og noen som driver den igjennom, meg"

The Parliament supported NICFI, but the FAC did express concerns about Guyana due to the lack of Norwegian experience and presence. The explanation is therefore not to be found in the pressure groups either, as no NGO or other pressure group advocated for Guyana. It thus seems that, although the domestic political level was important to provide the necessary support for NICFI, it did not influence the decision to support Guyana specifically, which is my main research focus. To answer the question why Norway chose a REDD partnership with Guyana, one has to look more closely at the actual decision-makers and their views and perceptions. This will be done in the following section.

6.3 Governmental politics

This part relies most heavily on Allison's Organizational and Bureaucratic Politics Model, described in section 3.2. In this section I look more closely at the specific actors that decided to elect Guyana for REDD partnership. This section relies more heavily on interviews than the previous ones, as I here give an account for my understanding of the perceptions of the key actors.

6.3.1 Who plays?

First, who were the main actors in Norway that chose Guyana? As the actor-specific framework FPA underscores, an analysis of foreign policy must include the relevant actors and departmental groups in their analysis. In this case, three institutions are worth mentioning: MFA, ME, and Norad. These are the three institutions that have responsibilities in NICFI. As we will see, the perceptions and priorities differ greatly in these institutions. But let us first discuss two central actors; Prime Minister Stoltenberg and the former Minister for International Development and the Environment, Erik Solheim.

6.3.2 Prime Minister Stoltenberg

As Hill (2003) argues, identifying who holds formal power is one of the tasks of a foreign policy analyst. In a book chapter titled "The Prime Minister's office — the smallest, but the most powerful?" Nils Morten Udgaard shows how the influence of the PMO in Norway has changed over time (Udgaard 2006). The role is usually a coordinating one, rather than a catalyzing one. But the PMO can become very important in those cases where the Prime Minister engages directly and personally (Udgaard 2006:52). That has been the case with REDD. Stoltenberg surprised even his closest colleagues when he announced three billion NOK to be spent annually on preserving the rainforest, in Cancun in 2007. He thus put his name and political prestige behind the REDD billions.

According to some informants, there was pressure from PMO to make things happen fast. The political advisor at the time, Kjetil Lund, has also been described as very influential. He is also part of the board of the Green Fund and has experience with CDM. According to some informants, PMO was eager to get results fast and pushed KOS to deliver results. It has been difficult to assess the influence by PMO, and the opinions of my informants have varied on the issue. The next key actor

discussed, Minister for International Development and the Environment Solheim, said that Prime Minister Stoltenberg was important in that he decided to opt for NICFI, but when it came to the Guyana decision, he let Solheim decide for himself without influencing.

6.3.3 *Solheim: Champion of the Earth II*

In his letter to Minister Solheim when leaving office, President Jagdeo states: “Your personal dedication has been a major reason why we have travelled this far” (Jagdeo: 2011). There is no reason to think otherwise. The two Champion of the Earth award winners respected each other and are without doubt a major reason why the partnership happened. Solheim has been especially engaged in the Guyana partnership and calls it the project that is closest to his heart.²⁶ He says, “What is unique is that the forest is close to intact. It is a fascinating country, and it’s funny that it’s a country that previously was only known for the Jonestown massacre, it was a typical fly-over country. It has meant a lot to Guyana finally being at center stage” (interview, Solheim).²⁷

Guyana is in fact the only country that was completely the decision of ME and has become a symbol case for KOS (interview, anonymous). Historically, in 2007 it was the first time Norway’s Minister for International Development and Minister for the Environment was combined and made into one “Super minister,” as it was called in the press. This institutional detail got attention throughout the world, and was by most of my informants looked upon as modern, and a logical follow-up of the term sustainable development.

