Russia’s climate policy has never focused on mitigation actions because of its ‘hydrocarbon culture’ built around dependence on fossil fuel exports. Due to the accelerating global low-carbon trend, and emerging carbon costs for Russian exporting industries, climate policies of other countries appear as a threat. Even though Russia has set up domestic regulations for climate projects and a pilot regional emissions trading scheme (ETS), it remains unclear whether greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have been reduced at all. Russia plans to ‘achieve’ its 2060 carbon neutrality goal by applying a new methodology to recalculate, and as such greatly increase, estimations of the carbon absorption from its forest sinks, offsetting domestic GHG emissions. Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the Western sanctions against Russia that followed, have ruptured climate diplomacy with the West, allowing Russia’s climate obstructionism to reach new highs.

Since the beginning of the 2020s, the Russian government has stepped up its attempts to form a non-Western climate coalition, which would define ‘sovereign’ climate priorities independent of the Western agenda. A non-Western climate coalition also fits the context of a ‘multi-polar world order’ promoted by Russia and China. The Russian government sees BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as platforms for such climate cooperation. Russia is pushing for the harmonization of climate policies and carbon markets. Moscow is also keen for the more efficient use of fossil fuels to be recognised as a legitimate climate measure, in an effort to prolong the future of global fossil fuel markets. If successful, these attempts could have a detrimental impact on the global climate agenda.

Although Russia is not perceived as a climate leader by its Asian partners, Moscow has recently played a key role in formulating climate cooperation within BRICS, the SCO and the EAEU. Russia has promoted the establishment of shared carbon markets as a means to gain access, for its climate projects, to Asian emissions trading systems. Linking Asian climate regimes to Russia’s opaque climate projects could lead to carbon leakage. Further, this would reduce the competitiveness of domestic industries in Asian partner countries, which are obliged to implement genuine emissions reduction measures.

Russia’s attempts to obstruct the low-carbon trend and to set up shared carbon markets have not succeeded so far within the EAEU, the SCO or BRICS. However, some shared market infrastructure on project verification and mutual recognition of methodologies could be achievable in the future. Though unlikely, more rigorous climate practices could spread from China to Russia over time as a result of such climate cooperation. What also remains uncertain is what influence the competing objectives of the different Asian cooperation organisations, of both continuing fossil fuel use and implementing genuine climate mitigation efforts, will have on global climate governance.

Notably, Russian exporting companies continue to maintain their independent climate agendas in preparation for future carbon border adjustments. However, they are suffering from the government’s climate obstructionist approach. In order to remain relevant in the international market, companies (beyond fossil fuel producers) understand that they must demonstrate the carbon competitiveness of their products. The absence of company-level carbon caps limits companies to fragmented, voluntary-based mitigation measures. Transparency and environmental integrity-related shortcomings of the Russian carbon project system also reduce the chances of Russian companies being able to sell carbon credits outside Russia or offset carbon footprint of their export products. Overall, Russia’s climate obstructionist and fossil fuel-oriented strategies have negative consequences for both the global climate agenda and domestic (non-fossil fuel) export-oriented industries, which play a smaller yet significant role in the Russian economy.