# The Commission on Sustainable Development

## A Study of Institutional Design, Distribution of Capabilities and Entrepreneurial Leadership

Stine Madland Kaasa

May, 2005

FRIDTJOF NANSENS INSTITUTT
THE FRIDTJOF NANSEN INSTITUTE

**Abstract**

The UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was established in 1993 in order to follow up the commitments made by member states at the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. As the CSD has recieved increasing criticism for its lack of effectiveness, a main objective for this study will be to evaluate what the Commission has accomplished during its first ten-year period. Furthermore, this report aims to describe and explain the mechanisms that affect the work of the CSD, in order to understand how it would be possible to enhance the potential for effectiveness. The first part of the analysis concentrates on evaluating and determining the degree of the CSD's accomplishments by comparing them to the CSD's mandate. Based on the perspectives of 'distribution of capabilities', 'institutional design' and 'entrepreneurial leadership', I evaluate which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD's performances in the second part. I conclude that the CSD has achieved some results in monitoring the process and promoting dialogue, due to the role of the secretariat and nonstate actors. However, the member states' positions and interests have had a major impact on the low degree of accomplishments in the area of policy guidance.

## Acknowledgements

There are many people that deserve my gratitude for completing this study. First of all, I will thank my supervisors, Professor Steinar Andresen at the University of Oslo and Research Fellow Lars H. Gulbrandsen at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, for their patience and professional guidance. I also thank Kristin Rosendal, Jørgen Wettestad, Peter Johan Schei, Elin Lerum Boasson, Øyvind Kaasa and the 'Global Group' for valuable input and advice.

I am very grateful for the scholarship, office facilities and financial support provided by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute. I also appreciate the help from several of the FNI staff and the people in 'Lysthuset'. Thanks to Maryanne Rygg and Ivar Liseter for technical assistance.

In addition, I thank my family and friends for being there in good and not so good times. A special thanks to Line, Astrid and Johan for listening.

Oslo, May 2005

Stine Madland Kaasa

# Contents

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| ACC | Administrative Committee on Co-ordination |
| CEB | Chief Executive Board for Co-ordination |
| CSD | Commission on Sustainable Development |
| DESA | Department of Economic and Social Affairs |
| DPCSD | Department for Policy Co-ordination and Sustainable Development |
| ECOSOC | United Nations Economic and Social Council |
| ENB | Earth Negotiation Bulletin |
| EU | European Union |
| G-77 | Group of 77 developing countries |
| GATT | General Agreement in Trade and Tariffs |
| GNP | Gross National Product |
| IACSD | Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development |
| IFF | Intergovernmental Forum on Forests |
| IPF | Intergovernmental Panel on Forests |
| IUU | Illegal, Unregulated or Unreported |
| JUSCANZ | Informal coalition of Japan, USA, Canada, Australia and New Zealand |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| ODA | Official Development Assistance |
| OPEC | Organization for Oil-Producing Countries |
| POA | Programme of Action |
| PrepCom | Preparatory Committee |
| SIDS | Small Island Developing States |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNCED | United Nations Conference on Environment and Development |
| UNEP | United Nations Environment Programme |
| UNFF | United Nations Forum on Forests |
| (UN)GA | United Nations General Assembly |
| UNGA-47 | United Nations General Assembly 47th session |
| UNGASS | United Nations General Assembly Special Session |
| US(A) | United States (of America) |
| WSSD | World Summit on Sustainable Development |
| WTO | World Trade Organization |

# 1.    Introduction

## 1.1    Subject of the Thesis

The UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 has often been seen as a watershed in the work of placing environmental and developmental issues on the international agenda. One hundred eighteen heads of governments came together to negotiate on and sign a number of declarations and conventions. Moreover, the 'sustainable development' was cemented as a concept, in order to solve the longstanding discussion on linking environmental and developmental problems. Agenda 21 was the main document adopted by the states, which was considered as an action plan for sustainable development.

In order to follow up the commitments from Rio, as well as to enhance the integration of environmental, economic and social dimensions of sustainable development at the national, regional and international levels, UNCED decided to establish a Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) within the United Nation's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Thus, Agenda 21 called on the establishment of the CSD in chapter 38 (UN 1992). A Special Session of ECOSOC in 1993 agreed on the CSD's mandate and main functions to; monitor and review progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 at local, national and international level; develop policy recommendations; and promote dialogue and build partnerships for sustainable development between governments, the international community, and major groups (Chasek 2000: 383ff; UN 1993a).

The establishment of the CSD was seen as one of the main outcomes of UNCED, as it was agreed that the follow-up activities would be of vital importance for sustainable development. However, there has been a growing concern if the CSD has succeeded in fulfilling its mandate and further advanced the sustainable development agenda (Chasek 2000: 379). Some observers have even argued that the CSD is a 'talk shop' and a waste of time and money (Brown 1998: 5). A question that should be answered then, is whether this criticism is well-founded or not. Thus, the main objective for this study will be to evaluate the CSD's accomplishments during its first ten years. Moreover, it will be important to explain which mechanisms that affect the work of the CSD, in order to understand how it would be possible to enhance the Commission's potential for effectiveness.

## 1.2    Research Questions

Scholars often distinguish between three types of institutional consequences; output, outcome and impact (Easton 1965: 351f). When an agreement is made and an institution is established, this will lead to consequences such as the norms, principles, and rules generated by the institution itself, that is, the output. Further, when an agreement is implemented, it is expected that this will lead to consequences in form of behavioural changes, which is regarded as the outcome of the agreement.

Finally, when measures are in effect and target groups are adjusted, this may in turn affect the physical problem at hand, that is, the impact of the agreement (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999: 4; Underdal 1998: 26; Underdal 2002: 7).

An institution's effectiveness is most often measured and determined by evaluating the outcome and impact. Preferably, a study of effectiveness should concern the ecological effects of an institution (i.e. impact), but such a study is seen as extremely difficult due to methodological problems. Thus, most studies are concerned with the outcome (Underdal 2002: 6f). However, in order to study the outcome, the consequences of an institution must be evaluated several years after the institution's entry into force (Underdal 1992: 230). As the CSD can be considered an immature institution, it is probably too early to determine possible behavioural change of target groups. Thus, I will base my study of the CSD on data about the output, in order to indicate its potential for effectiveness.

'The CSD' accomplishments', which refers to the rules, programs, means and efforts (i.e. the output) that have been decided upon by states, will be regarded as my dependent variable. In order to measure the score of the dependent variable, the first part of my analysis will focus on evaluating the degree of the CSD's accomplishments compared to the goals formulated by its mandate. The second part of the analysis will explore which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD's accomplishments. My thesis for the study of the Commission on Sustainable Development consists therefore of two research questions:

1.     To what degree has the CSD achieved its goals?

2.     Which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD's accomplishments?

The first part of the thesis is descriptive, while the second part is explanatory. My intention will be, first, to evaluate to what degree the CSD has succeeded in fulfilling its mandate, and then, to use theory in order to explain which mechanisms that affect the CSD and its accomplishments.

## 1.3    Choice of Theoretical Framework

My theoretical framework for the study of the CSD draws on regime theory generally, and regime effectiveness theory especially. Interest-based regime theory has become the mainstream approach to analyze international institutions, and is used to explain how institutions facilitate cooperation between states by helping them to realize common interests (Hasenclever et al. 1997). Thus, I assume that regime theory will provide some fruitful analytical tools for this case study.

A starting point for the study will be the two explanatory perspectives proposed by Underdal (2002: 13): 'the character of the problem' and 'problem-solving capacity'. In order to understand how it would be possible to enhance the CSD's potential for effectiveness, it will be important to explain and determine which mechanisms that affects the CSD's accomplishments. Thus, I assume that the 'problem-solving capacity'

perspective will be a useful approach for the analysis of the CSD. However, the problem-solving capacity of an institution can not be seen as independent from the problem(s) the institution is supposed to solve. The main point here is that a malign problem will affect the problem-solving capacity for an institution differently than a benign problem (Underdal 2002: 14f). Therefore, I will define the character of the problem prior to the analysis, in order to understand the CSD's potential for fulfilling its goals.

Concerning the 'problem-solving capacity', three sets of explanatory variables will be evaluated; 'institutional design', 'distribution of capabilities'; and 'entrepreneurial leadership'. I assume that all of the independent variables will contribute to the explanation of the degree of the CSD's accomplishments. The variables will be regarded as complementary, rather than incompatible. Thus, I will not only evaluate and determine how these variables can explain the achievements of the CSD separately, but also how they interact and work together.

## 1.4 Limitations of the Study

When deciding and explaining the degree of the CSD's accomplishments, I have made some limitations of the study with regards to time and space. Concerning time, I will evaluate the period 1993-2001, from the first session of the CSD to its tenth session. By making such a choice, I will neither evaluate the formation process of the CSD, nor the decision-making process after the ten-year review of the CSD at the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002. In my opinion a study of the formation process would be too comprehensive given the scope of this thesis, and an evaluation of the effects of the decision-making process after WSSD would be premature.

I have also made some limitations regarding space. When I have chosen the explanatory variables of 'institutional design', 'distribution of capabilities', and 'entrepreneurial leadership', I have at the same time also excluded other variables that may have been significant for the CSD. For the study of the CSD, I will mostly focus on the institution itself and its output. Hence, external factors, such as domestic politics, public interest, and linkage with other UN bodies or other organizations, will not be evaluated. Even though these factors might have provided interesting and significant explanations, I have chosen to exclude the factors in order to limit the study's complexity.

## 1.5 Outline of the Thesis

The next chapter will provide the theoretical approach and the methodology for the study of the CSD. First, I will give a general presentation of regime theory, and further, present the theoretical framework for evaluating the CSD's accomplishments. I will also discuss some of the main challenges to apply theory for this study. Second, I will consider some of the methodological problems regarding the evaluation of a single case study, and give an account for a research strategy that may reduce these problems. In chapter 3, a presentation of the background history of the CSD will be given. Chapter 4 will give a brief description of the main

decisions made by the states during the period 1993-2001. In chapter 5, I will evaluate and determine the degree of the CSD's accomplishments by comparing them with the CSD's mandate. Based on my theoretical framework, I will evaluate which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD's performances in chapter 6. Finally, in chapter 7, I will sum up my findings, discuss the fruitfulness of the study and look at the future prospects for the CSD.

## 2.     Theory and Methodology

The theoretical approach used for the study of the CSD will draw on mainstream regime theory generally, and regime effectiveness theory especially. First, the concepts of 'regimes' and 'institutions' will be specified and defined, as regime theory will be applied in the study of the CSD, which can be considered an institution. Then, I will give a general presentation of theory. Following this, I will discuss some of the challenges related to evaluating and measuring effectiveness, before I state the reason for the choice of the dependent variable. Furthermore, the selection of theoretical perspectives and three sets of independent variables will be discussed and explained. Finally, the methodology for this case study will be presented.

### 2.1   'Regime' versus 'Institution'

The concepts of 'regime' and 'institution' are often used interchangeably, even though regimes can be seen as a sub-group of institutions (Rosendal 1999: 11). It is therefore important to specify these two terms, so as to be able to distinguish between them. The so-called consensus definition of *regimes* most commonly used was first proposed by Stephen Krasner. According to Krasner (1983: 2), regimes are:

> implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action, Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.

Levy et al. (1995: 274) suggests a somewhat similar definition of international regimes as being 'social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, procedures and programs that govern the interaction of actors in specific issue areas'.[1] On the other hand, according to Keohane et al. (1993: 4), *institutions* can be understood as "persistent and connected sets of rules and practices that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations, They may take the form of bureaucratic organizations, regimes [...], or conventions (informal practices). As proposed by this definition, 'institutions' may be used as a more general term, including both organizations and sets of rules, codified in conventions and protocols that have been formally accepted by states. It is important to note that also the terms institutions and organizations have often been used interchangeably, even though *organizations* is a narrower concept, referring to 'material entities posses-

sing physical locations (or seats), offices, personnel, equipment, and budgets' (Young 1989: 31f). Following this, the CSD can not be regarded as a regime as it is not restricted to a specific issue-area, but is rather directed towards a broad range of issues as formulated in Agenda 21. However, the CSD can be described as an institution with organizational attributes, such as a secretary and equipment placed in New York.

Why then draw on regime theory in the study of the CSD? In Kratochwil and Ruggie's (1986) presentation of theory evolution, it is shown how the focus on international regimes became the main approach to study international governance after the decline of American hegemony during the 1970s and beyond. Thus, for analytical purposes it will be reasonable to draw on regime theory in the study of the CSD.

## 2.2    Regime theory

Neoliberal, or interest-based, theories of regimes have come to represent the mainstream approach to analyzing international institutions. The main objective is to explain how institutions help states to realize common interests and thus, facilitate cooperation (Hasenclever et al. 1997). Most theories of regimes are state-centred, and the basic assumptions of state actors are based on rational choice models (Haggard and Simmons 1987: 499). Actors are portrayed as unitary and rational behaving units that act to promote their interests. They are assumed to have consistently ordered preferences and choose among alternative courses of action so as to further these preferences. Moreover, actors are assumed to be 'egoistic', that is, their preferences shall be oriented toward maximizing their own well-being.[2] Also, mainstream regime theory draws heavily on both economical theories focusing on information and transaction costs, and game-theoretic models, like the Prisoner's Dilemma, to explain how international institutions can facilitate cooperation among states (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 4).

Robert Keohane's contractual (or functional) theory is regarded as one of the most significant approaches within regime theory. A main objective was to relax the basic actor assumptions of rationality and egoism, and thus lay the premises of empathy, changes in preferences and bounded rationality when explaining cooperation among actors. The analysis is based on constellations of interests, where the existence of common interests is seen as a necessary, but *not sufficient*, condition for cooperation. As noted by Keohane (1984: 97), cooperation may not be possible even when mutual interests exist, because of obstacles such as uncertainty, lack of information and fear of cheating. Hence, international institutions can help states realize common interests by removing main obstacles, and, with that, make cooperation possible 'not by implementing rules that states must follow, but by changing the context within which states make decisions based on self-interests' (Keohane 1984: 13)

The study of international regimes has focused on different stages of the regime process. Early regime analysis was concentrated on the *formation* stage, and identifying the conditions under which international regimes form, and the output of the formation process. As this analytical exercise failed to address the question of whether regimes matter, more resent

research has been concerned of the *implementation* stage and regime effectiveness (Levy et al. 1995: 287).

## 2.3    The Dependent Variable: The CSD's Accomplishments

One of the main challenges concerning research of regimes and institutions has been related to the question of how to evaluate and measure effectiveness. In general, according to Underdal (2002: 4), 'a regime [or an institution] can be considered effective to the extent that it successfully performs a certain (set of) function(s) or solves the problem(s) that motivated its establishment'.[3] The concept of effectiveness has evolved as scholars have addressed the question of why some efforts at developing and implementing joint solutions to international problems succeed while others fail (Underdal 2002: 3). Different approaches have been used in the attempt to answer this question. One approach relates to the concept of *compliance*, which is understood as acting in accordance with, and fulfilment of, the obligations accepted by signing (and ratifying) the agreement (Underdal 1998: 6). However, as noted by Underdal (ibid.), 'this concept of "compliance" involves no assumption of *causality*; i.e. I do not assume that rule-consistent behaviour will necessarily be *due to* the existence of a particular agreement' [emphasis by original]. Thus, using the level of compliance as an indicator of effectiveness will possibly lead to problems regarding validity. Moreover, compliance relates to adjustments made by states at the national level, which will not be included in this case study.

Another approach would be to evaluate the level of *implementation* when considering success or failure of problem-solving efforts. The concept of 'implementation' refers to the measures governments take to translate international accords into domestic law and policy. When an agreement is implemented, it is expected that measures are in effect and target groups adjusted. In other words, implementation leads to consequences in the form of changes in human behaviour (Underdal 1998: 26; Underdal 2002: 7). Thus, using implementation as an indicator would be a more valid approach, as effectiveness would be measured in terms of behavioural change. However, it is important to distinguish between the different types of institutional consequences. Easton (1965: 351f) and others distinguish between output, outcome and impact. *Output* is conceived of as the norms, principles, and rules generated by the institution itself. *Outcome* refers to the implementation, that is, the changes in the behaviour of relevant actors (target groups), while *impact* connotes the tangible consequences affecting the physical problem at hand (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999:4).[4] In the formation stage and its immediate aftermath, the output, that is, the norms and rules generated by the institution itself, is all we know. Thus, the main focus of an effectiveness analysis should therefore be in the implementation stage in order to measure effectiveness in terms of behavioural change (Underdal 2002: 6f). However, it is important to note that the outcome and the impact of a regime or an institution can be determined only in retrospect – meaning several years after its entry into force. Underdal (1992: 230) points out that 'if we want to evaluate regime effectiveness at an earlier stage – as we often do – the regime itself will be all that is known to us'.

In the study of the CSD, evaluating and measuring effectiveness in terms of behavioural change would be a difficult, if not impossible, task.[5] As the CSD was established in 1994, it can be considered a rather immature institution. Therefore, what we know in this case is mostly the *output* of the decision-making process. Thus, my intention will be to indicate the effectiveness of CSD on the basis of data about the output, an exercise that has to be pursued with great caution. This concerns implications of causality, which will be discussed further in section 2.8. Moreover, since it would be premature to evaluate changes in the behaviour of relevant actors, this implies that using the level of implementation as an indicator of effectiveness would not be possible in this study.

'The CSD's accomplishments' will be defined as the dependent variable in this case. The *CSD's accomplishments* will refer to the rules, pro-grams, means and efforts (i.e. the output) that have been decided upon by actors. The mandate of the CSD will serve as the point of reference, against which the accomplishments are to be compared. In order to mea-sure the dependent variable, a scale of high, medium and low score will be used. High score implies that the output is consistent with the goals of the mandate, and low score is understood as the output not being consistent with the goals. The degree of the CSD's accomplishments will be determined by, first, to evaluate the decision-making process during the period 1993-2001. Second, several experts will be asked to give a score of the CSD's accomplishments regarding how they consider the degree of goal attainment.

## 2.4   Two Explanatory Perspectives

In order to study which mechanisms explain the degree of the CSD's accomplishments, effectiveness theory provides some fruitful analytical tools for this case. Underdal (2002: 13) proposes two theoretical perspec-tives, 'character of the problem' and 'problem-solving capacity', which illuminate different aspects of an institution or a regime. The 'character of the problem' may explain why some problems are harder to solve than others. Whether a problem can be regarded malign or benign is due to differences in 'intellectual' and 'political' characteristics (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999). The 'problem-solving capacity' may explain why some problems are solved more effectively than others because of variations in the institutional design or because they are attacked with greater skill or energy (Underdal 2002: 23).

Most likely, the 'problem-solving capacity' perspective would be most fruitful approach to use for the analysis, since my main objective for the study of the CSD is to understand how it would be possible to enhance the CSD's potential for effectiveness. Where as the 'character of the problem' is a more static explanatory perspective, the 'problem-solving capacity' perspective can provide useful insights of how to improve the work of the CSD. However, Underdal (2002: 14f) points out that these perspectives cannot be seen as mutually independent; 'notions of capacity will have to be matched with notions of problem type and task'. A main assumption is that a malign problem will affect the problem-solving capacity differently than a benign problem As the character of the problem is expected to affect the problem-solving capacity, it will be

important to determine whether the problem can be considered malign or benign. I will therefore define the character of the problem prior to the analysis, in order to understand the CSD's potential for fulfilling its goals.

However, since the CSD is not restricted to a specific issue-area, but is rather directed towards a broad range of issues as formulated in Agenda 21, it will be difficult to define the problem in this case. As the CSD's mandate and functions concerns the work of advancing the sustainable development agenda, my suggestion is to consider 'sustainable development' as the problem. In my opinion, this is a reasonable choice, because many of the challenges and interest conflicts related to the work on sustainable development also affect the CSD.