When asked about the importance of the fact that the two areas belonged to one minister, Solheim answered: “It would not have been possible had that not been the case. That is because the policy to such a large degree was in ME while the money was in the MFA. No one ever gets a minister to give money to another ministry. We would never have gotten started had I not been in charge of both, that is absolutely certain” (interview, Solheim).²⁸ The importance of this institutional set-up is confirmed by my other informants, such as Pharo: “It was certainly an advantage that Solheim was Minister both for international development and the environment” (interview, Pharo).²⁹ There is no reason to underestimate this bureaucratic detail. Having one minister responsible for both international development and the environment, the bureaucratic setting

²⁶ My translation. The Norwegian word is “hjertesak”, which does not have a straight-forward direct translation to English.

²⁷ My translation. Original quotation: “Det enestående er at skogen er nær intakt. Det er et fascinerende land, morsomt med et land som det eneste det var kjent for var massakren i Jonestown, det var et typisk ”Fly-over country.” Det har betydd mye for Guyana endelig å være i sentrum.”

²⁸ My translation. Original quotation: ”Det hadde vært helt umulig å få gjennom hvis ikke det hadde vært tilfelle. Det skyldes at politikken i så stor grad lå i MD mens pengene lå i UD. Ingen får noen minister til å gi pengene til et annet departement. Vi hadde aldri kommet i gang hvis ikke jeg hadde hatt begge deler, det er helt sikkert.”

²⁹ My translation. Original quotation: ”Det var helt sikkert en fordel at Solheim var både utviklings- og miljøminister.”

was in place to facilitate a holistic approach with the coupling of aid and the environment.

Even though Solheim was officially in charge of both the environment with bureaucrats in ME and development, with bureaucrats in the MFA, he was much more aligned with the environmental side, according to my informants. One informant who attended meetings in Guyana had the impression that the Minister did not listen to the aid side in the Ministry, but was only getting advice from and was aligned with the environmental side (interview, anonymous). Other anonymous informants also confirm this view.

In Guyana, Solheim's sudden departure from office³⁰ caused alarm, according to one informant. Some of the informants in Guyana even expressed a worry that NICFI might end, as there were now two ministries instead of one. Their fear is not necessarily based solely on the fact of Minister Solheim having the two responsibilities, but also that he was perceived as so positive towards the Guyana partnership. He had been seen as extremely positive towards the partnership and a personal friend of Jagdeo (interview, anonymous).

As seen, Solheim was a key actor. I will now look closer at the definition of the situation, as perceived by Solheim and KOS.

6.3.4 *Quickly before Copenhagen!*

In my interviews of ME employees, all have highlighted the importance of how they defined the situation at the time of entering in agreement with Guyana. Central was the belief in an internationally binding agreement in Copenhagen that would include forestry. Norway had to show, with real-world examples, that REDD was working.

“The prevailing world view in climate policy circles was that in Copenhagen we would agree on a climate deal that would include forestry in the climate regime after 2013. To support that process, things had to happen quickly, and that demanded political leadership at the highest levels in our partner countries.” (interview, Pharo).

In other words, the MoU signed on November 9, 2009 was a last-minute call, only one month before the UNFCCC COP-15 in Copenhagen. “They were aware of the risks, but under very political pressure from Oslo. They had to do it quickly. And I think they wanted to get it signed before Copenhagen so they did what they could but I think in the end they just had to do it quickly” (interview, anonymous).

In the same line of reasoning is the notion that the money was put on the table and the policies outlined afterwards. As Minister Solheim said: “The money and the ideas came first, then we had to find out how to do this practically” (Solheim, interview). Repeatedly in my interviews the

³⁰ In March 2012 Solheim had to leave office and the development and the environment were again turned into two separate minister postings. The departure, which was against Solheim's own will, is seen as a result of internal workings in the socialist left party.

rhetorical question was asked: Should we wait until all the mechanisms were in place and then go ahead with the partnership? No, we wanted to make things happen, and learn by doing. “We must not let the perfect become the enemy of the good” seems to be a mantra that reflects the understanding in KOS. Solheim put it like this in the joint press release following the signing of the MoU: “We are giving the world a workable model for climate change collaboration between North and South. It’s not perfect, but it’s good, and it will be improved upon as we learn and develop together” (ME 2009).

