This chapter discusses China’s efforts to develop the Polar Silk Road (PSR) with an emphasis on the policy framework and relevant actors, as well as China’s polar maritime capacity, with a focus on shipbuilding. We contend that, in a period where few other available partners exist, China and Russia appear to be moving closer. However, this has not translated into accelerated PSR development. Moreover, China’s engagement in the Arctic is based on its own interests and is not solely dependent on cooperation with Russia, as indicated in its Arctic White Paper. We argue that the lack of development of the PSR is partially due to China’s preference for slow development rather than a hasty rollout given the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and US strategic competition with China. Simultaneously, the PSR is a relatively ambiguous and marginal project for the Chinese political system, in terms of its development as an international cooperation project. The PSR is, however, mentioned in policy documents, which nevertheless indicate sustained government efforts. During past Sino-Russian negotiations, the PSR was considered pivotal for Russo-Chinese cooperation, but China is currently keeping a low profile regarding the PSR and the Russian Arctic to avoid secondary sanctions from Western countries in the wake of Russia’s war in Ukraine.