## 2.5    The 'Character of the Problem' Perspective

According to Underdal (2002: 15) a 'problem' have both intellectual and political characteristics, which affect the problem-solving capacity. As a starting point, I will propose that the problem of 'sustainable development' can be regarded as both intellectually and politically malign. First, *intellectual* aspects of a problem are related to the scientific capacity needed to develop adequate solutions (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999: 5). Concerning the CSD, the problem of sustainable development can be considered as intellectually malign for several reasons: there is a lack of a consensus definition; specific knowledge of the problem is hard to attain, because it involves so many sub-problems; and the problem can be considered to be complex because it consists both internal and external linkages, as many sectors are affected, and many international institutions and organizations are involved in the problem-solving.

Second, *political* aspects of the problem are primarily linked to the degree of asymmetry in actors' interests and preferences (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999: 5). Keohane (1984: 6) points out one important precondition for solving a problem, that states must have interests in common which can only be realized through cooperation. Still, it cannot be taken for granted that states with interests in common will also cooperate. The main obstacles to cooperation, analyzed by Keohane (1984), are uncertainty, lack of information and fear of cheating. Lack of information about the other actors' objections and commitments, leads to uncertainty and the fear of cheating. Thus, institutions can facilitate cooperation by providing states with information or reducing their information costs (Keohane 1984: 97, 245). However, as stressed by Hasenclever et al. (1997: 32); 'it is not interests (preferences over outcome) that are adjusted when states cooperate, but policies (preferences over actions)'. Following this, institutions facilitate cooperation not by changing actors' interests or values, but by altering their 'incentives' for action. Regarding the political aspect of the problem, the degree of asymmetry in actors' interests and preferences will be affected by whether the states' *preferences over action* are identical, complementary or incompatible. The more asymmetric the preferences are, the harder it will be to solve the problem at hand (Skjærseth 1991: 28). Following this, 'sustainable development' is related to a longstanding interest conflict between Northern and Southern countries on the issues of environment and develop-

ment. Where as the North has most often stressed the importance of environmental protection and conservation, the South has mostly been concerned of the development agenda. This conflict has influenced the decision-making process of the CSD concerning issues such as financial resources, technology transfer, and consumption and production. According Bergesen and Botnen (1996: 42-47), the discussions on these issues have been affected by incompatible preferences between the Northern and Southern countries. McNeill (2000: 23) notes that 'sustainable development is an intensely political issue'. Thus, I will consider the problem of sustainable development to be politically malign due to asymmetric interests. Following this, as the problem of 'sustainable development' can be considered both intellectually and politically malign, the CSD has a difficult starting point for fulfilling its goal.

## 2.6    The 'Problem-Solving Capacity' Perspective - Three Sets of Explanatory Variables

Underdal (2002: 23) propose that 'problem-solving capacity' can be conceived of as a function of three main determinants: the institutional setting (the rules of the game); the distribution of power among the actors involved; and the skill and energy available for the political engineering of cooperative solutions. The term 'institutional setting' is used broadly as a label for two different notions of institutions – namely, institutions as arenas and organizations as actors. 'Power' is understood as a source of leadership, and is defined narrowly as the control over important events. 'Skills and energy' refers to the exercise of instrumental leadership (Underdal 2002: 24-35).

These three determinants of problem-solving capacity will serve as a starting point for the analysis of the CSD. However, some changes will be made due to the relevance for the study. Thus, the 'problem-solving capacity' will refer to three sets of explanatory variables: 'institutional design', 'distribution of capabilities' and 'entrepreneurial leadership'. The exploration of 'institutional design' will concern the institutional factors of 'the role of the secretariat', 'states' sector representation' and 'nonstate actors' access and participation'. When evaluating the distribution of capabilities, the main focus will be states' interests, positions and capabilities. Finally, I will use the term 'entrepreneurial leadership', proposed by Young (1991: 287), when reviewing the possibility of leadership exercised by individuals.

### 2.6.1  Institutional design

The main argument in regime theory is that international institutions matter. However, some international institutions make more impact and contribute to greater effectiveness than others, because of their specific institutional features. It is therefore important to analyze how an institution is designed in order to understand why it is effective or ineffective, and moreover, to understand how it would be possible to enhance its effectiveness. According to Wettestad (1999: 2), 'the existence and design of international institutions may become critically important in order to transform political opportunities into new or stronger commitments', especially concerning malign problems. Many institutional fac-

tors provide interesting insights to the significance of institutional design. Due to relevance, however, I will focus on 'the role of the secretariat', 'the states' sector representation', and 'NGOs' access and participation'.

*The Role of the Secretariat*

A secretariat can be regarded as an international organization established by the relevant parties to assist them in fulfilling an institution's main goal(s). Since state actors often have different interests and preferences, a well-functioning secretariat can assist the actors in cooperating and thereby solving the problem at hand more effectively (Andresen and Skjærseth 1999: 2, 6). Wettestad (1999: 26f) makes a distinction between two main roles of secretariats: assistant or player. The *assistant secretariat* acts as a behind-the-scenes adviser; provides administrative assistance to the parties in document preparation as requested; and collects and compiles follow-up reports from the parties. The *player secretariat* is described as an active and independent actor as it initiates and actively participates in agenda setting and protocol development; facilitate, and in some cases initiates, the development of parallel or single negotiating texts; framing central questions; acting as moderator or mediator in the events of negotiation stalemates; and take an active role in the analyses and dissemination of the parties follow-up reports (Wettestad 1999: 27). Andresen and Skjærseth (1999: 7ff) point out that a well-functioning secretariat should also be able to develop and maintain good relations with member countries, have sufficient funding to carry out their tasks properly and assure credibility across the North-South interests.

*The States' Sector Representation*

Most research concerning state participation has focused on the *type* of representation, that is, whether the participants are administrative-level bureaucratic or higher-level political, like ministers (Wettestad 1999: 23). In this case, however, the focus will be directed towards the *sector background* of the state participants. In other words, it will be important to study what kind of sectors of the national arena the delegation members are drawn from. Rosendal (2000: 87) points out that 'national interests' 'may be represented differently by different sectors of the administration'. Likewise, high-level politicians, like ministers, with different sector background will also represent different interests. Exemplified with Allison's words, *where you stand depends on where you sit,* an environmental minister will be expected to stress environmental issues more than the ministers in other ministries (Allison 1971: 176). Regarding the CSD, its work concerns advancing the sustainable development agenda, which consists of three main dimensions: environmental, social and economical issues. In order to place the same emphasis on all three dimensions, it would be expected that all three sectors should be represented.

*Nonstate Actors' Access and Participation*

As a starting point, it is important to note that *access* refers to the rules regulating the possibility of participation, while *participation* is understood as the actual participation of various groups (Wettestad 1999: 20).

The term *nonstate actor* can be understood as any organization that does not have a formal or legal status as a state or agent of a state (Raustiala 2001: 97f). In this regard, it is important to note that Agenda 21 identified nine *major groups*, and recognised that the participation of these groups would be necessary for advancing the sustainable development agenda[6] (Agarwal et al. 2001: 196). Hence, 'nonstate actors' will here refer to 'major groups'.

Concerning the effect of nonstate actors' access and participation, it is important to evaluate the difference between open and inclusive rules of access and exclusive opportunities for participation. Wettestad (1999: 21) points out the dilemma of the conflicting concerns for openness and legitimacy versus decision-making effectiveness. A negotiation process including all relevant parties will bring legitimacy to the final decisions. On the other hand, however, a large number of participants may affect the decision-making effectiveness and lower the highest common denominator achievable in a negotiation process. Moreover, openness and inclusiveness can also lead to rhetorical and symbolic show-off session, where words become more important than action. Still, according to Levy et al. (1994: 11) 'it is more or less uncontested that the participation of nonstate actors and epistemic communities, at least in the rule implementation stage, does improve the effectiveness of international environmental regimes'. Thus, nonstate actors may enhance output effectiveness by providing information, creativity and new ideas to the process; helping states identifying their interests; framing issues for collective debate; proposing specific policies; and identifying salient points for negotiation (Haas 1992: 2).

Summing up, I will present the following propositions:

P[1]:    *An active, independent and financially strong secretariat will enhance the degree of the CSD's accomplishments.*

P[2]:    *A broad and diversified sector representation of the states will enhance the degree of the CSD's accomplishments.*

P[3]:    *Open and inclusive rules of access and participation of a large number of nonstate actors will enhance the degree of the CSD's accomplishments.*

### 2.6.2 Distribution of Capabilities

It is reasonable to assume that the distribution of capabilities among state actors will affect the problem-solving process and have an impact on an institution's effectiveness. In order to evaluate how the capabilities are distributed, it will first be important to evaluate the state actors' interests as to understand the positions the states have in the negotiation process. It will be assumed that the parties act as *pushers, bystanders, intermediates* or *laggards.* Second, it will be necessary to examine the relationship between the actors' interests and their capability to achieve actual breakthrough in the negotiation process.

*Interests, Positions and Capabilities*

In order to understand the positions the states have in the negotiation process, it will be important to evaluate the states' interests. The interests will be reviewed in relations to the environmental, economic and social dimensions of sustainable development. It is reasonable to assume that a state's interest will determine its position. Thus, the interests will affect whether the state acts as a pusher, bystander, intermediate or a laggard (Rosendal 2000: 116f).[7] A *pusher* will here refer to a state that wants a strong CSD and a high degree of goal attainment, and therefore tries to enhance the decision-making process and push it in a positive direction. Opposite, a state that wants a weak CSD and a low degree of goal attainment, and attempts to slow down the decision-making process, will be referred to as a *laggard*. While *Intermediate* states will presumably take a position somewhere between pushers and laggards, *bystanders* will here be understood as states that are indifferent (Rosendal 2000: 117). As pushers and laggards are expected to affect the decision-making process the most, the focus of the analysis will mainly concern the possibility of these two positions.

However, the states' positions alone do not determine which states that achieve actual breakthrough in the negotiation process. It is the capabilities of states that give them the potential for influence. As noted by Rosendal (2000: 117), 'the label "pusher" refers not only to the relationship between a party's position and interest, but also to the capabilities available for pursuing these interests'. Thus, the distribution of capabilities among state actors will affect the decision-making process of an institution, because the decisions will reflect the interests of the powerful actors. It is therefore necessary to evaluate the state actors' capabilities, in order to identify which states have been the most powerful in the negotiation process and have achieved actual breakthrough for their interests. In general, 'capabilities' will refer to the possession of the material resources.

Concerning the potential for influence, it may also be relevant to evaluate the states' coalition size. Underdal (2002: 31) points out that, in a system practising the rule of consensus, 'coalition size will be an asset, exerting social pressure on a reluctant minority'. As the CSD practices the rule of consensus, like the UN in general, it is reasonable to assume that coalition size will be significant for influence in the negotiations.

Summing up, I will present the following proposition:

P[4]:     *If the most powerful actors act as pushers, the degree of CSD's accomplishments will be enhanced.*

### 2.6.3  Entrepreneurial Leadership

Scholars often distinguish between three types of leadership. Young (1991: 287) calls these forms of leadership *structural*, *entrepreneurial* and *intellectual* leadership. Interest-based perspectives are mostly concerned about entrepreneurial leadership, which is understood as 'an individual who relies on negotiating skill to frame issues in ways that

foster integrative bargaining and to put together deals that would otherwise preclude participants' (Young 1991: 293). As noted above, actors most likely enter negotiations with incomplete and imperfect information. Underdal (2002: 34) points out that 'this implies that *discovering*, *inventing* and *exploring* possible solutions may be important elements of the process'. Therefore, the political engineering of effective solutions, that is, the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership, might be a central dimension to evaluate in order to explain an institution's effectiveness. First, it is important to understand what kind of skills, energy and status an entrepreneurial leader might have in order to evaluate its ability to facilitate cooperation and enhance the problem-solving effectiveness. Second, I will explain the means an entrepreneurial leader use to exercise leadership.

An entrepreneurial leader's ability to find means to solve collective solutions is determined by their capabilities, that is, skills, energy and status. *Skills*, both substantial and political, are here understood as negotiation skills. *Energy* refers to a function of capacity and interest, while *status* includes both formal position in the negotiations and the more vague notion of 'reputation'. Energy and status are both capabilities that are linked to the entity the individual represents. It is important here to point out the difference between *individuals* and *entities*. Although leaders often act on behalf of entities, they are themselves individuals. An *entrepreneurial* leader may act on the behalf of various entities, such as states, coalition of states, nonstate actors, secretariats and so on (Skodvin Hegdal 1994: 5).

In order to understand the *source* of entrepreneurial leadership, it is important to evaluate what kind of situations that create space and needs for such leadership. When a problem can be considered malign, the demand for an entrepreneurial leader will increase because of the need for reducing insecurity, unveiling actual preferences and identifying various solutions. However, in such situations it is reasonable to believe that the negotiations would be distributive, rather than integrative. Thus, situations concerning malign problems will have a *need* for skilled leaders, but the *space* for leadership will be limited (Skjærseth 1991: 32). Moreover, it is important to note that also actors' preferences, institutional design and distribution of capabilities will affect the need and space for entrepreneurial leadership (Underdal 2002: 33) The source of entrepreneurial leadership can be understood as the accept or acknowledgement among relevant actors for exercising such leadership (Skjærseth 1991: 32).

The *means* an entrepreneurial leader use in order to exercise leadership can be linked to the different tasks such a leader has. Underdal (2002: 35) points out three major tasks: a) designing substantive solutions that are politically feasible; b) designing institutional arrangements that are conductive to the development, adoption, and implementation of effective solutions; and c) designing actor strategies that can be effective in inducing constructive cooperation. The main focus of this case study will be to explore to what extent one or more of these tasks of entrepreneurial leadership was in fact performed.

Summing up, I will present the following proposition:

P[5]:     *If entrepreneurial leadership is exercised by individuals, the*
         *degree of the CSD's accomplishments will be enhanced.*

## 2.7    Interaction Between the Explanatory Variables

The three sets of explanatory variables outlined here illuminate different aspects and provide different explanations of the CSD and its achievements. However, it is reasonable to expect that these variables also interact and work together regarding the explanation of the CSD's performances. Thus, they are considered as more complementary than incompatible. Even though I have derived different propositions about which mechanisms explain the CSD's accomplishments, based on the three sets of explanatory variables, I assume that all of the variables will help me to give answers to my research questions.

As these variables most likely interact and affect each other concerning their impact on the achievements of the CSD, it is difficult make any assumptions as to which variable have the most explanatory power. Thus, in order to gain clarity and a better understanding of how each of the variables has affected the CSD's accomplishments, the independent variables will first be evaluate separately (Rosendal 1999: 50). Then, I will explore how the three sets of variables may have interacted with each other. Following this, my general assumption is that the explanatory variables together would serve as a more comprehensive explanation of the degree of the CSD's accomplishments than the variables can provide separately.

## 2.8    Methodology

### 2.8.1  Designing a Qualitative Case Study

The research design for the study of the CSD is a qualitative case study. The general purpose of this research strategy is to analyze few subject matter in order to study the material in-depth (Andersen 1997: 121). Qualitative case studies are used to explain the causal links in real-life interventions that are too complex for other strategies, such as for surveys or experiments (Yin 1994: 15). Thus, a qualitative case study can be used to enhance the understanding of dynamic relations, processes and patterns of collaboration.

In order to interpret a study's findings, a preliminary theory is needed. The theoretical perspective(s) adopted for this study will direct the selection of explanatory variables that will be useful to guide data collection and analysis (Yin 1994: 13). Also, a case study inquiry relies on multiple approaches and sources of information, called *triangulation*, in order to achieve valid and reliable results. *Data triangulation*, which will be discussed in this section, is understood as the use of multiple data sources in the study (Yin 1994: 92). According to Yin (ibid.) the most important advantage presented by using data triangulation is 'the development of *converging lines of inquiry*'. This concerns *construct validity*, which is understood as establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied. The potential problems of construct validity can be addressed with triangulation, because the multiple sources of information

can provide multiple measures of the same phenomenon (Yin 1994: 33). The use of multiple sources of information will be further explored below.

The concept of *internal validity,* concerns establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from spurious relationships (Yin 1994: 33). Regarding this case, as noted above, it will be a methodological challenge to study the possibility for causal connections between the CSD and the actual accomplishments, due to the problem of internal validity. There are many factors that can influence the accomplishments, so it is difficult to isolate the effect of the CSD. External relations, such as great public interest and pressure in a certain time period due to major environmental disasters may explain the accomplishments. Moreover, the CSD is linked to other UN bodies and other international organizations in its work on sustainable development. Therefore, international processes and efforts by international organizations may have an effect on the accomplishments of the CSD. Also, domestic relations can be an explanatory factor, such as replacement of the US presidency that might change the USA's position from pusher to laggard or the opposite. It is also important to note that the CSD's mandate can be described as very broad and involves few obligations for the member states (Khor 1994: 103; Yamin 1998/99: 56f). Since efforts by the states can be regarded as voluntary, it is difficult to consider whether the accomplishments are a direct (or indirect) effect of the CSD, or whether the accomplishments would have been made regardless of the CSD.

An important point here is that it is a complex interplay between multiple factors that might effect the CSD's accomplishments. Even though there is a correlation between the CSD and the actual accomplishments, this does not necessarily indicate a causal relationship. The correlation may be explained by spurious factors, as shown above. Also, the causal connection might go in the opposite direction. However, it has become an accepted fact that international institutions matter to multilateral cooperation. Thus, as a starting point I will assume the actual accomplishments are due to the effect of the CSD. The main challenge of the case will then be to study whether the potential correlation is due to a causal effect of the CSD, or whether the correlation can be explained by spurious relations. To identify a causal connection, different analytic strategies may be used, such as process tracing and the method of counterfactuals.

*Process tracing* relates to the strategy of studying the decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into outputs and outcomes. As noted by King et al. (1994: 227) 'a theory that links initial conditions to outcomes will often imply a particular set of motivations or perceptions on the part of [...] actors'. This strategy involves the search for evidence - evidence consistent with the overall causal theory - about the decision process when accomplishments are being done. One of the strategies being used in this study to establish causality is therefore to trace the negotiation process from the 'end product' – the accomplishments – and back to the beginning of the negotiations. Explicit references of the states' actions in various documents or judgements of key informants can be used as indicators of the accomplishments (ibid.).

Another approach, which will be used in this study, is to evaluate the degree of accomplishments in relation to the goals that have been formulated by relevant parties (Jacobsen and Kay 1983: 18). As noted above, the established and formulated mandate will be understood as the main goal of the CSD, and will serve as the point of reference, against which the accomplishments are to be compared. However, it is important to note that achieving a declared goal does not necessarily imply that the parties involved have accomplished *all* that could be accomplished (Underdal 1990: 9). Moreover, if the goal is not explicitly formulated by the parties, it is a difficult criterion to use. Therefore, it is important to be aware of the possibility of validity problems when using this approach.

To a lesser degree, I will also use the *method of counterfactuals*. This is a strategy that involves systematically reconstructing how the course of event would have developed in the absence of a regime or an institution (Young and Levy 1999: 18). A counterfactual analysis can be described as a thought experiment where the expected decisions and efforts in the absence of the institution are identified, and then compared with the actual events. However, the method of counterfactuals is a highly time-consuming and complex approach to use. Therefore, it will not be possible to carry through this strategy thoroughly due to the scope of this case study. Thus, I will only indicate the possibility of other conditions than the CSD that may have been significant for the accomplishments.

### 2.8.2 The Case of the CSD - With the Ambition of Generalization?

Case studies have often been criticized as an inadequate research method because of the inability to generalize. However, it is important to note that the rejection of case studies as unscientific or unsuitable for theory development is due to the lacking ability to satisfy the demand of *statistical* generalization. The possibility to generalize based on a case study does not concern statistic, but rather *analytical* or *theoretical* representativity (Andersen 1997: 14). As pointed out by Yin (1994: 31), analytical generalization refers to a method where 'a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to support the same theory, replication may be claimed'.

The research method used here, will be a single-case study. I will therefore explore how fruitful the theoretical framework will be for the study of the CSD. Thus, different theoretical perspectives will be applied in order to evaluate the empirical results (Andersen 1997: 68f). The theoretical perspectives have guided the formulation of propositions that might explain the degree of the CSD's accomplishments. These propositions will be regarded as complementary, rather than incompatible. This means that empirical data that strengthen one of the propositions does not necessarily weaken the others (Baune 1991: 34). However, it is still important to evaluate the validity of the propositions to study the CSD's accomplishments. A preliminary assumption is that the validity of the propositions will differ and the explanatory power will be unequal in relation to each aspect being studied. An important task of this case study will be to show the theoretical perspectives' ability to explain the effect of an international institution. I do not have the ambition to contribute to theory

development, but hopefully this study will contribute to the understanding of how the theoretical perspectives may explain which mechanisms affect the accomplishments of an institution.