Financing NICFI from the aid budget was also “ok, but not perfect.” The aid budget was simply the only place they could get the money. This is because the government wanted to achieve the goal of spending 1 percent of the national budget on aid. The three billion NOK would contribute to this goal being reached, whereas keeping it outside of the aid-budget would demand a “re-prioritizing of a completely different scale” (interview, Pharo). Minister Solheim on his side could well have kept it outside of the aid budget:

I believe that the rich countries have filled the atmosphere with CO₂, we have a debt to pay and that we could well pay outside of the aid budget. But if you insist on having it hundred percent your way every time, you never manage to get anything done (interview, Solheim).³¹

In light of this, the fact that the money is development aid seems the result of a necessity.

6.3.5 *The seriousness of climate change*

Another and related feature was the strong understanding of the seriousness of climate change. With that in mind, it became crucial to make things happen in a sector that stood for about a fifth of greenhouse gas emissions.

“The situation of the international negotiations and the seriousness that the IPCC-report made clear meant that we were actively seeking large-scale solutions. The climate debate as a whole contributed to the possibility of an ambitious project like this” (interview, Tveteraas).

Phrases like “this is Norway’s possibility to help avoid the catastrophe” show the importance attached to REDD and NICFI. The initiative is first and foremost a climate initiative, as a result of the understanding of the seriousness of climate change that demanded solutions that could potentially create large emission reductions.

31 My translation. Original quotation: “Jeg mener at vi de rike landene har fylt opp atmosfæren med en CO₂, vi har en gjeld å betale, den kan vi godt betale utenfor bistandsbudsjettet. Men hvis du insisterer på å få det hundre prosent som du vil hver gang, så får du aldri til noe.”

6.3.6 *A new type of aid*

The understanding is also that new power dynamics demands new types of aid. There are increasingly assertive countries in the world that no longer want aid with strings attached, with the donor country deciding on the use of the aid money. With new donors such as China and Brazil that demand less from aid recipients, the recipient countries have more to choose from and do not necessarily want aid from Western countries that tell them what to do. The West is losing its dominance, and that is true also in the world of aid. According to Solheim, there is an “unbelievable arrogance in thinking that we know best” (interview, Solheim). According to Minister Solheim, NICFI represents this new type of aid that has taken this new multipolar worldview into account. This new aid is characterized by more flexibility and a larger space for action for the recipient.

A parallel can be drawn to the work of Eirik Jansen. Also he notes a conflict between future-oriented work versus detailed checking of financial standards.

When one is supposed to think of the big picture with regard to the environment and natural resources, it may easily seem too petty to check the details of financial accounts and grass root activities. This will be defined as the domain of the authorities, and according to the principle of recipient responsibility we must have confidence in their reports. Such attitudes seem to arise when the focus is on the overall, future-orientated work (Jansen 2009:20).

The quote is taken from Eirik G. Jansen’s paper “Does aid work?” as part of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre. He evaluates what went wrong in a Norwegian forestry program in Tanzania, where extensive corruption was revealed. There have been no such revelations in the Guyana case, and Solheim says that Norway is to keep a zero-tolerance for corruption. I still find there to be a parallel. In both cases the petty nitty-gritties are opposing the more visionary future-orientated work on the environment and forestry.

6.3.7 *Another perspective: bad aid*

“It was a very strange country to choose, there is no one here that knows Guyana. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we were skeptical, mostly for practical reasons, we had no presence there.” The quotation is from an informant in the MFA who has worked with and followed the Guyana partnership. All of the informants in the MFA agree that it was a problematic country, and their description differs greatly from the understanding described above, some even calling the choice “stupid.” There seem to be two different lines of thought that become apparent through the partnership with Guyana. The view in the ME is that REDD is something new and important, that demands a higher level of risk-taking than regular aid. In the MFA, on the other hand, the concern is that what has been learned through four decades of aid giving is undermined. The differences are exaggerated by the fact that ME is responsible for the political decisions regarding the REDD partnerships within NICFI,

whereas MFA is responsible for the actual spending and for ensuring that the developmental goals are achieved.

This partnership, one informant said, is outright “bad aid.” “Guyana says no, we want to decide for ourselves. Why? Guyana is among the most corrupt countries in the world. Jagdeo was steering it like his own farm. They don’t even have a law for public procurements!” (interview, anonymous). A few of the informants mentioned that it is problematic how Norway is speaking with two voices.

We have developed routines, management practices, and regulations through years in relation to the Storting and the Auditor General. We’re supposed to keep a zero-tolerance when it comes to corruption. Norway has helped build safeguards in IDB, UNDP, and the World Bank. We have demanded it, as we are in the boards (interview, anonymous).

The dilemma is that Norway is not acting consistently, according to some of my informants. On the one hand, Norway has been an advocate for strong safeguards in the World Bank, and now through this partnership it is seeking to avoid these same safeguards. This was referred to in several interviews as a problematic issue. An example is found in the MFA decision document concerning the making of an agreement with the World Bank to set up the GRIF (MFA: 2010). Here the MFA refers to a memo from ME, where ME recommends that Norway ask the World Bank either to consider a new mechanism, or change the existing mechanism in order to meet Guyana’s needs. In this regard, MFA warned against asking the World Bank to deviate from its standard operational policies concerning assessments of cost effectiveness and development effect. But the request is made, and the World Bank’s reply is that it is not an option to make changes to any of the World Bank’s operational policies (MFA 2010). Such examples put Norway in a bad light, according to the same informants.

According to Solheim, MFA showed their skepticism towards Guyana from the very beginning. But when asked who decided on Guyana, the answer was clear: “The *forest guys*³² and I decided that. If we’d said no, there would have been no partnership, but since we said yes, there was. Nobody else interfered with that” (interview, Solheim).³³ The skepticism from the MFA was noted, but did not prevent approval from being given.

But skepticism was also expressed elsewhere. Other donors had meetings with the Norwegian delegations when they visited Guyana in March 2010. The delegation was warned that Guyana was a difficult country with serious problems when it comes to corruption and public procurements. One informant says that Norway was quite naïve and had

³² In Norwegian, the expression forest people or “skogfolkene” is used for the people working in NICFI, which is also called the forest-initiative for short.

³³ My translation. Original quotation: “Skogfolkene og jeg bestemte det. Hadde vi sagt nei, hadde det ikke blitt noe, men siden vi sa ja så ble det. Det var ingen andre som blandet seg opp i det..”

done too little assessment of political risks and context in Guyana (interview, anonymous). The fact that Norway did not have anyone on the ground in Guyana was questioned and criticized by this and several other informants.

The government of Guyana's key advisor said that the communication with the two ministries has not always been easy: "There are two very different matters of opinion in the two ministries. The dialogue was always good with Solheim. Now with the two ministers it's going to get even more complicated. I believe Norway must have one agency and one minister that is responsible" (interview, Grin). Several informants in Guyana note a difference of opinion in the two ministries.

6.3.8 *Responsibility without influence*

The different opinions in MFA and ME are manifested in the MFA decision document concerning the agreement with the World Bank to establish GRIF (MFA 2010). This document is one of those I was given access to through the online official archive and provided a very interesting addition to my interviews. The document states that "KOS does not share all considerations in the note itself," and where KOS disagrees this is explicitly stated. One example concerns the negotiations with Guyana about the financial mechanism of the GRIF. In one paragraph, these are characterized as difficult and time consuming, largely because the Guyanese side repeatedly says that the funding is considered as PES and that it should not be regarded as development aid. In the document it is noted that KOS wishes to omit the paragraph "both because it is superfluous and because the rendering can at best be characterized as incomplete." MFA on the other hand "thinks that this demonstrates a key point in the discussions with Guyana and the Climate- and Forest Initiative in general" (MFA 2010, my translation).