### 2.8.3  Sources of Information

In order to analyze the CSD, I have used the method of data triangulation by gathering data from various qualitative sources. First, I have evaluated several types of primary and secondary documentary information, such as official documents from the UN, other formal studies or evaluations of the CSD and secondary documents like the Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB). Second, I have also conducted several interviews in which the selection of respondents has been based on their degree of involvement and/or their position in the decision-making process. The main purpose of selecting multiple sources of information is to strengthen the validity by triangulation. Therefore, I have chosen various sources with different biases and strength and used them complementary.

The *primary* documents used in this study are mostly official UN documents. These include the documents adopted by the states at the CSD sessions and official documents from the General Assembly (GA) and ECOSOC concerning the CSD. Also, official documents from UNCED and UN General Assembly Special Session (UNGASS) will be evaluated. The purposes of these sources will be: 1) to study the decision-making process, that is, to see which decisions that have been adopted by the parties; and 2) to use these decisions as a source of evidence when evaluating which mechanisms explain the CSD's accomplishments. *Secondary* sources have also been used, such as other formal studies or evaluations of the CSD. *ENB* contains detailed daily and summary reports of the CSD sessions, workshops and other meetings concerning the CSD, as well as media reports and press releases. Since ENB have followed the process of the CSD from the beginning, these reports have been useful to evaluate the possibility of changes during the time period of the study.

*Interviews* have also been an important part of the data used for this study of the CSD. I have conducted several interviews, which have served as sources of information that have been difficult to obtain through written documents. I have also used the interviews to test the validity of the information from written sources. The selection of respondents has been based on availability, on their degree of involvement and/or their position in the decision-making process. As the respondent information is often assumed to be biased, it has been important to strive for a broad selection of respondents.

Availability has been one of the main challenges when selecting respondents. Thus, almost half of the interviews have been conducted in Oslo, with representatives from the Norwegian Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The other interviews have been done in New York, with representatives from the CSD secretariat and the permanent UN missions of Norway and South Africa, and a NGO representative from ENB. These respondents have also been selected on the basis of their various positions in the decision-making process, in order to obtain broad and balanced information. Another challenge has been to find

potential respondents that have participated in the entire period 1993-2001, as the CSD has a high rate of replacements. However, three of my respondents, Idunn Eidheim, Hiroko Morita-Lou and Pamela Chasek, have been involved in the CSD process throughout the whole period.

The interviews have been conducted with an open interview guide, in order to adjust the questions in regard to what position the respondent have or what part of the process the respondent has been involved in. All of the interviews in Oslo, and one of the interviews in New York, have been recorded on tape, so as to provide a more accurate rendition (Yin 1994: 86). For the interviews with representatives from the CSD secretariat and the permanent UN missions, a clearance process was needed in order to use a tape recorder. Thus, I chose to use notes to record the information.

## 3.     Background History

The CSD was established through a process that lasted from UNCED's Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) IV to the first substantial session of the CSD. Thus, I will here give a short presentation of the formation process. Also, I will present the CSD's formulated mandate, its main functions and work programme, and its place within the UN system.

### 3.1    Pre-UNCED and UNCED

One of the most difficult issues to be resolved during the UNCED preparatory process was concerning the establishment of institutional arrangements necessary for the follow-up of UNCED. Still, this issue was not addressed until the fourth and last session of the PrepCom. PrepCom IV, chaired by Tommy Koh (Singapore), was held from 2 March to 4 April 1992. Working Group III was responsible for the legal and institutional issues, where Ambassador Ismail Razali from Malaysia was pointed out as Coordinator (ENB 1992a: 3).

The starting point of negotiation for both Northern and Southern countries in the working group was that they agreed that they should not create any new institutions. However, Razali presented a draft text as the basis for negotiations which proposed the establishment of a Sustainable Development Commission to monitor sustainable development performance at international, national and regional levels (ENB 1992a: 3). The proposal generate substantial debate, where as Norway wanted to establish the Commission directly under the GA, most states preferred to place the suggested Commission under ECOSOC (Leiro 2004; Schei 2004 [interviews]). However, the delegates finally agreed to a revised draft text presented by Razali. In the final draft, Razali presented two options for intergovernmental mechanisms; to establish a high-level Sustainable Development Commission as a main subsidiary organ of ECOSOC and the GA that would report directly to the GA on policy and to ECOSOC on coordination; or to establish a similar mechanism within a revitalized ECOSOC. He also proposed that the choice between these options should be left to UNCED, and that the 47th session of the GA (UNGA-47) should work out the modalities. The final draft presented to the Plenary was then adopted (ENB 1992b).

UNCED was held 3-14 June 1992 under the chairmanship of Secretary-General Maurice Strong. Ismael Razali was Chair for the Institutions contact group, which addressed issues such as the role, functions and reporting structure of the proposed Sustainable Development Commission (ENB 1992c). Three main documents were adopted by the delegates at UNCED: Agenda 21, The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and The Forest Principles. Agenda 21 provided for the establishment of the CSD in Chapter 38. The delegates also agreed to call on the GA to work out the modalities of CSD at its 47th session.

## 3.2    Post-UNCED

### 3.2.1  The Establishment of the CSD and Its Mandate

UNCED had left many considerations to the GA at its 47th session. One of the main tasks was to work out the organizational issues regarding the CSD. The GA decided to adopt the UN Resolution 47/191, which requested ECOSOC, at its organizational session for 1993, to set up a high-level Commission on Sustainable Development as a functional commission of the Council. The establishment of the CSD was requested in order to ensure effective follow-up to the Conference, as well as to enhance international cooperation and rationalize the intergovernmental decision-making capacity for the integration of environment and development issues and to examine the progress of the implementation of Agenda 21 at the national, regional and international levels. The GA also recommended several functions for the Commission (UN 1993b). The CSD was finally established at a Special Session of ECOSOC in February 1993 (Resolution 1993/207). As recommended by UNGA-47, the CSD's mandate was agreed to:

- monitor progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 and activities related to the integration of environmental and developmental goals through analysis and evaluation of reports from governments, NGOs and other UN bodies;

- review the progress in the implementation of the commitments set forth in Agenda 21, including those related to the provision of financial resources and transfer of technology;

- review and monitor progress towards the target of 0.7% of GNP from developed countries for official development assistance (ODA);

- review the adequacy of funding and mechanisms, including efforts to reach the objectives agreed in chapter 33 of Agenda 21, including targets where applicable;

- receive and analyze relevant information from competent NGOs in the context of Agenda 21 implementation;

- consider, where appropriate, information regarding the progress made in the implementation of environmental conventions, which could be made available by the relevant conferences of parties;

- enhance dialogue with NGOs, the independent sector, and other entities outside the UN system, within the UN framework;

- provide recommendations to the General Assembly through ECOSOC, on the basis of an integrated consideration of the reports and issues related to the implementation of Agenda 21; and

- consider the results of the review to be conducted expeditiously by the Secretary-General of all recommendations of the Conference for capacity-building programmes, information networks, task forces and other mechanisms to support the integration of environment and development at regional and subregional levels. (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 20f; UN 1993b).

Also, it was decided that the CSD would consist of 53 rotating member states, elected by ECOSOC for a term in office of three years. The Commission would then meet annually for a period of two to three weeks. Moreover, ECOSOC decided that, as a transitional measure, an organizational session of the Commission would be held in February 1993 to elect the officers of the CSD Bureau, namely, a chairman, three vice-chairmen and a rapporteur, and that the first substantive session would be held in New York in June 1993 (UN 1993a).

### 3.2.2 The CSD's Place in the UN System

The CSD is linked both vertically and horizontally to other parts of the UN system (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 21). First, its secretariat, the Division on Sustainable Development, reports to one of the Under-Secretaries-Generals, who in turn assists the Secretary-General. Second, it relates to UN agencies and bodies and takes part in an Inter-Agency Committee on Sustainable Development (IACSD) with over 20 members.[8] The CSD's secretariat, the Division on Sustainable Development, was provided for by the GA at its 47th session. The GA called on the Secretary-General to establish a clearly identifiable, highly qualified and competent secretariat support structure within the new Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD) to provide support for the Commission, the High-level Advisory Board and IACSD (UN 1993b; ENB 1993a).[9]

The High-level Advisory Board was called for in the Agenda 21 as an additional tool to strengthen the follow-up of Rio. The GA's Resolution 47/191 endorsed the view of the Secretary-General that 'the High-level Advisory Board should consist of eminent persons [...], with recognized expertise on the broad spectrum of issues to be dealt with by the Commission'. It was also decided that the main task would be to give broad consideration to issues related to implementation of Agenda 21, taking into account the thematic multi-year programme of work of the Commission, and provide expert advice in that regard to the Secretary-General and through him, to the CSD, the ECOSOC and the GA (UN 1993b).

In addition to the relations with the High-level Advisory Board, the CSD also took part in IACSD. The IACSD was created as a subsidiary to the

Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC) to focus specifically on sustainable development issues in the UN system.[10] The ACC was chaired by the Secretary-General and had the task of co-ordinating the policies of the different parts of the UN and to follow up the series of summits. The IACSD was made up of senior level officials from nine core members of the ACC.[11] It was asked by the ACC in 1993 to focus on four issues: streamlining the existing interagency co-ordination machinery; allocating and sharing responsibilities for Agenda 21 implementation by the UN system; monitoring the new financial requirements of UN system organizations that relate to Agenda 21; and assessing reporting requirements that are related to the implementation of Agenda 21 and making recommendations on streamlining (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 22).

*3.2.3 The CSD's Work Programme*

The CSD's work programme for the first four years was agreed on at its first session in 1993. The Multi-Year Thematic Programme of Work integrated the 40 chapters of Agenda 21 into nine clusters: (a) critical elements of sustainability (including trade and environment, sustainable consumption, combating poverty, demographic dynamics, and sustainability); (b) financial resources and mechanisms; (c) education, science, transfer of environmentally sound technologies, cooperation, and capacity building; (d) decision-making structures; (e) roles of major groups; (f) health, human settlements, and fresh water; (g) land desertification, forests, and biodiversity; (h) atmosphere, oceans, and all kinds of seas; and (i) toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes. The cross-sectoral issues (a) to (e) were to be considered by the Commission annually, while the sectoral clusters (f) to (i) were to be considered on a multi-year basis. Thus, (f) and (g) would be the main sectoral issues in 1994, (h) in 1995, and (i) in 1996. At CSD-1, it was also decided that the Commission would conduct an overall review of the progress achieved of the work programme and the implementation of Agenda 21 in 1997 (Chasek 2000: 380).

At UNGASS, in 1997, the Multi-Year Programme of Work for the next four sessions of the CSD was adopted. The delegates agreed that overriding issues for each year would be poverty and consumption and production patterns. Themes and sectors to be considered on a multi-year basis were: strategic approaches to freshwater management, transfer of technology, capacity-building, education, science, awareness-raising and industry (1998); oceans and seas, consumption and production patterns and tourism (1999); integrated planning and management of land resources, financial resources, trade and investment and economic growth and agriculture (2000); and atmosphere, energy, transport, international cooperation for an enabling environment, information for decision-making and participation (2001) (ENB 1997a).

## 4. The Decision-Making Process

In order to evaluate to what degree the CSD has achieved its goals, it is necessary to trace the decision-making process when accomplishments are being done. Therefore, I will here give a chronological presentation of the main decisions made by actors at each session, from CSD-1 to CSD-

10.[12] A rough presentation of the states' interests and positions related to the different issues will also be included.

## 4.1    The First Phase

### 4.1.1  The First Session of the CSD

Prior to the first substantive session of the CSD, an organizational session was held. During this session, the CSD elected the Chairman and other members of the CSD Bureau; discussed the provisional agenda and organization of work of the CSD-1; and approved an outline of a multi-year programme of work for the Commission (ENB 1993b).

The first substantive session of the CSD was held in New York from 14 to 25 June 1993, and was chaired by the Malaysian Ambassador Ismael Razali. According to the UN report of CSD-1 (UN 1993c), six procedural documents were to be negotiated during this session. Most of the agenda items dealt with organizing the future work of the Commission. Thus, the first substantive session turned out to be a continuation of the organizational session. The most important decisions adopted by the states were: the multi-year thematic programme of work for the Commission; setting up reporting processes to channel information from states on efforts to implement Agenda 21 into the CSD for review; addressing progress made by various parts of the UN system towards incorporating Agenda 21 into their operations; addressing progress achieved in facilitating and promoting the transfer of environmentally sound technology, cooperation and capacity-building; and addressing initial financial commitments, financial flows and arrangements to give effect to the decisions of UNCED from all available funding sources and mechanisms (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 24f; UN 1993c). Moreover, as noted by Chasek (2000: 380f), 'the Commission also recognized the need for intersessional work to address some of the more contentious issues that the CSD would discuss in 1994, namely finance and technology transfers'. Thus, it was agreed to establish two *ad hoc open-ended intersessional working groups* with government experts that would work out suggestions for the next CSD session on specific measures to enhance the implementation of Agenda 21 in these two areas (ibid.).

Regarding the decisions to be adopted, the discussion among actors mostly concerned the issues of national reporting, establishing intersessional working groups and financial flow and commitments. The discussion related to national reporting was a continuation of the debate between the Northern and Southern countries during the preparatory process and UNCED. The main point, as stressed by many developing-country delegations, was that the information provided by the governments should be voluntary. Also, members of G-77/China did not want anyone to examine the individual reports or make comparisons between them. The reason for this was that the developing countries did not want to create a situation where development aid would be linked to national reporting (Chasek 2000: 383f; ENB 1993c). Regarding the decision to establish two intersessional working groups, the US and the G-77 opposed the proliferation of working groups due to the fear of limited participation (G-77) and budget implications. In spite of the opposition, the decision was adopted

by the Commission (ENB 1993d). The discussion of financial flow and commitments concerned a long-standing conflict between North and South on financial issues, where as the developing countries pointed out the lack of financial resources for the implementation of Agenda 21, the developed countries had problems fulfilling their commitment to reach the accepted UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Product (GNP) for official development assistance (ODA) (ENB 1993e).

### 4.1.2  The Second Session of the CSD

Klaus Töpfer from Germany chaired the second session of the CSD, which was held from 16 to 27 May 1994. The main issues to be adopted were: decisions on chemical safety; requesting preparation of a Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the Worlds, to be submitted at CSD-5; calling for greater co-operation with governing bodies of international organizations, the Bretton Woods institutions and the General Agreement in Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and with major groups; the need for additional efforts in the areas of financial resources, transfer of environmentally sound technologies, co-operation and capacity-building to support the implementation of Agenda 21; and the need for additional measures to be taken to change contemporary patterns of consumption and production (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 25f; Chasek 2000: 381, 385; UN 1994).

Concerning decisions made regarding the CSD's working methodology, Chasek (2000: 381) notes that 'delegates widely acknowledged the need for effective intersessional work to prepare for the next session of the Commission, and the CSD took the decision to extend the mandate of the intersessional working groups'. Hence, it was agreed that one group would prepare for the CSD-3 discussion on land resource issues, and one group would focus on finance and technology transfer. Other decisions related to the working methodology were that the delegates emphasized the importance of the continuous exchange of information on practical experience gained by countries, organizations and major groups; the need for more simplified reporting procedures; the ongoing work on developing sustainable development indicators that could supplement national reporting; and the need for a dialogue-oriented approach, including the use of panel discussions and other means by which information could be shared and the experience of wide range of actors could be sought (Chasek 2000: 381). As noted by ENB (1994a), 'the use of panel discussions during the High-Level Segment was a great success'. The panels fostered a dialogue between the parties, such as experts, diplomats, politicians and NGOs, on issues like finance and the role of women in relation to sustainable development.

One of the major discussions among actors was related to the issues of national reporting and the development of indicators. Most countries agreed that the reporting procedures needed to be simplified. However, the states failed the attempt to adopt a decision on indicators due to opposition from the G-77/China Moreover, the discussions between North and South on the issues of financial resources and technology transfer continued as before. (ENB 1994a; 1994b).

*4.1.3  The Third Session of the CSD*

Prior to the third session of the CSD, two ad hoc open-ended working groups were held, one on sectoral issues and one on finance. One of the most important issues to be noted was regarding the discussion at the working group on finance, as the delegates were presented a matrix of financial instruments and policy options. The question of how to finance the implementation of Agenda 21 has proven to be the most difficult issue to solve. Hence, the matrix presented at the meeting contained various suggestions on new, innovative and alternative ways and means to finance sustainable development to be discussed by the delegates (ENB 1995a).

Henrique Cavalcanti from Brazil had been elected as Chair for third session of the CSD, which was held from 11 to 28 April 1995. As highlighted by Bigg and Dodds (1997: 26), more than 50 ministers and secretaries of state attended CSD-3. Some of the most important decisions made at this year's session was; the establishment of an Inter-Governmental Panel on Forests (IPF) which would report to UNGASS in 1997; the establishment of an ad hoc open-ended working group on consumption and production; and a timetable for the formulation of sustainable development indicators (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 27). The Commission also called for a review of the mechanisms for transferring environmentally sound technologies; agreed to continue with dialogue sessions and panel discussions; recognized the need to analyze the potential effects of environmentally related trade issues; recognized that poverty eradication is an indispensable requirement of sustainable development; and encouraged initiatives at the national and international levels, including action to phase out the use of leaded gasoline (Chasek 2000: 382).

As the sectoral issue of forest was on the CSD-3 agenda, the discussion on forests took centre stage. An idea of establishing IPF, proposed by the ad hoc working group on sectoral issues, were supported by a number of countries. However, some countries were concerned that the panel would be used as an instrument by interested parties to push the idea of a global convention on forest management. In the end, the delegates agreed to the establishment of the panel, whose objectives was to promote the implementation of UNCED forest decisions at the national and international levels (Agarwal et al. 2001: 185). The discussion that affected CSD-3 the most, however, was related to the issue of finance. Even though the Commission achieved some important accomplishments at its third session, the question of how to finance sustainable development efforts remained as one of the continuing areas of concern. The G-77/China stressed the need to mobilize new and additional financial resources to support sustainable development efforts and expressed concern about decreasing ODA levels (ENB 1995b). While some of the developed countries, such as Norway, Denmark, France and the Netherlands, supported the request for mobilizing new and additional financial resources, most of the Northern states, like the US, the EU and Australia, emphasized other funding sources than ODA, such as domestic resources and the use of economic instruments. The G-77/China opposed most of the proposals related to domestic resources and economic instruments, and called for deletion of the paragraphs that dealt with these matters (ENB 1995c). However,

proposals related to domestic resources and economic instruments, as well as references to the decline of the ODA in absolute terms, were included in the final document (UN 1995).

### 4.1.4  The Fourth Session of the CSD

The fourth session of the CSD, chaired by Bulgarian Rumen Gechev, met from 18 April to 3 May 1996. Gechev opened the session by noting the important role of CSD-4 in finalizing the Multi-Year Programme of Work and serving as a bridge to the preparations for UNGASS in 1997 (ENB 1996a). However, the focus of the next year's review of progress at CSD-5 and UNGASS provided a backdrop to many of the discussions at CSD-4 (ENB 1996b).

The Commission endorsed the Global Plan of Action on protecting the marine environment from land-based activities; urged governments to pilot the 126 indicators developed by the CSD Secretariat in conjunction with governments, UN agencies, and major groups; reviewed the implementation of the Programme of Action (POA) for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (SIDS); and addressed the relationship between the WTO provisions and trade measures for environmental purposes, including those relevant to multilateral environmental agreements (Chasek 2000: 382; UN 1996).