The different perspectives can to some degree be traced to the fact that the ME and the MFA have different areas of responsibility. Minister Solheim states that the different attitudes in the ME and in MFA are due to the organization and not inherent differences between the two departments. "Usually the MFA is just as risk-willing as the ME. The explanation is more of a human one, that it is ME that has driven this through while the MFA has been on the sideline. Then they get very nervous, fearsome and a bit jealous" (interview, Solheim).³⁴ This is parallel to the notion of roles and how bureaucrats and other professionals get socialized into certain attitudes. Remembering Hill's description of bureaucracies as typically risk-averse, systematic, and conservative, the description fits better in the case of the MFA bureaucrats than the ME bureaucrats.

That might, as Minister Solheim said in my interview, not be because the two departments view risk differently, but because they have different

³⁴ My translation. Original quotation: "UD er som regel minst like risikovillig som MD. Det har heller en menneskelig forklaring, at det er MD som har drevet dette gjennom mens UD har sittet på sidelinja. Da blir de veldig nervøse og fryktsomme og litt sjalu."

responsibilities (interview, Solheim). The ME is responsible for making REDD work politically, and must therefore be concerned with getting fast and visible results: that is, to put it bluntly, to make large payments quickly. The MFA, on the other hand, is responsible for the actual use of this money, and it is therefore natural that they be more skeptical and risk-averse. But not being politically responsible for the actual decisions means exerting little actual influence on how the money is used. This is an unsatisfactory combination, some informants pointed out. Being responsible, one would like to have the influence to decide.

The problem becomes so visual in the Guyana case because it was a country chosen by ME with MFA's objections being largely overruled. In that way, it can be seen as a symbol case of the interdepartmental disagreements in the forest initiative: "The Guyana case is very illustrative on the general disagreements on the forest initiative. It is a symbol case of the disagreements between MFA and ME, the different points of view become very clear" (interview, Trædal).

6.3.9 *Norad and the risk assessment*

In September 2010 Norad finalized a risk report that points to high risks in the Guyana partnership (MFA 2010). Norad is the directorate on development cooperation under the Norwegian MFA. Norad's main task is to ensure the quality of Norway's official development aid. As REDD is financed by ODA money, the REDD partnership with Guyana is one of the aid projects that are under Norad's mandate for giving quality assurance and advice. But Norad's role in deciding on Guyana has been modest. The fact that the risk report made by Norad was made almost a year after the partnership was signed shows that Norad had no "veto" power to stop the partnership. Even though risks were identified as high, the partnership was already initiated.

The lack of influence can be seen in light of the fact that the formal responsibility for Norway's development aid projects was moved from Norad to MFA in 2004 (Tvedt 2007). Additionally, this observation further puts weight on the claim that the decision was politically steered, and that the risk report was a box to be ticked more than it was a report that might make a difference. One of the contributors to the risk report said it had exerted little influence. According to him, the risks identified in the report were secondary to the political aspects of the partnership: "It was such a prestige project; the Ministry of Environment wanted it to work no matter what" (interview, Trædal).

6.4 **Foreign aid, PES or foreign politics?**

Many of the disagreements that have become apparent throughout this research deal with the fact that the money allocated stems from the foreign aid budget, and is reported as ODA. But does that mean that it is aid? In my title, I do call the partnership aid, naming the report *Aid in a rush*. But at the same time, the partnership is understood as PES by most of my informants in Guyana. From this perspective, the Norwegian funding is money *earned* as PES. "There are some parliamentarians in Norway who seem to feel that the tranches being paid from Norway to

Guyana is development aid, as opposed to Payment for Ecosystem services provided by Guyana”(Interview, Major General Singh). Such comments were common during my interviews in Guyana. Also President Jagdeo was firm in stating that the partnership was not to be considered aid. In a speech to his nation in 2008, he outlines the strategies Guyana can take on to pursue a low-carbon development. He states: “None of this is about countries like Guyana seeking aid – if anything, it is about rainforest countries assisting the developed world to solve a problem they mainly created” (Jagdeo 2008). This view was prevalent also among my ME informants.

Even though the partnership may be perceived as PES, it *is* undeniably aid, at least in terms of source of funding. I also label the partnership aid in the title of this report. The informants in Norad and MFA tended to emphasize the fact that the money does in fact come from the aid budget. They note that the risks are high and that Norway has little contextual knowledge about Guyana. They emphasize the need to ensure that development aspects and financial standards attached to ODA funding are followed. This is difficult, as Guyana is a complex country without Norwegian presence. Even though the money is channeled through the World Bank, the partnership represents a problematic use of foreign aid. In a statement on global public goods (NUPI referred to in FAC 2008: 26) NUPI warns against opening up for other purposes for the aid budget than poverty reduction. Norway’s stand on this issue may, NUPI notes, “lead to changing the international standard on the line between foreign aid and climate commitments” (FAC 2008:26).

In addition to representing both PES and aid, the partnership with Guyana can be seen as foreign policy. Through the partnership Norway wishes to demonstrate that REDD is working and through it inspire more donors to support the REDD regime. Some of my informants questioned Norway’s intentions behind the partnership. One informant, the leader of Conservation International in Guyana, claims that the involvement from Norway was strong right before the international climate conferences in Cancun and Copenhagen, but that it has become more distant. For this informant Norway’s REDD involvement is about an oil-nation “going green”:

The agreements with Brazil, Indonesia and Guyana and substantial funding have put Norway on the map. It is no longer the country with huge reserves of fossil fuels, and one of the countries causing climate change; it has managed to green-wash, and has now walked away from its active engagements with the countries. That’s a view which I think it’s difficult to argue against (Interview, Singh).

Another informant put it like this: “250 million USD over five years is not a big prize to pay to clean your conscience” (interview, Ram). Thus the REDD partnership with Guyana may be seen as official development aid, payment for environmental service and also foreign policy. But these different goals pull in different directions and create confusion both in Norway among government officials, and in the partner countries such as in Guyana.

6.4.1 Concluding remarks

In this last section I have shown that an actor-specific analysis at the governmental level is crucial to an understanding of the case. In performing this actor-specific analysis I have examined the main actors' understanding and interpretation of reality: their definition of the situation and how this definition has steered the actors to a course of action. I have shown that former Minister Solheim played a crucial role, and that he represents an important part of the answer to my research question. The bureaucratic set-up in which Solheim acted as minister for both international development and the environment, and the fact that Solheim engaged closely in the Guyana partnership, make him an important explanatory (f)actor. Here we also see how the different factors are interlinked: for example, the two principal actors Minister Solheim and President Jagdeo are connected through government networks.

I have also pointed to differences of perceptions and priorities between MFA and ME and how the partnership can be understood as foreign aid, PES and foreign policy at the same time. The differences identified are summarized in the simplified table:

Table 2 Differing views of the partnership

Views primarily expressed by ME/ KOS/ Solheim <i>(Responsible for the politics of the REDD partnerships. Strong influence over decisions)</i>	Views primarily expressed by MFA/Norad <i>(Responsible for the financial use of the REDD money and the development aspects. Exert less influence over decisions)</i>
Make progress fast, create models for the world, early action. There is political prestige in making large payments	Warns against rushing, escalating of payments happening too fast
Large payments is necessary to get international attention and is part of the strategy to fasten the process	Large payments without apparatus to deal with it in the recipient country are problematic
The poverty reduction is indirect, but REDD does leads to development, although indirectly, and it is ok to use the aid budget	There should be clear demarcation of means that are primarily a climate measure and not development aid
New challenges demand new thinking, Norway must be in front to ensure innovative financing models	Build on experience and lessons learned from decades of aid administration
Willing to take risks to establish a REDD regime. "MFA shows arrogance and an old-fashioned attitude when wanting detailed control of the use of money in the recipient countries" (interview, Solheim).	Norway takes more risks with the NICFI means than what it does with other aid programs. That is not being clearly communicated, and is a problematic use of ODA.