Since the forth session of the CSD was dominated by preparation for the upcoming CSD-5 and UNGASS, CSD-4's treatment of the sectoral issues was superficial. This concerned especially the issue of oceans (Agarwal et al. 2001: 185). One of the issues that attracted the most discussion by the Commission was participation of major groups and NGOs to UNGASS. Even though most delegations supported involvement of NGOs and major groups in general, the states disagreed about the rules of participation of major groups to UNGASS. The EU proposed that ECOSOC should be invited to ensure the continuation of the Rio arrangements regarding participation of major groups, and that the GA should be invited to ensure appropriate arrangements for the contribution of major groups to UNGASS and its follow-up. The US wanted to delete any reference to major group representatives in delegations to UNGASS, and objected to Canada's proposal for supporting the recommendations agreed to at CSD-2 confirming ECOSOC Roster status of all the CSD NGOs, and inviting major group participation during the preparations for and at CSD-5 and in the 1997 Special Session. The G-77 suggested deleting the sub-paragraph urging governments to include major group representatives in their national delegations (ENB 1996c). However, the states finally agreed to adopt the decision to encourage governments to involve major group representatives in preparations for the 1997 review process and in national delegations to the CSD-5 and, as appropriate, to UNGASS (ENB 1996d).

### 4.1.5  The Fifth Session of the CSD

The fifth session of CSD, chaired by Dr. Mostafa Tolba from Egypt, could be described as a 'PrepCom' to UNGASS. The delegates prepared a comprehensive document to be adopted by UNGASS, and agreed that

although some progress had been made in terms of institutional development, international consensus-building, public participation, and private sector actions, the global environment continues to deteriorate and the commitments in the UNCED agreements have not been fully implemented. Furthermore, CSD-5 identified energy/atmosphere, freshwater and forests as emerging priority issues (Agarwal et al. 2001: 187; Chasek 2000: 382). The states also considered the report of IPF on its fourth session. Regarding forests, several states, such as Portugal, France and Greece, advocated the establishment of an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) to initiate a global forest convention. The EU, Finland, Canada and Germany among others supported an international convention on forests. Others, such as China, Australia, Colombia, India, Brazil and the US among others, preferred to create an intergovernmental forum on forests or some other arrangement. The matters were to be discussed further at UNGASS (ENB 1997b).

### 4.1.6  UN General Assembly's Special Session

In 1997, five years after UNCED, the delegates reconvened in New York from 23 to 27 June to review the implementation of Agenda 21. Ambassador Ismail Razali was elected President of UNGASS, and Mostafa Tolba, Chair of CSD-5, was elected as Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole (ENB 1997c). As noted by Chasek (2000: 382) UNGASS 'served as a review and assessment of the work of the Commission, and how the UN system, governments, local authorities, NGOs and international organizations were implementing key components of Agenda 21 and moving toward sustainable development'.

The two main documents to be adopted were a Statement of Commitment and a Programme for Further Implementation of Agenda 21. The Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21 included: A) Assessment of Progress made since UNCED; B) Implementation in Areas requiring Urgent Action; C) Means of Implementation; and D) International Institutional Arrangements (ENB 1997d). The delegates also agreed on the next five-year programme of work.

Other decisions adopted by the states concerned the CSD's future role, programme of work and methods of work, and called on the CSD to;

- continue to provide a central forum for reviewing progress and for urging further implementation of Agenda 21;

- carry out its work in such a manner as to avoid unnecessary duplication and repetition of work undertaken by other relevant forums;

- make concerted efforts to attract greater involvement in its work of ministers and high-level national policy makers responsible for specific economic and social sectors;

- continue to provide a forum for the exchange of national experiences and best practices on the area of sustainable development;

- provide a forum for the exchange of experiences on region-
  al and subregional initiatives and regional collaboration for
  sustainable development;

- establish closer interaction with international financial,
  development and trade institutions; and

- strengthen its interaction with representatives of major
  groups (ENB 1997d).

Concerning the discussion on the Programme for Further Implementation
of Agenda 21, a deep concern was expressed that the overall trends for
sustainable development were worse than in 1992. Moreover, the dele-
gates acknowledged that the implementation of the commitments in the
UNCED and post-UNCED agreements, as well as others adopted before
1992, remained to be carried out (ENB 1997e). Thus, UNGASS recom-
mended to improve implementation of Agenda 21 issues such as: fresh-
water, consumption patterns, poverty, forests, energy and transport. On
the issue of freshwater, the delegates emphasized the urgent need to
formulate and implement programmes for integrated watershed manage-
ment, strengthen regional and international cooperation for technology
transfer, and financing integrated water resources programmes (Agarwal
et al. 2001: 200). The issue of forests generated considerable debate, as
the delegates disagreed on the various options for international arrange-
ments and mechanisms on forest management. The debate was led by the
Netherlands and Germany, who strongly advocated a legally binding con-
vention on forests. This proposal was opposed by many of the Southern
countries. In the end, the countries agreed to a recommendation on a
continued intergovernmental policy dialogue on forests (Agarwal et al.
2001: 200, 202).

## 4.2    The Second Phase

### 4.2.1  The Sixth Session of the CSD

The sixth session of the CSD met from 20 April to 1 May 1998, and was
chaired by Cielito Habito from the Philippines. The Commission adopted
decisions concerning: a review of implementation of POA for the Sus-
tainable Development of SIDS; and an enabling financial framework that
contributes to the promotion of private sector finance mobilization. The
states also recognized the value of the interactive dialogue between in-
dustry, business, trade unions, NGOs, governments and international or-
ganizations in responsible entrepreneurship, corporate management tools,
technology cooperation and assessment and industry and freshwater; and
the need for partnerships with major groups (ENB 1998a).

The two issues that dominated the discussions at CSD-6 were the econ-
omic theme of industry and freshwater management. Concerning the
issue of industry, Habito noted in his opening speech that industry has a
dominant role in sustainable development. He also pointed out that indus-
try could be the biggest source of funds for sustainable development,
especially since the world has moved away from the Rio funding targets
(ENB 1998b). A Stakeholder Dialogue between NGOs, industry, trade
and government delegates was introduced for the first time to discuss the

issues of industry and freshwater, technology cooperation and assessment, responsible entrepreneurship, and corporate management tools (ENB 1998c).

Freshwater became the sectoral focus at CSD-6, as UNGASS had called for highest priority to be given to freshwater problems. The main debate concerned the question of whether water was an economic or a social good. While the Northern countries wanted water to be considered an economic good with social value, the Southern countries emphasized that water should be seen in a larger social context (Agarwal et al. 2001: 204). The Commission agreed to give priority to the social dimension of freshwater management, but also to give further attention to explicit linkages of socio-economic development, for equitable utilization and efficient freshwater allocation and use (UN 1998).

### 4.2.2  The Seventh Session of the CSD

Simon Upton from New Zealand chaired the seventh session of the CSD, which was held from 19 to 30 1999. CSD-7 attracted more high-level representation than ever before as 89 ministers and high-level government officials were present. The Commission continued with the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues, and thus, held a four-session Tourist Segment with representatives from local authorities, trade unions, industry and NGOs and governments. Furthermore, the countries prepared for the UN General Assembly's Special Session to review the Barbados Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of SIDS (ENB 1999). The Commission also agreed to: establish an ad hoc open-ended intergovernmental group of experts on energy and sustainable development; a recommendation that the GA establish an open-ended informal consultative process on oceans and seas; a resolution on voluntary initiatives and agreements; call for action on illegal, unregulated or unreported (IUU) fishing; and a recommendation that ECOSOC adopt a draft resolution of the expansion of the UN Guidelines on Consumer Protection to include sustainable consumption (ENB 1999).

Some of the main issue to be discussed by the states at CSD-7 concerned: oceans and seas, consumption and production patterns, and voluntary initiatives by stakeholders. Concerning oceans and seas, the delegates discussed the problem areas of by-catch, destructive fishing practices, and IUU fishing. Indonesia and Madagascar pointed out that the subsistence of small-scale fishermen was often affected by industrialised fishing fleets and by IUU fishing. Nigeria and France called on the CSD to give priority to the issue of IUU fishing (Agarwal et al. 2001: 206). The Commission decided to recommend that the GA would establish an open-ended informal consultative process to take account of the inputs provided by UN bodies and major groups (UN 1999).

Finally, it is important to note the contribution of Chair Simon Upton to the negotiation process as he introduced a number of innovations such as video conferencing for Bureau meetings and including the identification of areas of non-agreement in the CSD-7 text (ENB 1999).

*4.2.3 The Eighth Session of the CSD*

Juan Mayr Maldonado from Colombia chaired CSD-8, which was held from 24 April to 5 May 2000. The agenda for the delegates of the CSD-8 were considered as very difficult as they were going to work out decisions regarding the cross-sectoral theme of finance, trade and investment, and the sectoral theme of sustainable agriculture and land management. The conclusions and proposals in the final report of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) were also to be discussed, as were preparations for Earth Summit (Rio + 10) in 2002 (ENB 2000).

Four Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues were held at this year's session on the issues of production techniques, consumption and safety; best practices in land resources management; knowledge for a sustainable food system; and globalization, trade liberalization and investment patterns. Included for the first time were a number of experts who initiated thematic discussions at the High-level Segment. The delegates adopted decisions on: preparations for the ten-year review of UNCED; an invitation to ECOSOC and the GA to act on the proposed terms of reference for an international arrangement on forests, as recommended by IFF; and the report from the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Energy for Sustainable Development, which is preparing the energy agenda for CSD-9 (ENB 2000).

Due to the difficult agenda of CSD-8, the states had to discuss issues involving strong political agendas. According to ENB (2000), these debates involved 'the aim of consolidating politically contentious issues that are being addressed in other forums'. The Commission focused on such issues as: good governance; the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements and the WTO; the removal of subsidies in developed countries; references to common but differentiated responsibilities and the precautionary principle; and the inclusion of references to 'legal' security of tenure and 'equal access' to land to all people. As noted by ENB (2000) 'some of the most protracted negotiations related to text on concepts that could be used as a cloak for protectionism'. Due to much disagreement, most of the decisions adopted on sectoral issues were watered down recommendation (Agarwal et al. 2001: 208).

A much less contentious issue to be discussed by the delegates at CSD-8 was on forests. Forests appeared on the agenda because IFF presented its final report to the CSD. As there was hardly any debate on the matters, the IFF report was adopted in two hours. The delegates also endorsed the report's main proposal that a new UN Forum on Forests (UNFF) would be created. ECOSOC was given the responsibility to work out the modalities (ibid.).

*4.2.4 The Ninth Session of the CSD*

The ninth session of the CSD took place from 16-28 April 2001, and was chaired by Bedrich Moldan from the Czech Republic. After considerations of the agenda and organizational matters, four Multi-stakeholder Dialogues were held on; equitable access to sustainable energy; producing, distributing and consuming energy; public-private partnerships to

achieve sustainable development; and sustainable transport planning. The scientific and technological community participated in the dialogues as a major group for the first time. Also, ministers and heads of delegations held several informal exchanges with the nominated CSD-10 Bureau members to provide political guidance on the preparatory process of WSSD scheduled to take place in Johannesburg in 2002 (ENB 2001a).

The discussions at CSD-9 were strongly affected by substantive disagreements related to matters such as: the use and transport of nuclear energy, sustainable development indicators, climate change and the Kyoto Protocol (ENB 2001a). Regarding the discussion on atmosphere, the rejection of the Kyoto Protocol by the US president George Bush in March 2001 received strong reactions from many of the other delegates (ENB 2001b). In the end, the debates did not result in any firm resolutions on the issues of the CSD-9 agenda. However, it was a clear consensus among the parties that it was time to 'radically restructure' the CSD. According to ENB (2001a) 'for many observers, CSD-9 was about preserving sovereign interests and narrowing down options for consideration at the 2002 Summit, rather than engaging in frank discussions on sustainable development with the goal of developing specific policy-oriented recommendations'.

### 4.2.5  *The Tenth Session of the CSD (PrepCom-1)*

CSD-10, acting as the first PrepCom for WSSD, was held from 30 April to 2 May 2001. The delegates elected Emil Salim from Indonesia as PrepCom Chair. The Commission adopted decisions on: progress in WSSD preparatory activities at the local, national, regional and international levels; modalities of future PrepCom sessions; tentative organization of work during the WSSD; provisional rules of procedure; and arrangements for accreditation and participation of Major Groups (ENB 2002).

## 4.3  Summery of the Decision-Making Process

With the tenth session of the CSD, the first ten years of the Commission were then completed. Summing up, it would be reasonable to say that the decision-making process of the CSD has had its ups and downs. The process had a slow start as the first substantive session dealt mostly with organizational issues. Also, the Commission did not make much progress at its second session, as the delegates were most concerned of issues related to the working methodology. CSD-3, however, has been highlighted due to the Commission's efforts of getting forests on the agenda. At the next two sessions, the progress on the work of the CSD slowed down because the countries started preparing for UNGASS. UNGASS represented a lowpoint for the parties involved in the work on sustainable development, as the delegates acknowledged that the overall trends for sustainable development were worse than in 1992, and that the commitments in the UNCED and post-UNCED agreements remained to be carried out. With that in mind, the countries started the second five-year period of the CSD. At CSD-6 and CSD-7, the Commission made great progress, both because the multi-stakeholder dialogues were introduced, and because freshwater and oceans were put on the agenda. The CSD did

not accomplish much at the next session, however, due to difficult issues such as trade, agriculture and finance. The last two sessions of the Commission's ten-year period were mostly affected by the countries' attempts to positioning themselves and narrowing down options for consideration at WSSD in 2002.

The presentation of the CSD's decision-making process has focused on the most important decisions made and the main issues discussed by relevant parties during the ten-year period 1993-2001. I will now turn to the first part of my analysis, and thus, evaluate the accomplishments of the CSD compared to its mandate.

## 5.    To What Degree Has the CSD Achieved Its Goals?

In order to answer the first question of my thesis, 'to what degree has the CSD achieved its goals?', it will be necessary to evaluate the degree of the CSD's accomplishments. Thus, the aim of this chapter will be to measure the value of my dependent variable, 'the CSD's accomplishment'. First, I will discuss some of the challenges of the CSD's mandate concerning goal attainment. Second, I will examine the Commission's accomplishments compared to its mandate. Finally, some comments regarding the measurement of the CSD's accomplishments will be made, before I will determine the score of the dependent variable and give an answer to the first part of my thesis.

### 5.1    The CSD's Mandate and Goal Attainment

As presented in chapter 3, the CSD was given a very broad mandate and programme of work. Thus, the CSD has some challenges concerning goal attainment. In broad terms, the mandate consists of three major goals:

- monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementation of Agenda 21;

- elaborating policy guidance and options for future initiatives aimed at achieving sustainable development; and

- promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development between governments, the international community, and major groups (Chasek 2000: 383ff; UN 1993b).

Concerning goal attainment, four major challenges can be pointed out. First, as the formulation of the CSD's mandate was broad and vague, the goals of the CSD have not been clear. This has lead to deliberations on issues addressed in other fora and to general, non-specific recommendations (Wagner 2003: 8). Second, the CSD was charged to monitor and review the progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 and activities related to the integration of environmental and development goals through analysis and evaluation of reports from governments, NGOs and other UN bodies, including commitments related to the provision of financial resources and transfer of technology (UN 1993b). Yamin (1998/99: 53) notes that 'not counting NGO input, an educated guesti-

mate might be somewhere between 400 and 500 entities, which might produce the same number of reports annually'. Thus, the task of monitoring and reviewing can be considered enormous. Third, evaluating the implementation of Agenda 21 is problematic due to the lack of a 'baseline' for measuring performance. As noted by Yamin (1998/99: 56), most environmental treaties provide for a goal and some kind of quantified baseline against which national performance can be assessed: 'both the multiple goal and wide-ranging nature of Agenda 21 would appear to preclude such an approach'. Finally, Agenda 21 is not legally binding and does not contain any obligations for the states (Agarwal et al. 2001: 171; Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]). Moreover, according to Dodds et al. (2002a: 4), 'the mandate of the Commission and the structure of the Secretariat make it clear that the CSD is intended to be a 'soft forum' in that it does not itself have the authority to develop new multi-lateral agreements'. Also, the CSD is not a legal authority and lack mandatory powers. Therefore, the CSD's mandate does not oblige states and others to submit information to the Commission (Yamin 1998/99: 53ff). Since the CSD does not have any mechanism to hold governments accountable, it weakens the CSD's impact on the international community and national governments (Wagner 2003: 4).

Following this, the CSD has had a difficult starting point for goal attainment. However, in order to measure the score of the dependent variable, I will examine the Commission's accomplishments regarding the three major goals noted above.

## 5.2  The CSD's Accomplishments

### 5.2.1  Monitoring and Reviewing Progress on the Implementation of Agenda 21

As noted, the reporting process on the implementation of Agenda 21 is voluntary for the states and others. However, according to Agarwal et al. (2001: 183), 'as far as the actual record of eliciting reports from national governments goes, CSD has been successful'. Eighty out of 114 countries that reported to the CSD during the period 1993-1997 did so on more than one occasion (Yamin 1998/99: 54). Also, 105 out of 149 countries submitted reports to the CSD more than once during the period 1998-2002.[13] Yamin (1998/99: 54) states that 'in fact when the track record of developing countries alone is looked at, the CSD's achievements seem extraordinary high, with the overwhelming majority of developing countries, including the least developed among them, having reported at least once'.

However, due to the voluntary nature of the national reports, the CSD organizational session of 1993 decided that 'it will be up to governments to decide on [the] degree of detail and regularity' of information submitted to the CSD (UN 1993c). Thus, as noted by Yamin (1998/99: 54), 'in keeping with their voluntary nature, the content, format and timing of reports is ultimately for governments to determine'. At the first session of the CSD, the Commission's lack of mandatory authority to determine these matters led to intense discussions (Yamin 1998/99: 54). In a final resolution, the governments agreed to accept several *suggestions* given by

**Table 5.1: Number of National Reports Received by the CSD**

| Year | Total number of reports | Number from developed nations | Number from developing nations | Number from economies in transition[1] |
|------|------|------|------|------|
| 1992[2] | 154 | 22 | 121 | 11 |
| 1994[3] | 53 | 22 | 27 | 4 |
| 1995 | 59 | 23 | 34 | 2 |
| 1996 | 41 | 20 | 19 | 2 |
| 1997[4] | 97 | 24 | 65 | 8 |
| 1998[5] | 56 | | | |
| 1999 | 60 | | | |
| 2000 | 74 | | | |
| 2001 | 53 | | | |
| 2002[6] | 141 | | | |

*Notes*[14]
1. Using the Annex 1 listing from the Framework Convention on Climate Change. Several countries have reported to the CSD which are not parties to the FCCC and therefore may fall under this heading, such as: Albania, Armenia, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Uzbekistan. These countries have been counted here as developing.
2. 1992 reports were submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the UN Conference on Environment and Development over the Period 1991-2.
3. There were no reports for the year 1993 as this was the CSD organizational year.
4. 1997 national reports were in the form of 'National Profiles'.
5. The figures of national reports 1998-2002 are only as total numbers.
6. 2002 reports were in the form of 'Country Profiles'.

*Source*:[15] 1992 figures from INTERAISE (1996), *World Directory of Country Environmental Studies,* May; 1994-7 figures from Mary Pat Silveira, United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (1997); 1998-2002 figures from Hiroko Morita-Lou, United Nations Division for Sustainable Development, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2005).

the Secretary-General, concerning the format and timing of reports (UN 1993c) [emphasis by author]. However, as pointed out by Chasek (2000: 384), the reporting guidelines proved to be too vague to facilitate a comprehensive reporting process. Thus, the delegates at CSD-2 and CSD-3 emphasized the need for more simplified reporting procedures and ongoing work on developing sustainable development indicators in order to achieve more concise reports for future sessions (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 26; Chasek 2000: 381). As a consequence, the Commission started a streamlining process of national reporting. One of the attempts of

streamlining was to introduce country profiles that were compiled by the CSD Secretariat by using all past reports. These profiles were then sent to their respective governments for updates and corrections (Yamin 1998/99:55). At CSD-5, the Secretary-General recommended that the countries should update the profiles on an annual basis. He also recommended that national reporting should continue, but only on those issues on which the states did not report to other fora or bodies. (Yamin 1998/99: 56). Yamin (ibid.) notes that 'since UNGASS, the CSD has kept the country profiles on file so that much of the general information will not have to be repeated on a yearly basis'. However, many of the countries, especially the developing countries, still complain about too much reporting to the various UN bodies. They stress that they do not have the capacity to report to all bodies of the UN (Mabhongo 2005 [interview]). According to Mabhongo (ibid.), the main reason for the reporting strains is the lack of coordination within the UN to share information. Hence, streamlining of the national reporting still needs improvement.