7 Conclusion

Through my analysis I have shown that an integrated account of international, domestic and governmental factors is necessary to understand why Norway entered into REDD partnership with Guyana. As the choice of Guyana is part of NICFI, the background for the initiative in general has also been dealt with in the analysis. My main focus has, however, been to understand why Norway chose Guyana as REDD partner country, in spite of the fact that Norway lacked experience with Guyana and that risks were identified as high. I have pointed to international, domestic and governmental factors that highlights why Guyana was chosen as REDD partner.

The international factors of climate change awareness combined with an economic logic provide the backdrop which made NICFI possible. More importantly for the Guyana decision, I identify the government networks through which Guyanese and Norwegian actors could meet and interact. Here, Prince Charles plaid a role as a kick-starter and facilitator with his Rainforest Project. I have followed the actor-specific mantra of FPA and analyzed the importance of Guyana's former President, Bharrat Jagdeo. He was a very important figure, whose strong standing on climate change at the international arena was one of the main reasons this partnership materialized.

Among domestic factors I have analyzed how the four Ps of Press, Public opinion, Parliament and Pressure groups have or have not influenced the decision on Guyana. Interesting here is that the Press and Public opinion seem to have had very little awareness of Guyana and thus did not exert influence on the decision. Also the Parliament and the relevant Pressure groups did not exert pressure to make Norway choose Guyana. While they were important in pushing for NICFI as an initiative, they provide poor explanations for the decision of electing Guyana as Norway's NICFI partner.

Better explanation to my research question is found in the governmental factors, which is the last part of the three-fold analytical division. Here it becomes clear that the initiation of the Guyana partnership was an internal decision taken by Solheim and his close colleagues in KOS. I also examine how different departments had and still have very different perspectives on several aspects of the partnership. This became evident both through my interviews, and also, in a very marked way, in the decision document (MFA 2010) where ME and MFA make different comments and express different opinions on several issues.

The traditional aid professionals argued against Guyana because of lack of Norwegian presence and knowledge about the country in addition to the challenges posed by corruption and fragile governance. Solheim and KOS on the other hand, looked at this not as traditional aid and thus had other priorities than standard development aid considerations. The fact that Guyana had a strong President with policies that matched KOS' intentions became more important than traditional aid concerns. The partnership can be seen as a case of aid used primarily as a climate tool,

and is in that way one example of the tendency of aid being used politically. This is also evident by the fact that the power to decide effectively laid not in the hands of the aid bureaucrats in MFA or Norad, but in the hands of KOS in ME.

To summarize, why did Norway chose Guyana as a REDD partner? First, Norway did not choose Guyana as REDD partner. Solheim and his close allies did. They chose Guyana because they were looking to establish a partnership with a high forest-low deforestation country to provide a model for the world, a success story that would enhance REDD before the Climate meeting in Copenhagen. They were convinced by Jagdeo's leadership and political will. Because of the set-up of NICFI, these climate-related concerns "won" over the aid-related risk and objections.

What new knowledge have I contributed with through this study? It is my opinion that this report offers a new and fruitful approach to the study of NICFI. Using the FPA approach has allowed me to dig deeper into the organizational and bureaucratic work and turf wars that surround the initiative. It also allowed me to analyze which international actors or networks facilitated the partnership. In addition focus on Guyana is unusual. This is a country that largely has steered away from public and scholarly attention. According to some of my informants, Guyana represents the epitome of the internal conflicts surrounding the initiative and thus it can provide a fruitful and concentrated case in point. The case shows how ME's priorities triumphed over more traditional foreign aid concerns and that little time and a closed decision making characterized the process. The case was said to be a symbol case that in a marked way sums up, and challenges, the different priorities that NICFI represents. The partnership was definitely decided on in a rush, but whether it should be characterized as aid or not, remains open for discussion.