Also, there are several problems concerning the use of self-reporting. First, the contents of the reports are difficult to compare (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Since the CSD does not have any 'baseline' for measuring performance, many of the reports are based on estimates rather than on statistically exact data, and much of the information reported is of a qualitative nature (Yamin 1998/99: 56; Chasek: 2000: 384). Finding ways to measure progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 has proven to be a continuous problem. As a response, the CSD has worked on developing indicators. The Commission adopted a decision at CSD-4, urging governments to pilot the 126 indicators developed by the Secretariat in conjunction with the governments (UN 1996). This could be considered as a major progress, as many states had opposed the use of indicators at UNCED. According to Chasek (2005 [interview]) the CSD has done a good job developing indicators. The problem, however, is that many of the countries do not have the data and the statistical information to use indicators (ibid.) Consequently, the use of indicators has not functioned as well as intended (Skåre 2005 [interview]).

Second, a widespread use of self-reporting also raises a general question of the reliability of the reports (Chayes and Chayes 1995 in Yamin 1998/99: 56). The content has been hard to verify, and thus, the accuracy has been uncertain. However, Yamin (1998/99: 56) points out that systematic falsification is rare, while non-reporting or provision of incomplete information is a more typical state reaction. Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 [interview]) note that, especially concerning certain issues such as the climate, the states do not wish to give any information on the matters in the reports. Furthermore, many of the states tend to make their implementation performance look good, or perhaps better than in practice (Yamin 1998/99: 56).

An additional problem concerning self-reporting is that the reports vary a lot: as some countries have followed the reporting guidelines, others just report on what they plan to do; and the reports are not always linked to the issues to be discussed at the sessions (Bergesen and Botnen 1996: 53; Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Following this, the national re-

ports that have been submitted are of uneven quality, of uncertain accuracy, and difficult to compare. According to Bergesen and Botnen (ibid.), 'the summaries produced by the Secretariat are based on insufficient coverage and are presented in such general terms that it is impossible to draw meaningful conclusions about policy relevance from them. Hence, they appear to play a marginal role when the Commission meets'. Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]) note that significance of the national reports at the sessions has declined during the ten-year period 1993 - 2002.

However, the reporting process receives credit for strengthening coordination and dialogue between government agencies and between them and major groups, and that the report preparation process has served as a good starting point for their preparation for the annual CSD session (DESA 2002 in Wagner 2003: 14). Moreover, Mabhongo (2005 [interview]) notes that national reporting is a useful mechanism to get firsthand information from the states, instead of getting the information from other sources. Wagner (DESA 2002 in Wagner 2003: 14) points out that 'some countries indicate that the reports provide a tool for awareness-raising and internalization of the concept of sustainable development'. Thus, it appears that the national reporting has been useful for the states. Furthermore, as pointed out by Yamin (1998/99: 57), 'the Secretary-General's conclusions about the reporting process contributing to the inward and outward processes would appear to be well founded'.

*5.2.2  Developing Policy Recommendations*

According to Chasek (2000: 385), the CSD's record in elaborating policy guidance and options for future activities to follow up UNCED and advancing the sustainable development agenda is a mixed one. As noted earlier, the CSD is not a legislative authority, and has not got the mandate to make legally binding agreements for the states. Thus, the Commission's task on policy guidance is limited to passing resolutions which 'recommend' and 'urge'. The Secretariat notes that the aspect of policy guidance has not been clear during the period 1993-2002, and therefore, the strong policy guidance has been deluded (Zhu and Morita-Lou [interview]). As pointed out by Wagner (2003: 14), 'many have questioned the value of annually documenting the international consensus on each agenda item when, in most cases, that consensus ends up rehashing other agreements or otherwise settling for a lowest common denominator'. However, the agenda-setting role of the CSD has been highlighted by many. As noted by Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 [interview]), the CSD puts issues on the agenda and initiates processes that continue into other fora. Mabhongo (2005 [interview]) notes that the Commission has kept people talking about various issues, and therefore kept the issues on the agenda. Thus, there are some areas where the CSD has had some success in policy guidance. The main areas that have been highlighted are: forests, oceans and freshwater.

In order to follow up the Forest Principles from Rio, the CSD was to discuss the issue of forests at its third session in 1995. The delegates agreed to establish IPF to formulate options for action to support the management, conservation, and sustainable development of all types of

forests and report back to the CSD in 1997 (Chasek 2000: 382). According to Chasek (ibid.), this decision was seen by many as a watershed event that has helped to focus the international dialogue on forest, and its 'deliberations built international consensus and formulated approaches for action on the majority of issues under consideration'. In 1997, the IFF replaced the IPF due to a recommendation by UNGASS to continue the intergovernmental policy dialogue on forest. Chasek (2005 [interview]) notes that both fora came up with a lot of good recommendations, but the dialogue on forests needed to be carried out on a higher level. At CSD-8, the delegates were to discuss conclusions and proposals in the final report of the IFF. They agreed to an invitation to ECOSOC and the GA to act on the proposed terms of reference for an international arrangement on forests, as recommended by the IFF. Thus, the UNFF was then established. Chasek (2005 [interview]) points out that this shows that when the CSD makes a recommendation, it is not necessarily ignored.

Another recommendation by the CSD that was acted on was to establish a consultative process on oceans (Chasek 2005 [interview]). When the issue of oceans and seas was on the agenda at CSD-7, the delegates agreed on a recommendation to the General Assembly to 'establish an open-ended consultative process' to take stock of the inputs provided by UN bodies (ENB 1999). The resulting UN Open-Ended Informal Consultative Process on Oceans, together with the Law of the Sea, was then intended to facilitate deliberations in the GA on developments in oceanic affairs and to strengthen international coordination and cooperation in the area of oceans and seas (Wagner 2003: 15). As noted by Hyvarnien and Brack (2000 in Wagner 2003: 15), this process 'may contribute to revitalising the Assembly's oceans debate'.

The issue of freshwater has also been highlighted as a success story of the CSD. At CSD-2, the CSD requested preparation of a Comprehensive Assessment of the Freshwater Resources of the Worlds, to be submitted at its fifth session in 1997 (Chasek 2000: 385). According to Chasek (ibid.), 'this assessment provides an overview of major water quantity and quality problems, with the aim of helping people understand the urgent need to deal with these issues before they become even more serious'. As a consequence of the assessment, the CSD decided to make freshwater a priority issue for the sixth session of the Commission. Since there has not been a body within the UN system for the issue of freshwater, the CSD has been important for putting freshwater on the agenda, and keeping it there. Mabhongo (2005 [interview]) points out that countries are still talking about the outcome of CSD-6, because they managed to treat the issue in an integrative manner, and discuss freshwater in terms of poverty and development.

However, even though important issues have been put on the agenda within the CSD, a relevant question is asked by Chasek (2000: 385): 'is the CSD having an impact outside of the UN basement?' She points out that several NGOs believe that the CSD needs a more strategic process, including greater involvement of experts, national-level officials from the capitals, and stakeholders at the local level (ibid.). The CSD has been the most successful ECOSOC commission to attract NGOs, ministers and representatives from national capitals. However, as many of the delegates

from developing countries are diplomats from the permanent missions in New York, this has affected the decision-making process at the CSD sessions (Chasek 2000: 386). As noted by Chasek (ibid.), 'the job of the diplomat is to negotiate, not always to understand the technical issues under negotiation'. As the diplomats do not always consult their capitals or the people who actually understand the various environmental and development issues, they do not necessarily have the knowledge to discuss the specific issues properly (Chasek 2005 [interview]). Consequently, the delegates who represent the developing countries, have often used general rhetorical statements in the discussions of the various issues (Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]). The CSD debates are therefore often characterized by North-South rhetoric, focusing on issues such as finance and technology transfer (Chasek 2000: 386). This also concerns the problem of disconnected cross-sectoral issues. As pointed out by Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]), many of the diplomats lack the understanding of the linkage between the issues of financial and technical transfer and the specific sectoral issues, and therefore do not discuss the matters in an integrative manner. Moreover, Agarwal et al. (2001: 172) point out that as the CSD has been treated as a negotiating forum by delegates, the CSD sessions have used to renegotiate decisions already settled in other international agreements. According to Brown (1998: 3), the negotiators often seem to be unaware of prior CSD decisions or the text of Agenda 21: 'as a result, proposals are often made that invite endless discussion of abstract matters that have been carefully worked out in the past and for which no further political progress is likely'. Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]) have a different opinion as they claim that the delegates actively use their archives to recollect previous decisions. In their opinion, the renegotiations are just a proof of strategic attempts of 'replay' (ibid.).

Following this, the CSD has had some success of policy guidance as they have put issues on the agenda, and kept them there. However, as there have been several problems regarding the negotiations, the discussions carried out during the CSD sessions have resulted in few action-oriented proposals on how countries and the UN system can move further towards sustainable development (Agarwal et al. 2001: 172).

### 5.2.3 Promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development[16]

Achieving the goal of promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development between governments, the international community, and major groups is generally seen as the most successful accomplishment of the CSD. One of the main reasons for this, is that the CSD has been innovative in finding new ways to involve the major groups (Chasek 2005 [interview]).

The degree of dialogue between governments and NGOs was significant already at the first session of the CSD, as NGO were given speaking slots at strategic points throughout all debates in the CSD plenaries, and to informal negotiations over specific policies and initiatives (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 24). At CSD-5, formal dialogue sessions between governments and each of the major groups were arranged for the first time

(Chasek 2000: 386). The Multi-stakeholder dialogues were introduced at CSD-6. This was considered an innovative approach by attempting to generate action-oriented dialogue between governments and major groups concerning a sector, such as agriculture or industry, or identifying future policies and action that would contribute to advancing the sustainable development objectives (Dodds et al. 2002b: 25). The Dialogues were also held at the next three sessions, and gained higher status as the outcomes were put on the table with Ministerial discussion and the CSD Intersessional documents for governments (Dodds et al. 2002a: 8).

Even though achieving the goal of promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development is generally seen as the most successful accomplishment of the CSD, several problems can be noted. The Multi-Stakeholder Dialogues is not always seen as a success because the major groups have often been talking to themselves, and because not enough major groups from developing countries have been participating (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Also, whilst the dialogues were interesting and useful in terms of information sharing, they did not have a clear impact on the intergovernmental process. As noted by Dodds et al. (2002a: 5), 'the dialogues remained tied to the effectiveness of the chair to ensure that governments receive the conclusions of the dialogues'. One reason for this has been that many of the diplomats, who negotiate, do not attend the dialogues: 'what they do is that they push the people from capitals into the dialogue sessions, while the diplomats go forth and negotiate' (Chasek 2005 [interview]). Thus, the major groups have been concerned that their contributions to the dialogues do not have an impact on the actual decision-making process of the CSD. Dodds et al. (2002a: 8f) notes that the mechanism of linking stakeholder contributions into the decision-making process is a shortcoming of the dialogues. The Secretariat (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]), however, state that the outcomes from the dialogues often serve as basis for negotiations.

Even though the link between the multi-stakeholder dialogues and the negotiations may need improvement, the dialogues have been an important mechanism for building partnerships between relevant parties in the work on sustainable development. The partnership building within the CSD has also had an effect at national and local levels. The Local Agenda 21 movement that came out of UNCED has offered means for local action plans to be developed within a city or town to implement the Agenda 21 recommendations (Wagner 2003: 16f). Thus, the CSD has most likely contributed to enhanced dialogue and partnerships building between actors at international, national and local levels.

## 5.3  The Degree of the CSD's Accomplishments

Even though the Commission has had a difficult starting point for goal attainment, several accomplishments can be noted. The CSD has received some credit for monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementation of Agenda 21, due to the contributions of the reporting process at international and national level. The contributions that have been highlighted are: awareness-raising and internalization of the concept of sustainable development at national level; strengthening cooperation and dialogue between government agencies and between them and major groups; and

various inward and outward processes of countries and stakeholders (DESA 2002 in Wagner 2003: 14; Yamin 1998/99: 14, 57; Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). The CSD has also had some success in policy guidance, especially concerning the issues of forests, oceans and freshwater. The agenda-setting role has been highlighted as the Commission has put issues on the agenda and kept them there, and initiated processes that have continued into other fora (Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]). Finally, promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development between governments, the international community, and major groups is regarded as the CSD's greatest accomplishment, due to the innovative ways of involving NGOs and other major groups into the work of the Commission (Chasek 2005 [interview]).

However, measuring the *degree* of CSD's accomplishments is a difficult matter. Due to a broad and vague mandate, there is quite a lot of room for interpretation and evaluation of what the CSD actually has accomplished during ten years (Chasek 2000: 383). Chasek (2000: 379) notes that 'the Commission is a different beast to everyone who is involved in or observes its work'. Thus, determining the score of the dependent variable depends on how the CSD's accomplishments are evaluated and measured. First, one might attach different importance to the goals, when measuring the degree of achievements. Even thought it would have been a reasonable approach, I have still chosen to attach equal importance to all of the CSD's goals. Second, one might have different expectations as to what the CSD *should* accomplish. It is therefore important to stress that the degree of the performances will be determined compared to the mandate of the CSD.

In order to give a score to the dependent variable, several experts have been asked to consider the degree of the CSD's accomplishments compared to the CSD's mandate on a scale of high, medium and low score.[17] Many of the respondents emphasized the difficulties of determining a score as they pointed out that the score was high in some areas, and low in other areas. They also pointed out the significance of how the mandate is interpreted. According to one respondent, the CSD has fulfilled its mandate, because the only obligation the Commission really has is to hold a meeting once a year. He claims, however, that the degree of accomplishments is low if you have a naïve reading of Agenda 21. Another respondent states that the environmental conventions have been more important than the CSD, because they show more results concerning behavioural and political changes. Thus, the CSD is given a low score due to the lack of obligations for the states. In the words of one respondent, the degree of accomplishments '[...] is high in the sense of innovation, low in terms of negotiated output. However, very high in the fact that [the CSD] is the place to be'. Following this, the final score given by the majority of the respondents was medium, as they summed up the scores in the various areas of the CSD's accomplishments. However, it is important to be aware of the possibility that some of the respondents have either attached greater importance to one of the goals than the others, or given a score of the accomplishments based on their expectations rather than with regards to the CSD's mandate.

Concerning my evaluation of the CSD's accomplishments compared to its mandate, a final judgement of the goal attainment is: medium score on reviewing and monitoring the implementation of Agenda 21; low score on policy guidance; and high score on promoting dialogue and partnerships between relevant actors. Summing up, the score of the dependent variable is medium. Thus, when returning to the first question of my thesis, 'to what degree has the CSD achieved its goals?', the answer would be that the degree of the CSD's accomplishments is medium. I will now continue with the second part of my thesis: 'which mechanisms explain the CSD's accomplishments?'

# 6.    Which Mechanisms Explain the CSD's Accomplishments?

The main focus of this chapter will be the second part of my thesis: 'which mechanisms explain the CSD's accomplishments?' In order to give an answer to this question, the degree of the CSD's accomplishments will be explained by using three sets of explanatory variables: 'Institutional Design', 'Distribution of Capabilities' and 'Entrepreneurial Leadership'. I will first evaluate the variables regarding the assumptions presented in chapter 2, and then determine if the variables can provide significant explanations for the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments.

## 6.1    Institutional Design

### 6.1.1  The Role of the Secretariat

Concerning my proposition that *an active, independent and financially strong secretariat will enhance the degree of the CSD's accomplishments,* the intention here will be to analyze whether the CSD Secretariat can be regarded as an active, independent and financial strong secretariat or a financial weak assistant secretariat. As a starting point, it is important to note that the opinions of the role of the secretariat are divergent, both with regard to what role the CSD Secretariat *should* have, and what role it actually has had.

Regarding the financial strength of the Secretariat, many have pointed out the lack of financial resources. According to Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 [interview]), the Secretariat's limited financial resources and technical equipment is a problem which is common for the UN system in general. The Secretariat (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]) notes that the lack of financial resources has been a continuous problem, which has lead to difficulties when organizing expert meetings and other intersessional meetings. Moreover, the Secretariat has only been able to support 15-25 representatives from developing countries to each session (Pietracci 2005 [interview]). Many have also pointed out the Secretariat's lack of manpower. Yamin (1998/99: 58) notes that 'seven people sitting in an office in New York cannot be expected to access the accuracy and reliability of hundreds of reports each year and to tell others anything useful about them [...]'. Khor (1994: 103) points out that 'by the time of the CSD session, a full year after the Rio Summit, the Secretariat had

only a handful of staff, and some of these had been "borrowed" from other departments'. However, it is important to stress that the manpower of the Secretariat has improved a lot since its establishment. The CSD Secretariat is budgeted for 60 persons, including the director, for 2005 (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Still, Ling and Khor (2001: 18) claim that 'significantly more resources and appropriate personnel would be needed by the CSD secretariat to play [an] expanded and more dynamic role'.

Even though the lack of financial resources have been a problem for the CSD secretariat, it has still received credit for its work of preparing comprehensive documentation, developing sustainable development indicators, compiling national reporting information, and integrating the work and contributions of major groups into the CSD process (Chasek 2000: 393). Due to learning effects, the secretariat has improved its capacity as it has increased the use of technology and has acquired more expertise than in the beginning (Chasek 2005; Leiro 2004 [interviews]). Also, according to one government representative (Hofseth in Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]), the secretariat has done a good job preparing and organizing the annual CSD sessions.

Concerning the role of the CSD secretariat, it is important to point out that most secretariats are dependent to a certain degree, and therefore, the role of the secretariat should be determined regarding the degree of dependence. As the CSD's placement is within ECOSOC, which again is placed under the GA, the secretariat was given a very dependent role by the states already at its establishment. The secretariat (Zhu and Morita-Lou [interview]) notes that it has a dependent role because it is placed under DESA and thus, follows DESA's rules and regulations in its work.[18] Moreover, the secretariat stresses that the CSD first and foremost has a service-oriented role. Following this, the CSD secretariat was mandated to assist the countries and the chairmanship of the CSD (ibid.). However, the *actual* role of the secretariat has been more active than the mandate it was given.

Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]) point out that the secretariat has self-interests, both in relation to the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and to the Chair. First, there has been a conflict between UNEP's goal, mandate and practice and the CSD secretariat, as the secretariat wants to be the main body for for instance environmental issues. Second, the Chair has had to negotiate with the secretariat in order to get breakthrough for his ideas and proposals (ibid.). Eidheim and Hofseth (ibid.) point out that the reason for these negotiations is that the secretariat has the experience of knowing which ideas and proposals that will be accepted by the states and coalition groups. However, as the secretariat is able to predict the various reactions from the countries, some self-censorship has been practised by the secretariat. According to Eidheim and Hofseth (ibid.), the secretariat has been more cautious towards G-77/China and the US than the EU, but in general the self-censorship has been practised regardless of the various countries.

Summing up, the CSD secretariat was established as a very dependent assistant secretariat, with the main functions of providing administrative

assistance to the parties in document preparation, and collecting and com-
piling follow-up reports from the parties. The secretariat can also be
regarded as financially weak. It would therefore be reasonable to assume
that the secretariat has had limited impact on the CSD's accomplish-
ments. However, as noted above, the *actual* role of the secretariat has
been more active than the mandate it was given. Thus, the secretariat has
been active to a certain degree in relation to the countries and the chair-
manship in the development of negotiation texts and protocols, due to its
experience and expertise. Following this, my conclusion is that the CSD
secretariat has enhanced the degree of the CSD's accomplishments.

### 6.1.2 The States' Sector Representation

Concerning my proposition that *a broad and diversified sector represen-
tation of the states will enhance the degree of the CSD's accomplish-
ments*, the intention here will be to analyze whether the states' sector
representation can be regarded as broad and diversified or narrow.

As noted earlier, it is important to integrate three main dimensions of
environmental, social and economic issues in order to advance the sus-
tainable development agenda. Chasek (2000: 394) notes that 'to be truly
effective in setting the sustainable development agenda, the CSD must
[...] attract and involve ministers of foreign affairs, finance, trade, agri-
culture, development or development assistance, forests, and so on'.
However, while the CSD attracts many ministers each year, a continuous
problem for the Commission during the period 1993-2001 has been that
most of the ministers represent the environmental sector (ibid.). This has
lead to two main problems for the CSD. First, since the CSD has primar-
ily attracted environmental ministers, the parties have given the most
attention to the environmental agenda. Leiro (2004 [interview]) claims
that this has been a cumulative development, as the environmental
ministers has been in the driver's seat when defining the CSD agenda, it
has become less relevant for other ministers to attend the meetings.
According to Dodds et al. (2002a: 5), the minimal participation by
ministers with other portfolios than environment has served to further
marginalize the debate at the sessions and limit the CSD's impact and
follow-up. Moreover, this has also affected the integration of develop-
mental and environmental aspects of sustainable development (Ling and
Khor 2001: 17).

Second, as the environmental ministers generally have less political influ-
ence than the ministers from finance, trade and industry, this has affected
the CSD's impact at national level (Agarwal et al. 2001: 173). Most
often, the environmental ministers do not wield a lot of power in their
home countries, and thus, do not have the influence needed for national
implementation (Mabhongo 2005 [interview]). Khor (1994: 110) points
out that the environmental ministers are in charge of ministries 'whose
views and budgets are generally given low priority compared to trade,
commerce, and economics ministries. These are the ministries that are
most closely linked to the dominant economic structures and institutions
that are, to a large extent, responsible for environmental problems'. Thus,
the states' sector representation has been narrow, due to the limited parti-
cipation by ministers other than ministers with the environmental back-

ground. Following this, my conclusion is that the states' sector representation has caused a reduction in the degree of the CSD's accomplishments.

### 6.1.3  Nonstate Actors' Access and Participation

Concerning my proposition that *open and inclusive rules of access and participation of a large number of nonstate actors will enhance the degree of the CSD's accomplishments*, the intention here will be to analyze whether the access of nonstate actors has been inclusive or exclusive, and whether the participation of these actors can be regarded as broad or limited.

The CSD is often seen as being at the forefront in involving NGOs and other major groups. Thus, the Commission has been regarded as pioneer within the UN system in its work of providing greater access for nonstate actors (Chasek 2005; Mabhongo 2005 [interviews]). Prior to UNCED, it was difficult for NGOs to access UN government delegates and to attend UN meetings. However, during the preparatory meetings of UNCED, NGOs and other major groups achieved greater access than before (Wagner 2003: 3). This process continued with the CSD as it was decided that the same NGOs that had been accredited with UNCED, would also gain accreditation with the CSD. The rules of access were actually enhanced at the first CSD session when compared to the UNCED process, due to help from the chairman Ismael Razali (Khor 1994: 112). As noted by Khor (ibid.), Razali 'allowed NGO participants access not only to the plenary meetings but also to the informal negotiation-group sessions, which have normally been held behind closed doors. NGOs were invited to speak at all sessions, including the ministerial meeting, and sometimes were given precedence over government delegates'. The CSD also provided opportunities and access for other major groups into the work of the Commission. Following the Agenda 21 decree of major groups participation, the CSD have continuously developed new ways of involving these groups at the sessions. At CSD-2, the major groups were able to ask their governments questions on their national presentations in front of their peer group (Dodds et al. 2002a: 8). The next year, CSD-3 introduced a 'Day of a Major Group', inviting the major group of local authorities to share national experiences on implementing Agenda 21. Similarly, a day of the workplace was held at CSD-4 (Agarwal et al. 2001: 196). From CSD-5 to CSD-9, formal dialogue sessions were held between governments and the major groups. This was seen as a significant step in institutionalizing major groups into the work of the Commission (Chasek 2000: 386). In 1997, all major groups were given a slot in the Heads of State meeting of UNGASS, for the first time within the UN system. (Dodds et al. 2002a: 8). Moreover, the first PrepCom for WSSD, CSD-10, had presentations by all nine major groups (ibid.).

In general, governments have seemed open to major group participation at the CSD sessions (Agarwal et al. 2001: 197). However, as noted by Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 [interview]), some of the developing countries have been protesting against the participation of some of their national NGOs, saying that they are political organizations, and not nongovernmental organizations. Also, the access of nonstate actors has

been limited in the negotiation process. Pietracci (2005 [interview]) points out that the actual negotiations have been the sole prerogative by member states. Even though the access for nonstate actors is limited in some areas, the access has still improved greatly during ten years. Wagner (DESA 2002 in Wagner 2003: 3) notes that 'in November 2001, the "CSD List", which identifies the NGOs with consultative status for the UNCED follow-up process, listed approximately 3000 organizations'.

The actual participation of nonstate actors has been highlighted as being of major importance for the work of the CSD. Eidheim and Hofseth (2005 [interview]) point out that NGOs and other major groups contribute to the democratization of the decision structure of the UN system in general. Concerning the CSD, the major groups have received credit for contributing to enhancing the quality of the decision-making process, to creating attention and pressure on governments, to initiating processes, to informing the member states and to pushing for policies (Leiro 2004; Pietracci 2005 [interviews]). According to Pietracci (2005 [interview]), the major groups have advocated for certain issues and have tried to influence the states, which is sometimes reflected in the output word-for-word in paragraphs. However, she (ibid.) notes that the major groups have been quite dissatisfied at times with how they affected the output. Hence, there has been a concern that the governments do not actually listen to the major groups. As noted earlier, one reason for this is that the diplomats, who most often have the responsibility of negotiations, do not attend the dialogue meetings (Chasek 2005 [interview]). However, many claim that the major groups have been heard when they are well prepared, and when they have important technical knowledge (Eidheim and Hofseth 2005; Mabhongo 2005; Skåre 2005; Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interviews]). Pietracci (2005 [interview]) points out that it is a limit to how much the member states can listen. As they have instructions from home, there are some constraints on the delegates from countries. In the word of one government representative, 'all delegations from a country have a mandate, and you can not go round the mandate. [NGOs] have to lobby at home, before the mandate gets written' (Hofseth in Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]). Chasek (2000: 387) notes that 'instead of observing what is going on, reporting to their own constituencies, and trying to influence policy-makers at home, some major group representatives behave like UN diplomats and spend their time trying to influence the text under negotiation'. However, this problem has improved as many of the major groups have learned that a lot of advocacy work needs to be done at home (Hofseth in Eidheim and Hofseth 2005 [interview]). Thus, the participation of NGOs and other major groups in the CSD has also had some effect on the domestic agenda in some states. Chasek (2000: 386f) points out that 'if the NGOs do not like what their government representatives are saying, they will report on this to their constituencies at home, who will in turn put pressure on the government to explain or even change its position'.

Even though the rules of access have included more and more NGOs and other major groups into an increasing number of areas within the CSD, the actual participation has been irregular. First, for some groups, the CSD has attracted members of umbrella organizations instead of members from the groups (Chasek 2000: 387). Second, many of the

bigger and more representative NGOs do not attend the CSD because they do not take it seriously (Maier 2000 in Agarwal et al. 2001: 197). Third, there has not been enough participation of major groups from developing countries. As noted by Chasek (2000: 387), 'many of them cannot afford to attend or are unaware of the importance of the CSD'. Thus, while NGOs from some of the Northern countries have been better informed and have often worked in close cooperation with their governments, NGOs from Southern countries have remained outsiders. Therefore, the view of the NGOs from developing countries has not often been adequately represented, especially not when writing a joint position paper (Agarwal et al. 2001: 198). According to Agarwal et al. (ibid.), there are two main reasons for the difficulties of Southern NGOs: 1) as many of the Southern governments have a top-down culture, there is no precedent for involving NGOs into decision-making; and 2) Southern governments often attend CSD sessions without clear positions issues, or portray any national interests.

Summing up, the CSD has been at the forefront within the UN system of involving NGOs and other major groups into its work, even though several problems can be noted. Overall, however, the rules of access have been open and inclusive, and the participation of nonstate actors has been broad. Following this, my conclusion is that the nonstate actors' access and participation have caused the degree of the CSD's accomplishments to enhance.

## 6.2 Distribution of Capabilities

Concerning my propositions that *if the most powerful actors act as push-ers, the degree of CSD's accomplishments will enhance,* the intention here will be to evaluate the states' interests and their positions, before the distribution of capabilities is explored. It is important to point out that as most states have used negotiating coalitions at the CSD, this evaluation will focus primarily on these coalitions.

### 6.2.1 The Interests of States and Coalitions

*The European Union (EU)*

The EU, which consisted of 15 member states during most of the period 1993-2001, has addressed sustainable development issues domestically for many years (Wagner 2003: 12).[19] The coalition has had some prob-lems with internal disputes, but has become a much more coordinated actor in global negotiations (Eidheim and Hofseth 2004; Skåre 2005 [interviews]). The EU has a centralized bureaucracy in Belgium, where the states' representatives develop common positions prior to most con-ferences, including the CSD sessions (Wagner 1999: 113f). As pointed out by Wagner (2003: 12), this allows the coalition 'to arrive at the CSD with relatively well prepared positions and alternatives and a "driving" strategy; it often presents action proposals rather than solely responding to other's suggestions'. However, the internal decision-making process faces a common problem for many negotiation coalitions, that representa-tives of 'small' countries have a limited ability to push their preferences compared with 'big' countries (Wagner 1999: 114). Most often, the EU

uses a problem solving behaviour (ibid.). Still, the position and priorities change some, depending on the issue and depending on who has the EU presidency. Thus, the issues and the presidency effects whether the EU is willing to compromise or if it takes the hard line (Chasek 2005 [interview]). Regarding the EU's main priorities, some have pointed out that the EU is more concerned with the environmental dimension than the other dimension (Mabhongo 2005 [interview]). According to Agarwal et al. (2001: 199), the EU wants a green image, but is not willing to part with the necessary resources. Concerning this, most of the EU countries have not fulfilled their commitment to reach the UN target of 0.7% of GNP for ODA (Agarwal et al. 2001: 221).[20]

*JUSCANZ*

The JUSCANZ group consists of Japan, the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Also, Norway, Switzerland and other non-EU OECD countries consult with this relatively unstructured group (Wagner 1999: 114). The group members discuss the issues and their positions during the CSD sessions, but do not develop a consensus position to be presented by a single speaker (Wagner 2003: 12). As noted by Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]), the interests and positions of the group members are quite broad, with Norway and Switzerland in one wing, the US and Australia in the other, and Japan, Canada and New Zealand somewhere in the middle. According to Schei (2004 [interview]), the positions of Canada and New Zealand have changed during the 1990s, as they often used to share the same position as the Nordic countries before, they now more often cooperate with the US and Australia. Wagner (2003: 12) points out that 'several of this group's members have traditionally taken progressive environmental positions and have played mediating roles in international fora'.

The US's position, however, is a different matter. In general, the US counters others' proposals more often than exploring options (Wagner 1999: 114f). As pointed out by Mabhongo (2005 [interview]), the US has also been reluctant to take any commitments. He (ibid.) notes further that the US wants minimal negotiations as a way to avoid commitments. The US's position has been affected a lot by domestic politics and constituency, and the negotiators are very much guided by instructions from home (Mabhongo 2005; Skåre 2005 [interviews]). They have mainly stressed economic interests, and thus, opposed any increase in financial aid[21]. Instead, the US has pushed for the mobilisation of domestic resources within developing countries and increased use of foreign direct investments (FDI) as a way to finance the implementation of Agenda 21 for developing countries (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199; Chasek 2005 [interview]). However, the US does not look upon the CSD as an arena to promote interests. Therefore, as pointed out by Chasek (ibid.), it has used the CSD as a place to explore and test proposals: 'if they get some good feedback on proposals, they may want to launch the proposals elsewhere, where it matters'.

*The Group of 77 and China*

The G-77/China consists of 132 developing countries from African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean regions. Internally, the group has often had diverging interests, with the small island states on one side and the oil-producing states on the other. This group nonetheless most often presents a joint position by a single speaker at the CSD (Wagner 2003: 11). According to Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]), the countries within the G-77/China realize that they are strong as long as they stand together and have one joint position. However, Wagner (1999: 113) notes that 'the delegates do not have the time, resources, or a centralized bureaucracy comparable to the EU's to prepare a joint position prior to the CSD sessions'. Thus, the G-77/China has many coordination meetings during the sessions, which often leave the group members focused on their joint position because they lack time to develop alternatives or fall back positions (ibid.). Also, it is not possible to agree on all issues, which means that there is a range of issues that they do not have any opinion about. There are only a few issues that they manage to agree on. (Eidheim and Hofseth 2004 [interview]). According to Chasek (2005 [interview]), the issues of financial and technology transfer are 'the only thing the entire G-77 can agree on'. Thus, the industrialized countries' commitment to reach the UN target of 0.7 % GNP for ODA has continuously been stressed by the G-77/China. Moreover, when they finally conclude on an issue, it is impossible for them to change their opinion. Thus, it is difficult for them to enter into compromises with other states (Eidheim and Hofseth 2004 [interview]). As noted earlier, another problem is that many of the G-77/China delegates are UN diplomats, because they tend to focus on the politics rather than the technical merits of the issues (Wagner 2003: 11). Moreover, their lack of capacity and understanding of complex issues handicap the negotiators and force them to fall back on making general statements and rhetorical remarks, especially regarding the issues of financial resources and technology transfer (Gupta 1997: 133 in Chasek 2002). The G-77/China is also affected by the chair of the group, which has a great role on deciding the positions and the main interests of the group (Zhu and Morita-Lou 2005 [interview]). Thus, it has been a problem for the CSD during the period 1997-2001, that most of the G-77/China chairs have been from the OPEC countries (Chasek 2005 [interview]).

### 6.2.2  The Positions of States and Coalitions

As mentioned earlier, the work of the CSD concerns a whole range of different issues. Thus, it is important to stress the difficulties determining the various positions in regard to the CSD, because the position depends a lot on the issue. Following this, some of the states and coalitions have had several positions, all according to the issue being discussed.

The EU is often seen as a pusher regarding many environmental issues. As noted above, the EU have addressed sustainable development issues domestically for many years, and thus, have become a progressive actor on environmental issues in international negotiations (Skåre 2005 [interview]; Wagner 2003: 12). Some of the issues that the EU has pushed for are; a forest convention, legally binding targets on greenhouse gas emis-

sions, and renewable energy technology (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199). On other issues, the EU has had a more intermediate position, and then, has mediated some disputes between the US and the G-77/China (Wagner 1999: 114). However, on some issues, especially on agriculture subsidies, it has not been willing to move, and thus, acted as a laggard (Chasek 2005 [interview]). Moreover, on the issues of aid and financial transfer, the EU has acted as a laggard together with many of the other Northern states (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199).

The positions within the JUSCANZ group have been very diversified. Norway, together with the Nordic states Denmark and Sweden, has often been given credit for acting as a pusher on environmental and developmental issues. They are also the only countries, together with the Netherlands, that have achieved the UN target of 0.7 % GNP to ODA (Agarwal et al. 2001: 221). The US, on the other hand, is mainly regarded as a laggard. It has not been willing to accept any commitments, especially not the target of 0.7 % GNP to ODA (Agarwal et al. 2001: 179; Mabhongo 2005 [interview]). The other members of the group have changed their positions, according to the issues. As noted above, however, Canada and New Zealand have more often shared the same position as the US than they used to (Schei 2004 [interview]).

Since the G-77/China is such a large group, their members have also had diversified interests and positions. At the CSD, however, they most often have a joint position. The G-77/China is mostly seen as a laggard, as the group members continuously have pushed for more aid for implementation of Agenda 21 and technology transfer. In general, they have been reluctant to accept any commitments as long as the Northern countries have not fulfilled their commitments on ODA and technology transfer (Chasek 2005 [interview]). However, the group is divided on the issues of climate change and energy. This has resulted in that the SIDS have acted as pushers, and OPEC countries have acted as laggards on these issues (Agarwal et al. 2001: 199f).

### 6.2.3  Distribution of Capabilities

The evaluation shows that the states' interests determine the position the states have in the negotiation process. However, the distribution of capabilities determines which states are the most powerful and have the potential for achieving actual breakthrough for their interests. As a starting point, I will assume that the EU and some of the large developed countries within the JUSCANZ group are the most powerful, due to their possession of material resources. In order to determine which actors that have affected the CSD's accomplishment, it is necessary to evaluate the actors' positions in relations to their capabilities.

As noted, the EU has had several positions within the CSD, depending on the issue. Concerning the most contentious issue of financial resources, the EU have not been willing (or able) to achieve the target of 0.7 % GNP to ODA for the implementation of Agenda 21, and thus, acted as a laggard. However, The EU has acted as a pusher on several environmental and developmental issues. Still, in my opinion, it is uncertain if the EU

has been powerful enough to pursue its interests on these issues to such a degree that it has affected and enhanced the performances of the CSD.

Regarding some of the large developed countries within the JUSCANZ group, the US and Australia have acted as laggards on most issues, while Canada and New Zealand have acted more as laggards in the later phase of the CSD than in the early phase. In my opinion, these states have been powerful enough to achieve actual breakthrough for their interests, due to their possession of material resources. Moreover, the evaluation of the decision-making process showed that these countries within JUSCANZ have most likely achieved a greater breakthrough for their interests than the EU. As noted in chapter 2, the states' coalition size may also been significant for influence in the negotiations. When evaluating the different coalition groups of the CSD, the G-77/ China is by far the largest group with 132 state members. Thus, it would be reasonable to say that also the G-77/China has been powerful enough to achieve breakthrough for its interests, due to its coalition size. Following this, my conclusion is that since these powerful states have acted as laggards, they have caused the degree of the CSD's accomplishments to reduce.

## 6.3   Entrepreneurial Leadership

Concerning my proposition that *if entrepreneurial leadership is exercized by individuals, the degree of the CSD's accomplishments will enhance*, the intention here will first be to evaluate the possible source for entrepreneurial leadership, that is, the space and needs for such leadership. Second, I will explore if one or several individuals have had the necessary skills, energy and/or status to exercise such leadership. I will also decide if one or several of these individuals have actually acted as an entrepreneurial leader by performing any of the following tasks; a) designing substantive solutions that are politically feasible; b) designing institutional arrangements that are conductive to the development, adoption, and implementation of effective solutions; and c) designing actor strategies that can be effective in introducing constructive cooperation.

### 6.3.1  Space and Needs for Entrepreneurial Leadership

As noted in chapter 2, the space and needs of entrepreneurial leadership is affected by the character of the problem, states' interests and the distribution of capabilities and the institutional design. First, as the problem of sustainable development was considered malign, I assume that there is a *need* for an entrepreneurial leader within the CSD, but also that the *space* for leadership is limited (Underdal 2002: 33). Second, the evaluation of states' interests and the distribution of capabilities showed that the most powerful states have acted as laggards. Therefore, it would be reasonable to assume that there is a need for entrepreneurial leadership, in order to enhance the degree of the CSD's achievements. Third, concerning the institutional design, the role of the CSD secretariat has had some effect on the space for entrepreneurial leadership. Chasek (2005 [interview]) notes that the secretariat does not like to loose control, and is therefore restrictive with regards to giving away control to the CSD chairperson or others. Thus, I assume that the secretariat has limited some of the space for leadership.

### 6.3.2 Individuals' Skills, Energy and Status, and the Entity They Represent

The ability of an individual to act as an entrepreneurial leader is determined by their capabilities, that is, skills, energy and status. As the energy and status are often linked to the entity the individual represents, it would be necessary to point out the entity the individual act on behalf of. Following this, I expect that a leadership would be exercised by an individual representing the CSD Bureau or the secretariat, but possibly also other entities.