8 Appendix

8.1 Interview overview

Table 3 Complete list of informants

Informant	Affiliation	Location	Date
Vemund Olsen	RFN, observer to the GRIF	Oslo	15.03.12
Leif Tore Trædal	Norad, Climate and forest evaluation, risk report co-author	Oslo	06.03.12
Eirik Jansen	Norad Department of Governance and anti-corruption	Oslo	06.03.12
Anne Kristin Martinsen	Norad, juridical department	Oslo	08.03.12
Tove Stub	ME, director KOS Guyana	Oslo	12.04.12
Marianne Johansen	ME, KOS Guyana	Oslo	12.04.12
Marte Nordseth	ME, former KOS Guyana, currently KOS Brazil	Oslo	12.04.12
Gjermund Sæther	MFA, in charge of NICFI coordination sept 2011- feb 2012	Oslo	27.04.12
Per Mogstad	MFA, in charge of NICFI coordination 2009-2011	Oslo	03.05.12
Erik Solheim	Former Minister, International Development and Environment, MFA	Oslo	10.05.12
Andreas Tveteraas	ME, KOS	Oslo	15.05.12
Alf Friisø	MFA, department of Latin America	Oslo	24.05.12
Trygve Bendiksby	MFA, department of multi-lateral organizations	Oslo	30.05.12
Steven Grin	Consultant, GOG/ GRIF	New York	04.06.12
David James	Independent member of MSSC, attorney-at-law	Georgetown	07.06.12
Chris Ram	Attorney-at-law, accountant and columnist	Georgetown	11.06.12
Shyam Nokta	Adviser to the President and Head, Office of Climate change (GOG)	Georgetown	12.06.12
Pradeepa Bholanath	Guyana Forestry Commission, Head-Planning & Development Division	Georgetown	13.06.12
James Singh	Guyana Forestry Commission, Commissioner of Forests	Georgetown	13.06.12
Major General Joseph Singh	Chairman of the Board, Guyana Geology & mines commission, independent member of MSSC	Georgetown	13.06.12
Sophie Makannon	Inter-American development Bank, Country Representative	Georgetown	14.06.12

Lawrence Anselmo	AmerIndian Peoples Association	Georgetown	14.06.12
Patsy Ross	United Nations Development Programme, Programme Analyst-Environment	Georgetown	14.06.12
Darshana Patel	The World Bank Guyana	Georgetown	15.06.12
Colin Sparman	Guyana Gold & Diamond Miners association	Georgetown	18.06.12
David Singh	Executive director, Conservation International Guyana	Georgetown	19.06.12
Preeya Rampersaud	Environmental policy coordinator, Conservation International Guyana	Georgetown	19.06.12
Gaulbert Sutherland	Journalist, covering the Norway-Guyana partnership for <i>Stabroek News</i>	Georgetown	19.06.12
Nicola Jenns	DFID, worked in Guyana for 4 years	Bridgetown	25.06.12
Raymond Drouin	Head Development Cooperation, Guyana and Suriname, Canadian High Commission	Georgetown (phone interview from Oslo)	06.07.12
Tim Liang	PhD on Guyana and REDD, London School of Economics	Georgetown (phone interview)	12.07.12
Ann Danaiya	Journalist, <i>Development Today</i>	Oslo	13.08.12
Per Fredrik Pharo	ME. Leader of NICFI	Oslo	17.08.12
Hans Brattskar	ME Expedition leader Department of International Climate Cooperation	Oslo	28.08.12
Mads Halfdan Lie	Forest and Climate Officer (REDD+) WWF Norway	Oslo (phone interview)	20.09.12
Inge Nordang	MFA, Latin America section	Oslo	18.10.12

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