*Leadership by the Bureau*

The Bureau consists of the chair and four vice-chairs. Due to the chair's formal position as a leader, I assume that possible entrepreneurial leadership would be exercised by one of the chairs. In interviews, two names have most often been mentioned in regard to the exercise of entrepreneurial leadership: Ismael Razali from Malaysia and Simon Upton from New Zealand.[22]

The Malaysian ambassador Ismael Razali had most likely a significant role in the formation process of the CSD, as he chaired all of the working groups dealing with the establishment of the Commission (ENB 1992a; ENB 1992c).[23] He was approved as chair for the first substantive session of the CSD, and has been highlighted by many for being one of the most important chairs of the CSD (Chasek 2000: 380). It is therefore reasonable to say that Razali a reputation as an entrepreneurial leader. He has been given credit for being a very competent diplomat that knew his craft, and for being a tough politician due to the way he led the negotiations. It has also been stressed that he was innovative concerning the dialogue between participants and the involvement of nonstate actors. Khor (1994: 110) notes that 'participants were asked not to make set-piece speeches, but to have an open and free exchange; as a result, the discussions were more direct and frank than the normal diplomatic and cautious UN style'. Razali also helped to develop unprecedented access and involvement for nonstate actors. He allowed them access not only to the plenary meetings, but also to the informal negotiation-group sessions, which had normally been held behind closed doors (Bigg and Dodds 1997: 24; Khor 1994: 112). Furthermore, he efficiently explored the possibilities for collective solutions, and worked with the purpose of obtaining agreements. The fact that he was from the South was also an advantage concerning the willingness of the Southern countries to cooperate. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that Razali had both the skills and energy to act as an entrepreneurial leader. Regarding the means an entrepreneurial leader use in order to exercise leadership, this evaluation shows that he also, to a certain degree, performed the tasks which is accounted for. Following this, my conclusion is that Ismael Razali exercised entrepreneurial leadership for the CSD, and therefore, caused the degree of the CSD's accomplishments to enhance.

The CSD-7 chair, Simon Upton from New Zealand, is most often pointed out as the most significant chair during the second phase of the CSD. He has also been given credit for bringing new energy into the Commission.

Thus, Upton had a reputation as an entrepreneurial leader, due to both his formal position as chair and his reputation for leadership. He had the benefit of being the first chair to be elected a year in advance, and used this year to establish important one-on-one relationships with ministers prior to the session. As Upton was determined to achieve a more relevant and focused debate at CSD-7, he conducted a series of visits to capitals and prepared the ground for procedural changes. He also introduced a number of innovations such as video conferencing for Bureau meetings, and thus, made it easier for developing countries to participate at these meetings (ENB 1999). Following this, it can be noted that CSD-7 attracted more high-level representation than ever before (ibid.). At the session itself, Upton encouraged the states to engage in dialogues, and told them to stay away from prepared statements. According to ENB (1999), Upton had 'a backup plan to continue circumventing any attempt by delegates from the New York missions to return to the old ways, by working the phones behind the scenes, making use of a list of direct telephone numbers collected during his ministerial tête-à-têtes'. Also, ENB (ibid.) notes that he encouraged the negotiators to place their failure to agree on important issues on record in the CSD-7 text on Oceans and Seas: 'Upton preferred to celebrate this frankness rather than support the Commission's tradition of protracted negotiations leading to a lowest common denominator agreement'. Furthermore, he improved the multi-stakeholder dialogues by involving more major groups. This review shows that Upton was able to act as an entrepreneurial leader, due to his skills and energy, but also his status. It will also be reasonable to say that he performed the necessary tasks to a certain extent. Thus, my conclusion is that Simon Upton exercised entrepreneurial leadership for the CSD, and therefore, caused the degree of the CSD's accomplishments to enhance.

*Leadership by the Secretariat*

It would be reasonable to assume that a possible leadership would be exercised by any of the two secretariat directors the CSD had during the period 1993-2001, due to their formal position as a leader. Joke Waller-Hunter was appointed as the first director, and lead the secretariat from 1994-1998. JoAnne DiSano has been the secretariat director since then.[24]

Of the two directors, Waller-Hunter has most often been given credit for her leadership. It has been emphasized that she is competent, and that she has been proficient in maintaining informal contact with the countries. However, the secretariat director is not really allowed to contact countries informally. DiSano has been proficient, while following the rules, and doing her job well according to the mandate the secretariat was given. Even though both directors have had a formal position as a leader, and Waller-Hunter has had a good reputation for leadership, it does not seem likely that any of the secretariat directors have actually exercised *entrepreneurial* leadership.

One respondent pointed out the important impact by Andrey Vasiyev, who worked for the secretariat through the whole period 1993-2001. The respondent gave him credit for working with the delegates, and coming up with the various compromises behind the scenes; 'he was the one who

knew how to work with the delegates to get the desired outcome'. Even though Vasiyev might have had some attributes of an entrepreneurial leader, it is uncertain if he actually exercised entrepreneurial leadership. His role as leader has not been mentioned by the other respondents, and thus, I will not go as far as to state that Vasiyev has acted as entrepreneurial leader. Still, I assume that Vasiyev's work has been significant for the role of the secretariat. Summing up, I believe that there have not been any individuals representing the secretariat that have exercised *entrepreneurial* leadership.

*Leadership by Other Entities*

Nitin Desai has most often been mentioned as a possible entrepreneurial leader concerning leadership from other entities than the Bureau or the CSD secretariat.[25] Desai had the formal position as a UN Under-Secretary-General, and thus, was number two under the UN Secretary-General. He headed first the DPCSD, which the secretariat was placed within. After the UN reorganization, when DPCSD was renamed DESA, Desai continued as head for DESA (Wagner 2003: 4). Even though he has had a formal position as a leader, there are mixed views about his reputation for exercising entrepreneurial leadership. According to one respondent, he has meant a lot for the CSD, because of his philosophical view. However, another respondent claims that Desai did not have the necessary vision, but that 'he was better at taking someone else's vision and make it happen'. He was therefore most of all a good administrator. It has been pointed out that Desai was an intellectual capacity for the CSD, and that he had a great interest for the sustainable development agenda. Moreover, it has been claimed that Desai also had a personal interest of making the CSD the main arena for sustainable development instead of UNEP, which was a benefit for the Commission in order to get important attention from the countries. Moreover, he has been given credit for having charisma, and being able to talk to politicians and making them feel comfortable, which is seen as an important ability in order to be heard.

However, it has been claimed that Desai has suppressed the CSD to a certain degree, in order to maintain control of the Commission. According to one respondent, Desai was removed from a lot of direct responsibilities concerning the CSD, when DESA was established. Thus, he had more of a role to play during the early years of the CSD than later. Moreover, one respondent thinks that Desai should have been able to do more to strengthen the CSD, due to his position. However, the respondent assumes that it might not have been politically possible to do more because of the countries' opposition. Following this, the evaluation shows that Nitin Desai has enjoyed some status as a leader. He has also been given some credit for his skills and energy. Moreover, it seems like he has performed some of the necessary tasks with regards to using the means of an entrepreneurial leader. However, I am not certain if it is reasonable to say that he exercised actually entrepreneurial leadership. Thus, I assume that he has had some significance for the CSD concerning leadership.

## 6.4   Explanatory Power

The evaluation of 'institutional design' showed that; the actual role of the secretariat has been more active than the assistant role it was given by its mandate; the states' sector representation has been narrow; and the rules of access for nonstate actors have been open and inclusive, and the participation have been broad. Concerning the CSD's performances, my conclusion was that the role of the secretariat and the nonstate actors' access and participation had caused the degree of the CSD's accomplishments to enhance, while the states' sector representation had caused the degree of the CSD's performances to reduce. Thus, I believe that all of these variables can provide significant explanations for the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments. First, as the secretariat has been active to a certain degree in the development of negotiation texts and protocols, it is reasonable to believe that the CSD secretariat has affected the CSD's goal of policy guidance. Moreover, it seems like the secretariat has had a positive impact on the CSD's accomplishments of monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementation of Agenda 21, and promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development. Second, as the states' sector representation has been narrow, I believe that this has especially affected the CSD's performances on policy guidance. The limited participation by other ministers than ministers with the environmental background has lead to a one-dimensional focus on sustainable development. Achievements on monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementation of Agenda 21 may also be affected as environmental ministers often lack the influence needed at national level to fulfil the recommendations on national reporting. Third, as the rules of access for nonstate actors have been open and inclusive, and the participation has been broad, this has probably affected the CSD's performances concerning all of the main goals. Most likely, the nonstate actors have been able to influence the decision-making process, initiate processes, contribute with ideas and information, and put pressure on relevant parties. Thus, it is reasonable to believe that they have had an impact on the CSD's achievements on monitoring and reviewing progress on the implementation of Agenda 21, and elaborating policy guidance. Moreover, it would be reasonable to say that they have contributed to enhanced dialogue on sustainable development. Following this, in my opinion 'institutional design' can provide a significant explanation for the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments.

The evaluation of the distribution of capabilities showed that the most powerful states have acted as laggards. Thus, my conclusion was that since these powerful states have acted as laggards, they have caused the degree of the CSD's accomplishments to reduce. As the most powerful actors have acted as laggards, I assume that this has affected the CSD's accomplishments concerning all of its goals. Since the countries are in charge of the decision-making process, they are able to determine much of the output of the CSD. Most likely, the degree of the CSD's achievements would have been lower if the output had only been affected by the interests of the most powerful states. Following this, in my opinion 'distribution of capabilities' can provide a significant explanation the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments.

The review of entrepreneurial leadership showed that the CSD-1 chair Ismael Razali and CSD-7 chair Simon Upton have exercised entrepreneurial leadership. Thus, I concluded that they had caused the degree of the CSD's performances to enhance. Due to their capabilities and their use of the means available for an entrepreneurial leader, it is reasonable to say that Razali and Upton have contributed to the CSD's accomplishments regarding all of its goals. I believe that they have had an impact especially on the work of elaborating policy guidance and promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development. First, they have both used the means of an entrepreneurial leader, in order to achieve results on policy guidance. Second, they have also pushed for greater involvement of major groups, and been innovative in finding ways to enhance the dialogue, and thus, had a positive impact on the CSD's performances concerning the goal of promoting dialogue and building partnerships for sustainable development. However, it is very important to point out that both Razali and Upton had the formal position as chair for only a year, and thus, their impact were probably quite limited with regards to the whole period 1993-2001. As a new CSD chair is elected every year, there is no continuity for the chair to exercise leadership. It is reasonable to believe that this will reduce the general effect on the CSD's accomplishments. Moreover, even though the CSD has needs for leadership, the space has been quite limited. Thus, the limited space has probably reduced the possibilities for most individuals to act as entrepreneurial leaders. As the evaluation showed, entrepreneurial leadership has most likely only been exercised by two of the CSD chairs. Following this, in my opinion 'entrepreneurial leadership' can only provide a significant explanation for the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments to a certain extent.

Summing up, the evaluation of the three sets of explanatory variables shows that they all can more or less provide significant explanations for the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments. However, deciding which one of them has had the most explanatory power is a difficult matter, because the variables interact and work together concerning the explanation of the CSD's accomplishments. The variables are considered to be complementary rather than incompatible. Thus, they can explain how the decision-making process is pulled in both negative and positive directions, which in turn explain why the degree of the performances was considered medium. Following this, the variables provide most likely a more comprehensive explanation together than if considered separately.

## 6.5   Interaction Between the Explanatory Variables

I have chosen to evaluate the independent variables separately, in order to gain clarity and a better understanding of how each of the variables has affected the CSD's achievements. However, it is reasonable to assume that the negotiations and decision-making process of the CSD during the period of 1993-2001 has been a dynamic process, and thus, I assume there has been a continuous interaction between the independent variables. Therefore, I assume that the variables provide a more comprehensive explanation for the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments together than if considered separately. I will here evaluate the interaction between the independent variables.

After evaluating the independent variables separately, I assume there has especially been continuous interaction between the secretariat, the CSD chair, and the countries, and that each of them have affected the other two concerning the impact on the achievements of the CSD. First, the CSD secretariat has most likely had some impact on the role of the countries and the chair. Chasek (2005 [interview]) notes that the secretariat does not like to loose control, and is therefore restrictive with regards to giving away control to the CSD chair or others. As pointed out earlier, the Chair often has to negotiate with the secretariat in order to get breakthrough for his ideas and proposals (Eidheim and Hofseth 2004 [interview]). As Eidheim and Hofseth (ibid.) experienced when working for the CSD-12 chair Børge Brende, the Chairman's Summary had been significantly edited by the secretariat.[26] Furthermore, in periods when the chair has not been able to exercise the necessary leadership, the sessions have been steered quite a lot by the secretariat (ibid.). Concerning the secretariat's impact on the role of the countries, the influence has been more indirect. As it is the secretariat's job to develop reports, negotiation texts and protocols, I would assume the secretariat has had some influence on the countries because it has an opportunity to determine the focus of the sessions. Also, some of the individuals from the secretariat, such as Vasiyev, have acted as moderators or mediators between the countries. Therefore, I would assume that if a compromise is reached, individuals from the secretariat have been able to affect the countries' position on the negotiated issue.

Concerning the CSD chair, I would assume that the chair has affected the role of the secretariat and the countries, as the chair has had the formal leadership of the CSD. The evaluation showed that two chairs, CSD-1 chair Ismael Razali and CSD-7 chair Simon Upton, had exercised entrepreneurial leadership. I would expect that these two, and possibly other chairs, have been able to take control over the secretariat and have been able to steer the sessions. The review of 'entrepreneurial leadership' also showed that Razali and Upton influenced the countries' positions, as they were able to work out compromises and enhance the dialogue and cooperation between the countries.

Most of all, I believe that the countries have affected the role of the secretariat's and the CSD chair. The evaluation showed that the secretariat practised self-censorship, as it has the experience of knowing which ideas and proposals that will be accepted by the countries. Moreover, I assume it has been difficult for the chair to exercise leadership in negotiations on issues where the states have strong interests, such as the issue of financial resources. Most importantly, as the countries are in charge of the decision-making process, they are able to make decisions that might have a great impact on the role of the secretariat and the role of the chair.

This evaluation shows that there has been a continuous interaction between the secretariat, the chair and the countries, but also that there has been a certain alternation as to which actors have influenced the CSD process. This explanation is supplemented by the explanatory power of the variables of 'the states' sector representation' and 'nonstate actors' access and participation'. As the states' sector representation remained narrow more or less through the whole period 1993-2001, this has had a

continuous negative effect on the CSD's accomplishments. Also, as the nonstate actors' rules of access have been open and inclusive, and the participation has been broad more or less through the whole period 1993-2001, this has had a continuous positive effect on the CSD's accomplishments. My conclusion here is that these variables complement each other with regards to the explanation of the CSD, and thus, in my opinion the variables together provide a more significant explanation of the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments than the variables provide separately. However, even though the variables complement each other, I assume that 'distribution of capabilities' has the highest explanatory power of the three variables as the countries actually are in charge of the decision-making process.

## 7.    Conclusion

My main purpose for this study has been to determine and explain the degree of the CSD's accomplishments during the CSD's first ten years, in order to indicate its potential for effectiveness. Two theoretical perspectives, 'character of the problem' and 'problem-solving capacity' were introduced to study the performances of the CSD. As a point of departure, I considered the problem of sustainable development to be politically and intellectually malign, and thus, the CSD had a difficult starting point for goal attainment. The first part of my analysis was concentrated on evaluating and determining the degree of the CSD's accomplishments. The second part was based on the 'problem-solving capacity' perspective, in which I used three sets of explanatory variables, in order to evaluate and determine which mechanisms explain the degree of the performances of the CSD. I will here sum up my main findings of the analysis, before the fruitfulness of the study will be commented. Finally, I will look at the future prospects for the CSD.

### 7.1    Main Findings of the Analysis

The first part of my analysis concerned answering the first question of my thesis, 'to what degree has CSD achieved its goals?' In order to determine the score of my dependent variable, I evaluated the decision-making process of the CSD during the period 1993-2001. The Commission's achievements were examined with regards to the three major goals of its mission, as set out by Resolution 47/191. As elaborated on in Chapter 5, a final judgement of the performances of the CSD was; medium score on reviewing and monitoring progress on the implementation of Agenda 21, low score on elaborating policy guidance and options for future initiatives, and high score on promoting dialogue and partnerships for sustainable development between governments, the international community, and major groups. Overall, the degree of the CSD's accomplishments was considered to be medium.

The question of 'which mechanisms explain the CSD's accomplishments?' was to be answered in the second part of my analysis. First, three institutional factors of institutional design, 'the role of the secretariat', 'the states' sector representation' and 'nonstate actors access and participation', was examined with regards to the assumptions proposed in Chapter 2. The evaluation showed that the actual role of the secretariat had

been more active than the assistant role it was given by its mandate; the states' sector representation had been narrow; and the rules of access for nonstate actors had been open and inclusive, and the participation had been broad. Thus, the role of the secretariat and the nonstate actors' access and participation had caused the degree of the CSD's performances to enhance, while the states' sector representation had caused the degree of the CSD's accomplishments to reduce. Second, I reviewed the 'distribution of capabilities', in which I concluded that as the most powerful states had acted as laggards, they had caused the achievements of the CSD to reduce. Third, the evaluation of 'entrepreneurial leadership' showed that limited space had probably reduced the possibilities for most individuals to act as entrepreneurial leaders. Thus, only two of the CSD chairs had exercised entrepreneurial leadership, in which I concluded that they had most likely enhanced the CSD's performance, but within a limited time period.

Summing up, I concluded that all of the independent variables provided significant explanations of the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments to a certain extent. Some of the variables explained how the decision-making process was pulled in a negative direction, and some of the variables showed how the process was pulled in a positive direction. Thus, I assumed that these variables complemented each other regarding the explanation of the medium degree of the CSD's accomplishments. Following this, I concluded that the independent variables together provided a more significant explanation than the variables provided separately.

## 7.2    The Fruitfulness of the Study

My intention here is to make some comments about the fruitfulness of the perspectives of the 'character of the problem' and 'problem-solving capacity'. As a point of departure, I think these perspectives provide some interesting insights in regard to the achievements of the CSD.

As the perspectives of the 'character of the problem' and the 'problem-solving capacity' is seen as mutually independent, I defined the character of the problem prior to the analysis, in order to understand the CSD's potential for goal attainment. However, I assumed that the 'problem-solving capacity' perspective could provide some significant explanations, in order to understand how it would be possible to enhance the CSD's potential for effectiveness. Thus, I used the 'problem-solving capacity' perspective to explain and determine which mechanisms that affects the degree of the CSD's accomplishments. As the negotiations and the decision-making process of the CSD can be seen as a dynamic process, it is reasonable to assume that there are mechanisms that affect each other, but also pull the process in different directions. Thus, 'the role of the secretariat' and 'entrepreneurial leadership' were useful for understanding some of positive driving-forces within the CSD. It has also been important to evaluate the significance of 'nonstate actors' access and participation' as the participation of NGOs and other major groups has been highlighted as one of the major positive attributes of the CSD.

On the other hand, the limited participation by ministers other than those with environmental background has been a continuous problem for the CSD concerning the integration of the environmental, social and economic dimensions of sustainable development. Hence, 'states' sector representation' provided a valuable supplement to the other explanatory variables. Most important, the evaluation of 'distribution of capabilities' and states' interests and positions was significant in order to understand which mechanisms that pulled the process in a negative direction. Since the states are in charge of the decision-making process, they are also able to decide the success or failure of the CSD to a certain extent. An institution is only as strong as the member states want it to be. However, as the most powerful actors acted as laggard, this affected both the positive impact of the secretariat and the chairs, and, most importantly, the CSD's potential for effectiveness. First of all, the states gave the CSD a low-level placement within the UN hierarchy. The consequence was that the CSD has no operational arm to enact its decisions, and it does not have the final word on its decisions (Wagner 2003: 4). Moreover, the states decided that the reporting process would be voluntary. Thus, the CSD does not have any enforcement mechanisms to hold the governments accountable and to put pressure on the countries in order to improve the national implementation. This is an important point to stress as the CSD's capacity to function efficiently depends heavily on how the truthful governments are about the actual implementation of the Agenda 21 (Maier 2000 in Agarwal et al. 2001: 216).

The 'distribution of capabilities' has also been useful to understand the effect of the North-South conflict, since this conflict has hampered the decision-making process and often lead to 'lowest common denominator' agreements. Hence, it is reasonable to believe that the CSD's accomplishments will not enhance significantly until the countries break out of the North-South schism. However, this approach has some limits concerning the coalition size influence of the Southern countries. Most likely, the Southern countries only have this kind of influence within fora such the UN, due to a widespread use of the consensus rule.

Even though the perspectives of the 'character of the problem' and the 'problem-solving capacity' provide some significant explanations, some limitations can be noted. As pointed out in Chapter 2, CSD is linked to other UN bodies and other international organizations in its work on sustainable development. Therefore, international processes and efforts by international organizations may have an effect on the accomplishments of CSD. This regards especially the CSD's relationship with UNEP, as there has been a concern about the overlapping and duplicative functions of the CSD and UNEP. The concepts of 'regime linkage (Young 1996) and 'regime interplay' (Stokke 2000) may have been relevant to include, in order to understand the impact of these effects. Moreover, I believe that domestic politics have affected the states' interests and positions at international level. Thus, I assume that such an approach could have been useful in order to understand the position of the most powerful actors and the importance of political will at national level to move the process forward. Also, 'domestic politics' could have provided a more comprehensive explanation of the narrow states' sector representation. As noted by Chasek (2002: 7), national governments are sectoral

or compartmentalized by nature, and thus, the lack of coordination between the different ministries at the national level, is most likely reflected at the international level.

Finally, I believe that my approach to the study of the CSD has some limitations regarding its positive effects. As the CSD's accomplishments have been evaluated compared to its mandate, I have not included the more widespread consequences of the CSD. Eidheim and Hofseth (2004 [interview]) noted that it is the things that happen outside the formal framework which is really important. First of all, the CSD has motivated numerous government-sponsored meetings and workshops related to the implementation of Agenda 21. Moreover, its lack of decision-making capacity may have allowed more open dialogue and greater flexibility in involving civil society organizations. The CSD has also fostered coordination on sustainable development within the UN system and galvanized NGO and major group activities and action aimed at sustainable development at the international, national, and local levels. Most important, the Commission has attracted ministers and major group to exchange ideas and information, and to share experiences and technology, and thus, been an important meeting place for the actors involved in the work of sustainable development (Chasek 2000: 393; IIED 2001: 8 in Wagner 2003: 4). Following this, even though the achievements seem modest if the CSD is evaluated compared to its mandate, in my opinion the CSD has been significant for advancing the sustainable development agenda.

Summing up, it is reasonable to say that the perspectives of the 'character of the problem' and the 'problem-solving capacity' is useful for understanding the significance of an institution such as the CSD. These perspectives also provide explanations of what might affect an institution's potential for effectiveness. Furthermore, they may be useful concerning information about how to improve the institution's potential for effectiveness. However, some limitations are noted, in which the lack of insights from 'domestic politics' is the most important.

## 7.3   Future Prospects for the CSD

The study of the CSD has shown that it has made a positive contribution to the work on sustainable development. However, some improvements are needed if it is truly going to be *the* institution for advancing the sustainable development agenda many hoped it would be. First of all, the CSD needs a more focused agenda. Thus, it should address a few priority global issue areas where no other forum has any responsibility, such as freshwater. Second, the Commission needs mechanisms to avoid further conflict between the Northern and Southern countries. As this is a longstanding conflict, it will not be an easy matter to solve. One suggestion is additional funding to support increased representation from national capitals of the developing countries, in order to limit the participation of UN diplomats at the sessions. Third, and most important, the implementation process needs to be strengthened. Therefore, the CSD should focus on capacity-building and technological improvements at national and local levels. Moreover, the national reporting should be improved. As suggested by Maier (2000 in Agarwal et al. 2001: 216), the current format of the national reporting system should be changed, 'from

the one currently conducted by governments, to one where the assessments are carried out independently and freely by qualified institutions'. Overall, political will needs to be mobilized at international, national and local levels, in order for the CSD to advance the sustainable development agenda.

These are only a few suggestions of how the CSD can be truly successful. As the CSD is still a young institution, only time will tell how it will develop in the years to come. Since I have only evaluated the achievements of the Commission during the period 1993-2001, the changes made at WSSD in 2002 have not been discussed here.[27]

## Notes

[1] The concept of 'regime' has often been criticized because of the lack of precision and vagueness. Also, the so-called consensus definition first proposed by Krasner is still contested by many scholars. For further discussion of the concept, see Levy et al. (1995: 270ff) and Hasenclever et al. (1997: 186ff).

[2] See for instance Waltz (1979) and Keohane (1984)

[3] This definition of effectiveness is not sufficiently precise to be useful as an analytical tool for systematic empirical reseach, but since my main objective in this thesis will not be effectiveness in such, I have chosen to use this definition without further clarification.

[4] 'Impact' will also refer to the set of consequences flowing from the implementation of and adjustment to a regime or an institution (Underdal 1992: 230).

[5] Effectiveness can be specified by drawing a distinction between implementation, where consequences are in the form of changes in human behavior, i.e. outcome, and the consequences that materialize as changes in the state of the biophysical environment itself, i.e. impact (Underdal 2002: 248). As studies of impact are seen as extremely difficult because of methodological problems, most work has been concerned of outcome. Therefore, effectiveness will here be understood as consequences in the form of outcome.

[6] As identified in Agenda 21, the major groups are: women, youth and children, indigenous people, nongovernmental organizations, local authorities, workers and trade unions, business and industry, scientific and technological communities, and farmers (Agarwal et al. 2001: 196).

[7] These terms are most often used in relations to more issue-specific interests, where it is possible to predict an actor's position by evaluating the actor's costs and benefits (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). However, since the CSD is not restricted to a specific issue-area, but is rather directed towards a large number of issues, these terms will be used more generally.

[8] The IACSD became the Inter-Agency Meeting on Sustainable Development in 2000 (Wagner 2003: 5).

[9] A UN reorganization changed the name of DPCSD to the Departement of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) (Wagner 2003: 5).

[10] ACC was renamed the Chief Executive Board (CEB) for Coordination in 2000 (Wagner 2003: 5).

[11] The members of IACSD are the Food and Agriculture Organization, UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, World Health Organization, World Meterological Organization, World Bank, UN Development Programme, UN Environment Programme, the International Labour Organization and International Agency for Atomic Energy.

[12] It is important to note that also UNGASS, the five-year evaluation of the CSD, will be included in the presentation because of its relevance to the decision-making process.

[13] 1992-1997 figures from DPCSD table from Yamin 1998/99. 1998-2002 figures from DPCSD table (on file with author).

[14] Notes 1-4 are from Yamin 1998/99: 58.

[15] Sources on national reports 1992-97 are from Yamin 1998/99: 58.

[16] It is important to point out that 'partnerships' is here used as a general term, and not as the concept of 'Type II partnerships' which was introduced at WSSD, and concerns voluntary agreements entered into by private and public sector entities (Wagner 2003: 17).

[17] The total number of respondents was 7.

[18] DESA (Departement of Economic and Social Affairs) is the new name of the former Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development (DPCSD) (see 3.2.2).

[19] The EU was expanded from 12 to 15 member states in 1995, and from 15 to 25 states in 2004.

[20] Only four countries have achieved the 0.7 % of GNP target for ODA: Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden (Agarwal et al. 2001: 221).

[21] The US has never accepted the UN target of 0.7 % of GNP for ODA (Brown 1998: 4)

[22] When not specified, the information is based on interviews with Chasek [2005]; Leiro [2004], Schei [2004] and Zhu and Moita-Lou [2005].

[23] Ismael Razali chaired the working group on legal and institutional issues at UNCED's PrepCom IV, when the idea of a sustainable development commission was first introduced. He was also approved as chair for the Institutions contact group, which addressed the role, functions and reporting structure of the Sustainable Development Commission at UNCED. Moreover, he chaired a special open-ended ad hoc working group of the Second Committee of UNGA, that worked out the modalities of the CSD for UNGA-47 (ENB 1992a; ENB 1992c).

[24] The information is based on interviews with Chasek [2005]; Eidheim and Hofseth [2004]; Eidheim and Hofseth [2005]; and Schei [2004].

[25] When not specified, the information is based on interviews with Chasek [2005]; Eidheim and Hofseth [2005]; Schei [2004]; and Zhu and Morita-Lou [2005].

[26] 'The Chairman's Summery' is the CSD chair's own summary of the session, which is one of the documents adopted by the Commission.

[27] The ten-year review of the CSD.

# References

## Written Sources

Agarwal, Anil et al. (2001): *Poles Apart.* New Delhi, India: Thomson Press.

Allison, Graham (1971): *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston, MA: Little and Brown

Andersen, Svein S. (1997): *Case-studier og generalisering. Forskningsstrategi og design*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.

Andresen, Steinar and Jon Birger Skjærseth (1999): 'Can International Environmental Secretariats Promote Effective Co-operation?' Presented at the United Nations University's International Conference on Synergies and Co-ordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Tokyo, Japan, July 14-16. Conference Paper.

Baune, Øyvind (1991): *Vitenskap og metode.* Seventh edition. Oslo: Falch Hurtigtrykk.

Bergesen, Helge Ole and Trond K. Botnen (1996): 'Sustainable Principles or Sustainable Institutions? The Long Way from UNCED to the Commission on Sustainable Development', *Forum for Development Studies* 1: 35-61.

Bigg, Tom and Felix Dodds (1997): 'The UN Commission on Sustainable Development', p. 15-36 in Felix Dodds (ed.): *The Way Forward. Beyond Agenda 21.* London: Earthscan.

Brown, Donald A. (1998): 'Making CSD Work', *Linkages Journal* 3 (2): 2-7.

Chasek, Pamela S. (2000): 'The UN Commission on Sustainable Development: The First Five Years', p. 378-398 in Pamela S. Chasek (ed.): *The Global Environment in the Twenty-first Century: Prospects for International Cooperation.* New York: United Nations University.

Chasek, Pamela A. (2002): 'Beyond Johannesburg: Advancing the Sustainable Development Agenda'. ECSP Report 8.

Dodds, Felix et al. (2002a): 'Post Johannesburg: The Future of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development', London: WHAT Governance Programme. Paper 9.

Dodds, Shona E. H. et al. (2002b): 'International Environmental Governance: The Question of Reform: Key Issues and Proposals'. Presented at WSSD. Johannesburg, 26 August - 4 September. UNU/IAS Report.

Easton, David (1965): *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* New York: John Wiley & Sons.

ENB (1992a): 'PrepCom Highlights', 1 (13), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1992b): 'PrepCom Highlights', 1 (24-26), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1992c): 'Institutions', 2 (5), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1993a): '47th Session of the General Assembly', 5 (1), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1993b): 'A Brief History of the CSD', 5 (2), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1993c): 'Exchange of Information on the Implementation of Agenda 21 at the National Level', 5 (4), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1993d): 'Financial Commitments, Flows and Arrangements', 5 (5), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1993e): 'Informal Negotiation Group', 5 (7), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1994a): 'A Brief Analysis of the Second Session of the CSD', 5 (25), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1994b): 'General Discussion on Progress in the Implementation of Agenda 21', 5 (16), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1995a): 'Report of the CSD Ad Hoc Working Group on Finance', 5 (28), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1995b): 'Financial Resources and Mechanisms and the Cross-Sectoral Cluster', 5 (31), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1995c): 5 (30-40), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1996a): 'Opening Plenary', 5 (47), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1996b): 'A Brief Analysis of CSD-4', 5 (57), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1996c): 'Drafting Group III', 5 (50), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1996d): 'Drafting Group III', 5 (54), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1997a): 'UNGASS Highlights', 5 (87), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1997b): 5 (70-72), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1997c): 'Opening Plenary', 5 (84), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1997d): 'Programme for Further Implementation of Agenda 21', 5 (88), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1997e): 'A Brief Analysis of the Special Session', 5 (88), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1998a): 5 (100-109), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1998b): 'Opening Statements', 5 (101), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1998c): 'CSD-6 Highlights', 5 (102), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (1999): 'Closing Plenary' and 'A Brief Analysis of CSD-7: Simon Says', 5 (132) Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (2000): 'Closing Plenary' and 'A Brief Analysis of CSD-8', 5 (157), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (2001a): 'Closing Plenary' and 'A Brief Analysis of CSD-9', 5 (183), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (2001b): 'In the Corridors', 5 (174), Winnipeg: IISD.

ENB (2002): 'Cosing Plenary', 22 (51), Winnipeg: IISD.

Haas, Peter M. (1992): 'Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination', *International Organization* 46 (1): 1-36.

Haggard, Stephen and Beth A. Simmons (1987): 'Theories of International Regimes', *International Organization* 41 (3): 491-517.

Hasenclever, Andreas et al. (1997): *Theories of International Regimes.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jacobsen, Harold K. and David A. Kay (1983): 'A Framework for Analysis', p. 1-21 in David A. Kay and Harold K. Jacobsen (eds.): *Environmental Protection. The International Dimension.* Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun & Co.

Keohane, Robert (1984): *After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Keohane, Robert O. et al. (1993): 'The Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions', p. 3-24 in Peter M. Haas et al. (eds.): *Institutions for the Earth. Sources of Effective International Enviomental Protection.* MA: MIT press.

Khor, Martin (1994): 'The Commission on Sustainable Development: Paper Tiger or Agency to Save the Earth?', p. 103-113 in Helge O. Bergesen og Georg Parmann (eds.): *Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 1994* 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

King, Gary, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba (1994): *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Krasner, Stephen D.: (1983): 'Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Rehimes as Intervening Variables', p. 1-21 in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.): *International Regimes.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Kratochwil, Friedrich and John G. Ruggie (1986): 'International Organization: a State of the Art on and Art of the State', *International Organization* 40 (4): 753-775.

Levy, Marc A. et al. (1994): 'The Study of International Regimes', IIASA, Working Paper, WP-94-113.

Levy, Marc A. et al. (1995): 'The Study of International Regimes', *European Journal of International Relations* 1 (3): 267-330.

Ling, Chee Yoke and Martin Khor (2001): 'Some Issues from a Developing Country Perspective', Penang, Malasia: Third World Network. Working Paper.

McNeill, Desmond (2000): 'The Concept of Sustainable Development', p. 10-29 in Keekok Lee and Alan Holland (eds.): *Global Sustainable Development in the 21st Century.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Rosendal, G. Kristin (1999): *Implementing International Environmental Agreements in Developing Countries: the Creation and Impact of*

*the Convention on Biological Diversity.* Oslo: University of Oslo, Institute of Political Science. PhD dissertation in Political Science.

Rosendal, G. Kristin (2000): *The Convention on Biological Diversity and Deveoping Countries.* London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Raustiala, Kal (2001): 'Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime', p. 95-117 in Urs Luterbacher and Detlef F. Sprinz (eds.): *International Relations and Global Climate Change.* MA: MIT Press.

Skjærseth, Jon Birger (1991): *Effektivitet, problem-typer og løsningskapasitet: En studie av Oslo-samarbeidets takling av dumping i Nordsjøen og Nordøstatlanteren.* Lysaker: FNI Report 009-1991.

Skodvin Hegdal, Tora (1994): ' "Structure" and "Agent" in Institutional Bargaining: Institutional Design and Political Leadership in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea', *Cooperation and Conflict* 27 (2): 1-19.

Sprinz, Detlef and Tapani Vaahtoranta (1994): 'The interest-based explanation of environmental policy', *International Organization* 48 (1): 77-105.

Stokke, Olav Schram (2000): 'Managing Straddling Stocks: The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes', *Oceans and Coastal Management* 43.

UN (1992): 'Chapter 38: International Institutional Arrangements', in Agenda 21, *www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/ agenda21chapter38.htm*, as viewed on April 20, 2005.

UN (1993a): 'Establishment of the Commission in Sustainable Development'. E/1993/207, February 12, *www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/ res/1993/eres1993-207.htm*, as viewed on March 30, 2004.

UN (1993b): 'Institutional arrangements to follow up the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development'. A/RES/47/191, 29 January, *www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/ares47-191.htm,* as viewed on 30 March 2004.

UN (1993c): 'Commission on Sustainable Development. Report on the Work of Its Organizational Session and on the Work of Its First Session'. *Economic and Social Council, Official records, Supplement No. 5.*

UN (1994): 'Commission on Sustainable Development. Report on the Second Session'. *Economic and Social Council, Official records, Supplement No. 13.*

UN (1995): 'Commission on Sustainable Development. Report on the Third Session'. *Economic and Social Council, Official records, Supplement No. 12.*

UN (1996): 'Commission on Sustainable Development. Report on the Fourth Session'. *Economic and Social Council, Official records, Supplement No. 8.*

UN (1998): 'Commission on Sustainable Development. Report on the Sixth Session'. *Economic and Social Counsil, Official Records, Supplement No. 9.*

Underdal, Arild (1990): *Negotiating Effective Solutions: The Art and Science of 'Political Engineering'*, Ch. 1, Second draft, March.

Underdal, Arild (1992): 'The Concept of Regime Effectiveness', *Cooperation and Conflict* 27 (3): 227-240.

Underdal, Arild (1998): 'Explaining Compliance and Defection: Three Models', *European Jounal of International Relations* 4 (1): 5-30.

Underdal, Arild (2002): 'One Questions, Two Answers', p. 3-45 in Edward L. Miles (ed.): *Environmental Regime Effectiveness. Confronting Theory with Evidence.* MA: MIT Press.

Wagner, Lynn M. (1999): 'Negotiations in the UN Commission on Sustainable Development: Coalitions, Processes, and Outcomes', *International Negotiation* 4: 107-131.

Wagner, Lynn M. (2003): 'A Commission Will Lead Them?: The UN Commission on Sustainable Development and UNCED Follow-Up', Prepared for delivery at the 2003 International Studies Association Annual Convention. Draft.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979): *Theory of International Politics.* London: Addison-Wesley Publications.

Wettestad, Jørgen (1999): *Designing Effective Environmental Regimes.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Yamin, Farhana (1998/99): 'The CSD Reporting Process: A Quiet Step Forward for Sustainable Development', p. 51-62 in Øystein B. Thommessen and Olav S. Stokke (eds.): *Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development 1998/99.* London: Earthscan Publications.

Yin, Robert K. (1994): *Case Study Research. Design and Methods.* London: Sage Publications. Second Edition.

Young, Oran R. (1989): *International Cooperation. Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Young, Oran R. (1991): 'Political Leadership and Regime Formation: on the Development of Institutions in International Society', *International Organization* 45 (3): 281-308.

Young, Oran R. (1996): 'International Linkages in International Society: Polar Perspectives', *Global Governance* 2 (1): 1-24.

Young, Oran R. and Marc A. Levy (1999): *The Effectiveness of Internaional Environmental Regimes*. MA: MIT Press.

Young, Oran R. and Gail Osherenko (1993): 'The Formation of Internaional Regimes: Hypotheses and Cases', p. 1-21 in Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (eds.): *Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes.* Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

## List of Interviewees

Chasek, Pamela (2005), Ph.D, Editor, Earth Negotiations Bulletin. *Interiew with the author,* New York, 11 March.

Leiro, Jostein (2004), Deputy Director General, Department for Global Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *Interview with the author,* Oslo, 1 December.

Eidheim, Idunn and Paul Hofseth (2004), Deputy Director General and Senior Advisor, Department for International Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Environment. *Interview with the author*, Oslo, 16 December.

Eidheim, Idunn and Paul Hofseth (2005), Deputy Director General and Senior Advisor, Department for International Affairs, the Norwegian Ministry of Environment. *Interview with the author,* Oslo, 16 February.

Mabhongo, Xolisa (2005), Minister Counsellor, Permanent Mission of South Africa to the UN. *Interview with the author*, New York, 9 March.

Pietracci, Frederica (2005), Division for Sustainable Development, DESA. *Interview with the author,* New York, 10 March.

Schei, Peter Johan (2004), Director, Fridtjof Nansen Institute. *Interview with the Author*, Lysaker, 25 and 26 March.

Skåre, Mari (2005), Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Norway to the UN *Interview with the author*, New York, 9 March.

Zhu, Juwang and Hiroko Morita-Lou (2005), Senior Sustainable Developent Officer, Division for Sustainable Development, DESA and Chief, National Information Analysis Unit, DESA. *Interview with the author*, New York, 7 March.